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Human solidarity
A Thomistic Perspective

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Abstract: This is a speculative study which explores the origins and meaning of solidarity as an ontological and ethical principle in human nature, from the perspective of the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas.

The good which is proper to man is a perfection in act of the human form in each person, in conformity with the divine idea of that nature and the divine providence for his individual circumstances. As action follows being, a perfect human act is not only his own perfection as man, but a love of the good possessed by him for others who have a natural capacity to receive it. If man loves and pursues the perfection of his nature as a communicable good, he binds himself to that good as a principle of unity with his fellow men and thus participates in the communication of good by divine providence. In such communication, man acknowledges the vital distinction between person and good. His love of the common good induces that love also in others and gives rise to relationships of civic friendship. Human solidarity, in this analysis, concerns the possession and enjoyment of natural talents and material resources as goods which are intrinsically communicable and which perfect a person as imago Dei when he uses them prudently in the service of others.

Key words: Solidarity. St. Thomas Aquinas. Human Nature.

Resumen: Se trata de un estudio especulativo, que explora los orígenes y el significado de la solidaridad como un principio ético y ontológico de la naturaleza humana, desde la perspectiva de la enseñanza de Santo Tomás de Aquino.

El bien propio del hombre como tal es la perfección de la forma humana en cada persona, en conformidad con la idea divina de su naturaleza y con la providencia divina para sus circunstancias individuales. Como el actuar sigue al ser, un acto humano perfecto no es solamente su propia perfección como hombre, sino un amor del bien poseído por él para otros que tienen una capacidad natural para recibirlo. Si el hombre ama y busca la perfección de su naturaleza como un bien comunicable, él se compromete a este bien como un principio de unidad con sus semejantes y, por tanto, participa en la comunicación del bien por la providencia divina. En dicha comunicación, el hombre reconoce la distinción esencial entre la persona y el bien. Su amor por el bien común induce ese amor también en los demás y da lugar a relaciones de amistad cívica. La solidaridad humana, en este análisis, se refiere a la posesión y disfrute de los talentos naturales y de los recursos materiales como bienes que son intrínsecamente comunicables, que perfeccionan la persona como imago Dei cuando se usan con prudencia en el servicio de los demás.

Palabras clave: Solidaridad. Santo Tomás de Aquino. Naturaleza humana.
«No man is an island, entire of itself. Our lives are involved with one another, through innumerable interactions they are linked together. No one lives alone. No one sins alone. No one is saved alone. The lives of others continually spill over into mine: in what I think, say, do and achieve. And conversely, my life spills over into that of others: for better and for worse.»

The myriad ways in which we depend on one another give rise to questions concerning the nature of our responsibility for one another and its relationship with our personal good. Interdependence is often seen as a limitation—to be tolerated to the extent that it is inevitable, and perhaps for the advantages it can bring—but seldom as a dimension of the good of the human person. Does it imply a compromise between the good of the individual and that of the community? Is responsibility for others a burden which impedes us in the pursuit of our own good? Do progress and freedom lie in the direction of reducing this interdependence?

Implicit in such questions, perhaps, is the idea that the good of the person is a product of his freedom, that it may be determined by his freedom. Anything which might act as a restraint on that freedom is seen as a limitation of man’s personal good. In this perspective, our neighbour is an «other» to be tolerated or used according to rules of justice. Even human love itself, in this view, has an essentially self-centred objective. The «other» is valuable to me, because I «need» the fellowship, admiration and service of other people, because I «need» others in order to enjoy «my» good, because I cannot be happy alone. Love is seen as an exchange in which these needs are satisfied—it breaks down if one party to the «bargain» fails to meet the expectations of the other. The primary objective of political society is then a peaceful co-existence of essentially independent interests, which are nevertheless obliged by unavoidable circumstances to interact with one another. Such co-existence is indeed one of the core values of a modern liberal democracy.

Reflection on the implications of this interdependence has given rise to a Christian understanding of human solidarity, as an important characteristic of the theological anthropology on which the social doctrine of the Church is based. We read in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church that «the new relationships of interdependence between individuals and peoples, which are de facto forms of solidarity, have to be transformed into relationships tending towards genuine ethical-social solidarity. This is a moral requirement inherent within all human relationships. Solidarity is
seen therefore under two complementary aspects: that of a social principle and that of a moral virtue.» (no. 193).

A study of the sources of human anthropology inevitably encounters evidence of man’s Trinitarian origin, for man is made in God’s image.³ This theological background allows us to understand the notion of a human person in terms of his ultimate dignity –his capacity for communion with the divine persons– and thereby to make sense of the ineradicable inclination which leads him to society and fellowship with his fellow man. «The common ancestry and natural unity of the human race are the basis for a unity in grace of redeemed human persons under the headship of the New Adam in the ecclesial communion of human persons united with one another and with the uncreated Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.»⁴

The purpose of the present study is to contribute to a better understanding of human solidarity –as an emerging principle in the social doctrine of the Church– by exploring its rational foundations from the perspective of the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Although St. Thomas does not deal explicitly with the concept in its modern usage, the comprehensive range of his teaching provides us with all of the analytical tools necessary to explore the underlying issues – the ultimate meaning of the engagement of man with other men and with material creation.⁵

The subject matter involves a host of preliminary and collateral issues, which are addressed in this study only to the extent necessary to develop the central argument from the teaching of St. Thomas. The focus is on that which is distinctive in man among rational beings, as a key to interpret the particular mode of likeness of God to which he is called, and to discover the role of solidarity in this similitudo. Given the range and fundamental nature of the concepts involved, the procedure adopted is to outline –with the guidance of selected commentators– the teaching of St. Thomas on various issues (e.g. the distinction of essence and esse, the divine processions, the imago Dei in man, his participation in being) to the point necessary to reveal some conclusion which contributes to our understanding of solidarity. The integrated and interconnected nature of these topics (e.g. being and good) –and the impressive consistency of ideas in the corpus of St. Thomas– inevitably lead us to revisit some of these ideas from various perspectives in the course of the study, as similar conclusions emerge and converge towards a synthesis.

The study opens with a brief outline of the historical tensions between the notions of personal and social good, and the emergence of human work
and service of others as key ideas in the ratio of human society (I-1). The doctrinal basis for a developed understanding of solidarity is then illustrated from a selection of sources in the Magisterium (I-2). The history and evolution of the doctrine are already well documented in other studies and are not considered here in any detail. There is, however, a brief review in the Appendix of some current theological opinions on doctrinal issues which are relevant to this study.

If the underlying question in our understanding of solidarity concerns the nature of human good, the first area of study must be the origin and exemplar of that good in God. In Chapter II, therefore, we consider the distinction between the being of God and that of creatures (II-1), the notion of created subjects of being (II-2), the divine communication of good and the divine ideas (II-3), the processions of divine persons in the modes of nature, intellect and will, as the origin of the distinction of creation from God (II-4), and finally, the important distinction between person and communicable good (II-5).

From a consideration of the origin and communication of good in the divine Trinity, we then turn in Chapter III to the communication of that good in creation. Applying the notions we have considered earlier, we consider created good as a participation in the divine good (III-1) and as intrinsically communicable (III-2) and distinguish the good of creation itself—the exitus from God—from the good of its return to enjoy the fruits of communion with God (III-3).

The participation of man in the good, in the exitus of creation, is as an image of God which is destined to become a likeness, in his redivitum to God as his final end. We therefore consider in Chapter IV, the development by St. Thomas of the revealed doctrine of the imago Dei (IV-1), the perfection of the similitudo of that image in each person and in the collegium of human persons in the final judgement (IV-2).

Drawing together these elements of the analysis in Chapter V (included in the present excerpt), we consider in more detail the social dimensions of human good. We look at the common good, based on a natural inclination to a communication of good in an ordered communion of men (V-1), the relation between the good of the individual and the natural good of the species in others (V-2), the characteristics of a communicable good, as measure, species and order (V-3), and finally, the virtue of solidarity itself, based on man’s responsibility—as a principle of other men—to communicate the good (V-4).
A SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION

The history of man's creation, fall and redemption makes it evident that God's providence for mankind has both a personal and a collective dimension – God cares for each man as participating in a «whole» which in turn is part of the final end of each one. Human dignity suggests a unique value in each individual and yet it points towards a realisation of that value in friendship with others in an ordered social life. Central to this question, then, is the meaning of the individual life of a human person. It involves values which ultimately remit to the question of the personal nature of God, from whom is all personhood and love and to whom all men relate as their origin and final end.

Solidarity cannot be a fellowship in material goods alone, since of themselves such goods are diminished the more they are shared; they cannot fulfil the role of common goods, much less are they an adequate personal end for man. The teaching of the Magisterium on solidarity challenges the individualism of our age and implies a particular vision of human and supernatural good. It is important, therefore, that it be well understood. How are we to account for the proposition that the good of the person can only be realised in a «gift of self», without falling into a discredited collectivism or a naïve socialism? Why or to what extent –even in the state of original justice– should a person prefer his participation in the communicable good of a social group to his enjoyment of a «competing» private or incommunicable good, or prefer the good of one social group to that of another (e.g. of a more immediate group of which he forms part)? In what sense does the natural endowment of a person with a superior talent or gift invoke the moral responsibility of that person to use that gift in the service of others? The tension between personal and social good has been amply debated in the past, but the development of the concept of solidarity in recent decades should allow us to formulate a more satisfactory solution than the affirmation of one alternative at the expense of the other.

Human solidarity rejects the notion that the «good» is an essentially individual objective or that love of the good for others involves the limitation of personal good. If this assumption were correct –as a premise of human nature– the love of neighbour and the virtue of charity would imply a violence to that nature and even a rejection of the material world as an obstacle to the love of God. If parents and children each have an equal dignity as human persons, and yet children evidently require the personal commitment and service of their parents to achieve their good, it seems to follow that the good of the
parents—as human persons—somehow includes their commitment to care for the needs of other persons (of their own children and, by extension, of other dependents). This implies that the personal good of parents and of children alike includes the good they have in common as a family.

If we were to love such a good (e.g. membership of a family) for ourselves alone, we would be attempting to define the good in terms of our possession of it. That would be to love self as the absolute good and to seek relative goods as a means to the fulfilment of self. The self would thus be an incommunicable good, in competition—for its fulfilment—with the needs of others. When we understand, however, that the good we ultimately seek is not a finite reality but a good without limit—an eternal moment of joy which vastly exceeds our capacity to comprehend it—we can begin to understand and possess that good as a good also for others. We can distinguish, in other words, between the person that we love and the good that we love for him. We can then love the good per se and our participation in that good as an instance or realisation of the good.

The absence of limitation in the divine nature—ipsum esse—helps us to understand something of the essence of Good as diffusive. St Thomas explains that «the very nature of God is goodness, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Hence, what belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others, as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).» A person, strictly as such, is habens esse not ipsum esse. The divine Persons love, in and for one another, the perfect possession and communication of the divine nature. It is proper to the notion of a «person» to have and to enjoy (i.e. to communicate) the good and, in that sense, to be good, but not as the final end of the will. However, the good per se, as object of the will, is not loved in the abstract but always as good for a person, and it is properly loved for every person (within the apprehension of the rational will and according to a natural order of proximity) for whom it is a natural good, and not exclusively in the agent. This is true in an absolute and inimitable sense within the Blessed Trinity, but it is also true of the likeness of the divine life which the divine persons freely communicate to rational creatures.

Creation is born of the infinite knowledge (scientia) in God, which comprehends not only the divine essence in itself, but all of the possible modes of being in which the unlimited good of God can be participated by creatures, as an image participates in its exemplar. Nothing can come to be other than what is known by God—in his scientia approbationis—as a likeness of his own essence.
Every such likeness willed by God has its own perfection according to a form in which the divine essence is imitated. Whatever has being –from that very fact– has some analogous participation in the goodness of God. The highest participation of a rational creature in the goodness of God lies in an operation in accordance with his specific form.

A created person, then, is a potency to receive and enjoy (use, communicate) a participation in being according to a form or nature. The natural good proper to a human person is the perfection of his specific nature –in his operations, according to his individual circumstances– in conformity with the divine idea of that nature and the divine providence for those circumstances. His natural good is neither the divine essence itself, nor even a divine idea, but a likeness of a divine idea communicated by God to man. Although it has characteristics which are particular to each person, his natural good is a perfection of the human form which –as imago Dei– he has in common with all men.

Man’s happiness involves his capacity to know and to will, which can only be fulfilled in knowing a good which he does not define –but which defines him– and in willing that good for himself and for others of his own nature in his operation. «Practical knowledge is, first of all, the lived moral knowledge of the rationally acting agent; and only remotely it is knowledge –either reflexive or not– of first values or practical principles (major-premise level) and knowledge of suitable means (minor-premise level). Practical knowledge, properly speaking, cannot be separated from the (particular and concrete) action. A universal knowledge of the good is practical only secundum quid, as far as it is directed to the action. Otherwise it would be theoretical knowledge, no longer searching, but contemplating the good. This is a very important point: for Aquinas the intellectual (nous) knowledge of the good is not practical knowledge, because «practical» is only what relates to the action – and action relates to the means. If you are already enjoying the end, or the good, your intellectual knowledge of it is theoretical.»

The theological notion of human solidarity is grounded ultimately in the unity of God and in a corollary of that unity – that every intermediate or ‘practical’ good which moves the operation of a rational creature has its origin and end in a single unlimited and diffusive ‘theoretical’ Good. The love of neighbour to which we are inclined is not a «love» in precisely the same sense as our love of God. We love the divine essence –in each of the divine persons– as our end, our life, the origin and goal of our being. We do not love our neighbour –and we ought not to love ourselves– in any of those ways. St.
Thomas explains that we ought to love our neighbour as we love ourselves, inasmuch as we should will for him the same good that we will for ourselves. The same communicable natural good defines the true self—the perfect natural fulfilment—of every human person.

Man has a specific likeness to God in his capacity to participate in the communication of the good of his nature to others; he receives and possesses that good—in particular perfections—as a good which is intrinsically communicable, insofar as the ‘practical’ good of his operation is properly ordered to his ‘theoretical’ good. The human good is communicable because it transcends the limitations implied in the numerical individuation of human persons, to allow each one to participate in a good of the species which is common to all. It may be mediated through matter—the corporeal dimension of man—but the good itself is achieved in the unity of persons as a single principle of operation in respect of the final end of man. Loving the good for others is thus the substance of man’s operation, the perfection of his knowing and willing. This natural perfection, when elevated by grace, becomes the participation of an adopted son of God in the good of the divine nature itself.

Human solidarity concerns the role of man in the communication to others of the likeness of God proper to his nature. It is precisely in communicating this good—an operation in accordance with his human nature—that man comes to possesses the good himself. He defines his moral self and his relations with others in terms of the good, and not vice versa. It is essential to the notion of a communicable good that it retains its form—its orientation to man’s end—when it is communicated. It is for each recipient of the communication, however, to make that good his own—as a personal good—by responding to the communication and directing his own operations to that end.

Man’s stewardship of material creation, extended over time and space, is a gift and a vocation, proper to the human race as such, which engages the responsibility of individuals in every generation. It is the natural medium for the communication of the good which is proportionate to human nature—as a participation in divine providence—and is thus the occasion for man as imago Dei to acquire and exercise a greater similitudo to God in his operation. From the very fact of his composition in matter and spirit—in the providence of God—each human person is endowed with or acquires gifts, talents and resources which distinguish him from his fellow men. Natural inequalities in these aspects—and the interdependence which follows as a consequence—, far from being an obstacle to human solidarity, are the very opportunity and condition for its efficacy.
The essential bond of solidarity is the practical commitment of the agent to the common good, in his prudential choice and use of intermediate goods. An operative love of the good of human nature is the only basis for true justice, enduring concord and civic friendship in society. If, in his operations, man loves and pursues the perfection of his nature as a communicable good, he binds himself to the principle of unity and thus contributes to the solidarity of the species. His love of the common good induces that love also in others and gives rise to relationships of civic friendship, an organic order ad invicem in human society. Men are thus united in their love and commitment to a communicable good, which is at once the perfection of each one and of their life in society.

Man does not act alone in the communication of good, but is always a principle from a principle: he communicates the good to others in fidelity to, and in union with, the original and final principle of his species. He is not acting as the origin or arbiter of the good but as one who has received it and willingly transmits it to others. The exemplar of such communication can be found in the generation of the Son from the Father—a principle from a principle—and its motive force in the Love proceeding from both. As the three divine Persons act as one principle in the exitus of creation and in their providence for its perfection, the plurality of human persons—as images of God—depend upon and assist one another in their reditus to God, in their prudent use of the means to perfect their personal likeness to God. The perfection of solidarity in society is that the plurality of men—individuated numerically, but one in their origin, their natural intellectual principles and their end—act as one body or collegium in respect of the use of the perfections, temporal goods and resources given to mankind as a means to attain their common end.

Whereas the natural equality of human persons—in respect of their access to the means to the end—is safeguarded by justice, the very ratio of that equality is fulfilled in solidarity, which moves man to use those means, with diligence and prudence, for the common good. In this way, solidarity exceeds and perfects the object of justice—giving effect to the equality which it attains—and commits men to an active service of the natural common good on which a true civic friendship is based. Solidarity is thus a natural foundation in man for the grace of charity, in which the supernatural friendship of men with God is ultimately perfected.

The central thesis may be illustrated briefly in the following example. In circumstances of great need, food is to be distributed. The food itself is a
material good which is not communicable – two persons cannot eat the same piece of bread. The communicable good involved is that ‘available material resources, in circumstances of human need, be ordered to the relief of distress’. This human good is possessed or enjoyed by those who, insofar as they have available resources, act prudently to put them at the service of those in need. It is communicated and accepted as a solidary good when those who receive the material resources co-operate in their distribution and use, attending not only to their own needs but also to the needs of others for whom they are intended. This communication of the good is inspired by the virtue of solidarity – which perfects the natural inclination, as a stable commitment –, whereas the virtue of justice ensures the integrity of the communication.

The object of the virtue of solidarity, therefore, concerns the prudent use of temporal goods and human perfections in which the good of the human species is communicated. It perfects man in his love of and use of the intermediate goods of his nature by directing them also to the good of that same nature in others. It is expressed in the practical criterion that we should truly want for others the goods we want for ourselves.

We can describe the virtue of solidarity as social prudence, a perfection of the cardinal virtue of prudence which encompasses in its object the good of everyone for whom the agent (whether an individual or a multitude) is a potential principle, on the basis of a natural proximity, authority or interdependence in society. It extends also to the reciprocal virtue in those who are the beneficiaries of a communication of good, because the virtue reaches its fruition in the bonds of friendship it establishes among the members of society.

From the nature he has in common with others, man has an inclination to the truth about himself and to his good – as something received – and thus to the virtue of justice. From his individual personality he has a principle of initiative and love, by which he prudently commits his personal talents to the service of others – the virtue of solidarity. In this way, he perfects his capacity as imago Dei to know and love God and disposes himself and others to receive a participation in the divine communion as members of the human collegium, in which each person loves the others as himself and rejoices in their good as in his own. The perfection of joy in a solidary communion is that each person wills that the object of his love be loved equally by others, such that they participate together in a consortium amoris.
1. Spe salvi, 48.


3. International Theological Commission, Communion and Stewardship. Human Persons Created in the Image of God (23 July 2004): «La Civiltà Cattolica» IV (2004) 254-286, no. 6: «As the witness of Scripture, Tradition and the Magisterium makes clear, the truth that human beings are created in the image of God is at the heart of Christian revelation. This truth was recognized and its broad implications expounded by the Fathers of the Church and by the great scholastic theologians.»

4. ITC, CS, no. 65

5. Illanes, J.L., La santificación del trabajo, Ediciones Palabra, Madrid 1980, p. 175: «El hombre existe en el mundo, forma parte de un universo con el que está íntimamente unido y con cuyo destino es solidario, aunque lo transcienda. La narración del Génesis debe ser recogida en toda su fuerza y asumida como punto de partida para el estudio teológico. La visión del cosmos que nos transmite S. Tomás de Aquino constituye un buen apoyo a este respecto: lo que vertebrá la estructura de lo creado es precisamente la interconexión de las causalidades; la unidad del cosmos es una unidad de actividad.»


7. Stb III, q. 1, a. 1.

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**Abbreviations of the Thesis**

**Magisterium**

- **CCC** | Catechism of the Catholic Church
- **CA** | Centesimus Annus (On the Hundredth Anniversary of Rerum Novarum)
- **CSDC** | Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church
- **DM** | Dives in misericordia (On the Mercy of God)
- **FR** | Fides et ratio (On Faith and Reason)
- **GS** | Gaudium et spes (On the Church in the Modern World)
- **LE** | Laborem exercens (On Human Work)
- **MD** | Mulieris dignitatem (On the Dignity and Vocation of Women)
- **PDV** | Pastores dabo vobis (On the formation of priests)
- **RN** | Rerum novarum (On the Condition of Workers)
- **SRS** | Sollicitudo rei socialis (On Social Concern)
- **SP** | Summi Pontificatus

**Works of St. Thomas Aquinas**

(Latin text, unless noted as translation)

- **CTb** | Compendium of Theology (Vollert, C., trans.)
- **De 108 art.** | Responsio de 108 articulis ad magistrum Ioannem de Vercellis
- **De Caus.** | Super librum De causis expositio
- **De Ente** | De Ente et Essentia (On Being and Essence) (Miller, R.T., trans.)
- **De Malo** | Quaestiones disputatae de malo
- **De Pot.** | Quaestiones disputatae de potentia
- **De sub. sep.** | De substantiis separatis
- **De Ver.** | Quaestiones disputatae de veritate
- **De Ver. (I)** | The Disputed Questions on Truth: Vol. I (Mulligan, R.W., trans.)
- **De Ver. (III)** | The Disputed Questions on Truth: Vol. III (Schmidt, R.W., trans.)
- **De Vir.** | Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus
Div. Nom. In librum B. Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio
Div. Nom. (Mar.) In librum Beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio (Marietti)
In Polit. (cont.) Continuatio S. Thomae in Politicam (lib. III a lect. VII)
In Polit. Comentario a la Política de Aristóteles (Mallea, A., trans.)
Quodlib. II* Quodlibet II*
* [similarly: III, IV, VIII, XI]

ScG
Latin: Summa contra Gentiles
English: Of God and His Creatures. An Annotated Translation (with Some Abridgement) of the Summa contra Gentiles of Saint Thomas Aquinas (Ricaby, J., trans.)

ScG (Prim.) Primae redactiones Summae contra Gentiles

ScG III-1 Summa contra Gentiles Book Three. Providence Part I (Bourke, V.J., trans.)

ScG III-2 Summa contra Gentiles Book Three. Providence Part II (Bourke, V.J., trans.)


Sent. I* Scriptum super Sententias I*
* [similarly: II, III, IV]

Sent. De anima Sentencia libri De anima
Sent. Eth. Sentientia libri Ethicorum
Sent. Polit. Sententia libri Politicorum

STh I* Latin: Summa theologiae
– Prima Pars
– Prima Secundae
– Secunda Secundae
– Tertia pars

English: Summa theologiae I* (Benziger Bros. English Dominican Fathers, trans.)
* [similarly: I-II, II-II, III, Suppl.]

Super Eph. Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Ephesios lectura
Super Ioan. Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura
Symb. Expositio in Symbolum Apostolorum. Reportatio Reginaldi de Piperno
Human solidarity

COMMUNITY
ORIGIN & END

Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram et subicite eam (Gen. 1:28)

1. The Common Good

The common good is an important and complex topic in its own right and one that exceeds the scope of the present study. We have seen that the creation of man is for the sake of an operation–by which he can merit beatitude–and that his operation is the communication of good, as a secondary cause in the providence of God for men. Our interest in this chapter therefore is to understand human perfections, talents and resources as communicable goods, such that in the use of perfections which are his own good, man serves the same good in others. We consider the good from the point of view of the prudent solicitude of the solidary person, who wills that his own good be loved equally by others as a truly common good.

Good is the only object of love—it is related to love either as the cause of love or as caused by it. In creatures, love is caused by good, but God’s love is the cause of a likeness of good in creatures. The love of God for the divine good itself—the subsistence of persons in the divine essence—is the only divine ‘motive’ for the communication of a likeness of that good to creatures. «The last end is not the communication of goodness, but the divine goodness itself, for love of which God wills to communicate it.» God does not act in creation to attain the good—as though moved by an appetite to possess something he lacked–but in order to freely communicate to creatures a participation in the
good which he already possesses as his perfection, and which is already perfectly communicated in the divine essence. He acts, not from an appetite for an end desired, but for love of the end possessed. This communication of a good possessed follows from the perfection of love of the good—it is its operation, fruition or «use»—just as the action itself of a perfect agent follows from the perfection of its being.

The notion of the communication of good by God, however, is not that of a simple emanation from a source, like rays of light from a sun, but of a circular motion—an exitus which is for the sake of a reditus. The source of good is both the origin and end of all being. Whatever «emanates» from that source in creation is not «cast out», as it were, from the source, but is created ad extra in order that it may return, moved by its own intellect and will, to enjoy the fullness of good in God. The exitus is a created participation in being, whereas the reditus is the perfection or use of that participation. The «good» communicated in the exitus is the primary good of participation in being in accordance with a species, whereas, in the reditus, it refers to the secondary perfection of that participation, as the final end of the creature. That secondary perfection is achieved in its operation—in accordance with its nature—and in its participation in the communication of good to others. «It is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself.» Thus, every creature has a natural inclination to the good—to the perfection of its own nature and of that nature in others—as the basis for its participation in the order of creatures ad invicem and ultimately in the universal order in creation to God.

A good is common to several persons insofar the same good can, at least potentially, be the object of the will of each member of the group—it must come within the compass of his personal good in some form. A personal good may be considered absolutely (i.e. union with God, as man’s final end) or relatively (the intermediate goods which lead to the attainment of the final end). Man’s ultimate goal does not comprise the exclusive possession of some private property, but the creaturely perfection of a personal communion with the divine persons and with every other person who attains the same end. At the level of the absolute good, at least, we can envisage an ultimate point of convergence of the Good, in which it literally makes no sense to distinguish personal and common good. The personal good of each one will comprise his participation in the communion of the blessed with the divine persons.
God perfects created persons by giving them an active share—each in accordance with his mode of being—in his providence for creation. A created person is *good*, therefore, insofar as he *has* being in accordance with a form—his primary perfection—and *communicates* with other persons, divine and human, in that form by means of his operation—his secondary perfection.¹⁴

This interpersonal communication takes place on three levels. The highest level—the final good and the perfection of participation—is the contemplation of the divine Persons, a participation in the divine communion itself by means of a grace added to the created nature. Every created person, thus elevated by grace, is a potential or actual communicant in this ultimate good, unless he has wilfully excluded himself from communion.

Given that ultimate point of convergence of good in the Trinity (which is the object of charity), the question then arises whether, in relation to the relative goods which are intermediate goals of man’s action, there is some earlier point of convergence, such that we can speak of a true *common* good of human nature as such. The ultimate Good is common in a sense to the whole of creation, and in particular to angels and men, as free agents endowed with intelligence and will. This common good does not suffice, however, to distinguish human solidarity from supernatural charity. A commitment to this latter common good unites all of God’s personal creatures—by supernatural grace—but does not of itself entail a particular natural relationship among a subset of those creatures. The «common good» which is the object of the commitment of solidarity is a universal natural good—a mode of likeness to the divine essence—which is specific to human persons as such. This common good is not merely an intermediate good—a vehicle, as it were, which carries its passengers to their destination but which no longer serves a function at the end of the journey—but an intrinsic part of the mode of participation of human persons *as such* in the ultimate Good.

The second level, therefore, is a communication in the good of the nature or species of the person. Angels communicate in their intellectual nature with each other and with men at this level. Human persons have, in addition, a communication in a *common* species with a single material origin. Men communicate with each other in the human form—as their principle of operation—and in the temporal goods which serve the good of their nature. The good which is proportionate to the human species is not restricted to the individual good—man’s social nature comprehends the notion of a *common* good of the community of men. «Now the common good is always more lovable to the
individual than his private good, even as the good of the whole is more lovable to the part, than the latter’s own partial good.”

Operations of knowing and loving, which have God as their ultimate object, are not sufficient of themselves to account for inter-personal solidarity –if it were otherwise, we should have to explain the absence of an equivalent natural solidarity among the angels, or of angels with men. The angelic ministrations of knowledge and love in respect of other creatures are a fruition and enjoyment of their beatitude. The operations of man in statu viae, however, are part of the very process by which he achieves that beatitude. In each case, the created person is participating in the providence of God for others –as an image of God– but that providence is directed to angels as the fruition of perfection in their natures, whereas it is directed to man (and, in him, to material creation) to accomplish the perfection of his nature.

The root of the distinction lies in the composition in man of body and soul. Men already communicate in a specific common good, while yet in statu viae, because the individuation of human persons is not by a distinction of nature –as is the case with angels– but by the disposition of a common nature (a single mode of participation in being) to inform signate matter, which derives from Adam as head and primogenitor of the human race.

To have a good in common can properly be said of a community or «college» of persons, each of whom is capable of deliberative action in pursuit of a goal or end which transcends the immediate and the particular. A common good is properly an indivisible and communicable good, not merely an aggregate of private or material goods which are necessarily diminished the more they are shared. If material goods constituted the substance or goal of the common good, the concept would imply a compromise or negation of the individual good and thus a real conflict of interest.

We should also discount the idea that a common good could properly be the good of an impersonal entity, such as a collectivity or subsisting «whole.» If such were the case, it would not in fact be truly a common good, communicable to the members of the community (nor would it be a good at all, in the sense of an object of a personal will). The idea that a good or value is communicable to many persons also implies that the more widely it is diffused, the more it perfects each one who participates in it. A common good is therefore the good of each one of the members of a community –not just of a majority– considered in their relationship with each other.
The potential perfection of the human species far exceeds the capacity of any individual. It is achieved gradually and in a limited measure in each individual, and ultimately and perfectly in the *collegium* of the human race at the end of time. Nevertheless, that perfection is the natural good of every man—the good to which he has a natural inclination and towards which he progresses in communion with others.

The human species is a mode of being in which the divine essence is imitated by created persons; the more perfectly *human* a person is, the more like to God. The person attains a measure of human perfection insofar as he knows and wills the good of the human species, for himself and for others, and dedicates his actions to that end. Communication is fundamental to this perfection, because it is through knowledge and love that man knows himself and in some way makes his own the form of other men—and thus extends the perfection of his own participation in the common nature—while at the same time being a cause of good in others and fostering unity among those with whom he is in communion. This unique intra-species communication of good—the unity of the *collegium* of all men, which reaches its *apoteosis* in the final judgement—is the subject matter of human solidarity. It serves as a school of love—which prepares men to participate in the divine communion—but it also forms a central part of the ordered unity of the created universe, in which the relationship of the human species to the material world, on the one hand, and to the myriad species of angels on the other, will manifest the absolute goodness and glory of God.¹⁷

The third level of communication follows from the second. It comprises the communication of good between human persons in contingent human communities, in which the *form* and the good of the group are integrated with the good of the person. A community or *economy* of persons is defined by the good which persons have in common, in which they *communicate*. There is a hierarchy of good—and thus of communities—reaching from the limited good of the corporeal appetites of a single individual to the ultimate perfection of all men in beatitude—and, within those communities, an order of proximity, insofar as one person is in some way a cause of the good of another. This third level can be sub-divided into communities which are natural to the human species as to their kind—but subject to choice as to their realisation in the individual—and those which are simply discretionary. The former—the family, the political community—involve a communication in goods which are *necessary* to man, whereas the latter—a business enterprise, an international organisa-
tion—involve a communication in goods which are *useful* or *fitting* to man as a means to his perfection.

That which naturally presents itself to the will as good depends on the extent to which the individual intellect comprehends the good of others. Thus there is a certain friendship among those related by consanguinity, those with a common interest or enterprise, those forming a political community and an unqualified love among those who love God as their final end. \(^{18}\) «Now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or intellect; the more universal the aspect of the apprehended good, the more universal the good to which the will tends... Now the good of the whole universe is that which is apprehended by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of all things: hence whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of the common good; this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the whole universe. On the other hand, the apprehension of a creature, according to its nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to that nature.» \(^{21}\)

In any intermediate community of persons, the good in which they communicate—their «common good»—is a more perfect goal of personal action than the participation of an individual in the same good, or in the good of a lower community, *provided* the common good itself is well ordered to the final end of man. For the purposes of that common good, each individual is related to the community as a part to a whole, and to other individuals as part to part.

The *likeness* of the human person to the divine essence is found in his relationship to the good of the communities in which he participates, again *provided* that good is ordered to the final end of man. The more complete his communication of the good he possesses, the more perfectly he imitates God, and is thus assimilated to the divine essence. In the divine exemplar, the three persons communicate perfectly in the absolute good—they know and will that good for each other and for themselves in a single act. A human person who communicates in the good of his family, loves that good for himself and for each member of that family. Likewise, a virtuous citizen communicates with others in the good of his country and wants that good for each of his fellow citizens as he wants it for himself.

Members of a partial community—which is well ordered in respect of the perfect community—should love preferentially those with whom they communicate, in respect of those matters which they have in common, \(^ {22}\) but not otherwise. \(^ {23}\) The distinction can be seen in an example used by St. Thomas concerning the actions of soldiers in a battle. The help given by one soldier to
a colleague should be given to him not «*tanquam privatae personae*» but for the sake of the common good —«*sicut totam rempublicam iuvans.*»\(^{24}\) If the soldier in question had to choose between helping one —in which the common good would be better served— and another, with whom he has a proximity of origin or consanguinity, he should choose the former because of the existential priority of the *relevant* common good.

These tertiary communities are ordered among themselves to the good of man in accordance with reason, known to man through the natural law. The generic good of each community is some aspect of the virtuous life of its members. Participation in such communities is therefore a part of the perfection of man. He is *more perfectly* a human person when he integrates the good of an intermediate community —family, Church— with his own good and dedicates his talents and goods to that end, than when he seeks his individual good alone. The integration of a common good with the personal good implies that —in matters within the ambit of the group— the good of the group is willed by the agent for every member of the group, including self. In consequence, a personal action in favour of the common good contemplates the benefit of all, in accordance with a rational order of proximity to the agent. Likewise, the benefits received by the agent from participation in the group are reciprocated by a willing co-operation in the common good —otherwise, his participation degenerates into a seeking of the good of the group for himself alone.

At each end of this spectrum of communication, therefore, we find an alternative paradigm of personal good. That good may either be sought (a) as something fitting (*conveniens*) to the nature of the person —whether in general or as a member of a particular group— and therefore as something communicable to all who share that nature or participate in that group, or (b) as something favouring his individuality, and therefore as something essentially *incommunicable*. The first approach is directed towards the *consonantia* of persons in the divine essence, a unity of distinct persons in an ordered love. It is characterised by an absence of limitation and is thus assimilated to the *esse* of God. The alternative paradigm tends towards the individual —one of a vast multitude of mutually indifferent or hostile persons— closed in on self and inclined to others only insofar as they are a means to that individual good. This latter tendency is rooted in matter as the principle of individuation and the mode of being which is most remote from the divine essence.
1.1. The natural inclination to good

Human dignity—and thus moral value—are impressed on the human person—like a coin which bears the seal of the King—with an impression that is not erased by sin. That impression is a certain vocational instinct—an impulse of love—that moves man freely to his end, in accordance with the nature he has received. This natural love is also part of the ratio of the unity of created persons, in that all are called from one origin, by means of a received impression, to the same end. The necessity of the moral value of the person per se flows from his being created in the image and to the likeness of God, who alone is absolutely necessary. Its imperative force comes from the will of God, who directly creates each human person for that end and redeems man in a gift of grace.

Moral behaviour is a free response to the love of God, a reception of the gift of God whereby he creates us. The norm of love (cfr. Mk 12:29-31) reflects the dual order proper to man’s condition as a created person, having a nature in common with others—love of God as the origin and end of one’s nature and love of others as equal in that origin and end. The love of one divine person for another is the same love with which he loves himself and us. The analogous love for one another in human persons is to love the good that one has received, as a good which can also be communicated in some measure to others. The realisation of that common good in each person is the end to which Christ, as man, dedicated himself on earth—«This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you.» (Jn 15:12).

The apprehension of the created likeness of God inspires a natural love of the good—as the perfection of nature—leading to God as the final end of man. «There is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.» The inclination to know the truth about God is proper to man as imago Dei, as are the inclinations to live in society, to communicate good to dependents and to love those on whom one depends. Those inclinations come from the habit of synderesis—a natural knowledge and love of self in one’s origin and end, the apprehension of one’s nature—but synderesis does not perfect the likeness of God in man until it is...
expressed in the virtuous use of that nature in accordance with those inclinations.\(^{38}\)

The basic dynamism and potential of human solidarity can be found, therefore, in the natural love of every human being for others of his own species\(^{39}\) –its realisation, however, requires personal virtue. The natural disposition is based on the fellowship of men in the ontological good received from God –it is a natural inclination to the good of human nature in oneself and in others, prior to reflection or choice. «As natural knowledge is always true, so is natural love well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than the inclination implanted in nature by its Author.»\(^{40}\) This natural intellectual love –found both in men and in angels– is an ontological «instinct» by which created persons are turned towards God as their final end, by means of intelligible good.

In man, however, natural love is not merely generic –as between angels who are each unique in species– but has a further dimension, that of a specific likeness. One man naturally loves another because they ‘communicate’, each finds in the other a likeness to his own good.\(^{41}\) «Now, it is natural to all men to love each other. The mark of this is the fact that a man, by some natural prompting, comes to the aid of any man in need, even if he does not know him. For instance, he may call him back from the wrong road, help him up from a fall, and other actions like that: ‘as if every man were naturally the familiar and friend of every man’.\(^{42}\)

The human good itself is the natural object of the will, not per se the fact that the good is possessed by one or another.\(^{43}\) The human will is a faculty proper, not to the individual principle, but to the nature which is common in man. The will naturally desires that good in self, as its own perfection, and –insofar as it possesses the good– desires to communicate it to others.\(^{44}\) Natural love of others derives from love of one’s own species as the cause of one’s being, which in turn derives from love of God as the First Cause.\(^{45}\) «For this reason [a creature] tends to its own good, because it tends to the divine likeness and not conversely. Hence it is clear that all things desire the divine likeness as an ultimate end.»\(^{46}\)

St. Thomas points to communication in natural goods as the starting point of all social intercourse –the koinònia, the common possession or community, posited by Aristotle\(^{47}\)– and of man’s communion with God, in knowledge and love.\(^{48}\) Natural love is the seed of a communion among men, such that man –in the expression preferred by St. Thomas– is an animal sociale.\(^{49}\)
That economy, in turn, is a medium or environment in which the rational nature of man is perfected by a growth in virtue. «To say that man is a political animal, or even better a social animal, is not to designate in him the simple animal tendency toward a more or less gregarious instinct, but rather the capacity for virtuous development necessary for life in society.» Although life in common with others is of the greatest utility to man, man would naturally live in society even if he had no need of the practical benefits that attach to social life.

Living together in a virtuous society is not the end of man, but is for the sake of that end. The ultimate common good of human nature is to contemplate God. That contemplation is not simply an abstract ontological concept—it implies a real communication, a mutual indwelling, of divine and created persons in knowledge and love. The final beatitude of man is a communion with the divine persons, with angels and men in «the ordered society of those who enjoy the vision of God.» But even in this life, the highest human operation—the fruition, or putting into act, of a perfected mode of being—requires the society of others.

Man is in the image of God precisely in that in which he has most in common with his neighbour—there is a greater community of good between man and his neighbour than between man’s soul and his own body. Nevertheless, man is also in God’s image in respect of his corporeal nature—even more akin to the image of God than an angel—sofar as man proceeds from man, as God from God, and the soul of man informs a material body, as God sustains the whole of creation. Human generation establishes relations between human persons—whereby the parents are co-principles of their children—in which man is especially likened to God, «sic magis convenit cum homine.»

Man’s relationship with material creation is as though a representation in microcosm of the creative power of God. The material dimensions of this human good are expressed in Genesis, in the divine mandate to increase and multiply—«crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram»—and in man’s role of stewardship in material creation—«subicite eam et dominamini piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli et universis animantibus, quae moventur super terram» (Gen. 1:28). The good to which man is thus directed is a good of his species, not something determined by what might suit the particular interests of the individual as such.

Man is led to a love of others of his species by a natural love, because the ultimate good of the human species is an indivisible good in which he partici-
pates in common with others, insofar as he perfects himself in his relations with them.61 Love of others draws man out of himself to be one with them and to seek their good as he seeks his own.62 «A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): ‘On behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things’.»63 When he has a good –a gift, talent, perfection or power– he wills that others would also participate in that good, that it would serve their final end as it serves his.64 This natural capacity in man for mutual help is a participation in the providence of God for the perfection of man –a specifically human mode of imitation of the divine essence, by which man grows in the likeness of God.65

The good on account of which man loves his neighbour with a natural love is the good of his being simpliciter –his nature and dignity as imago Dei which he shares with the neighbour and all men– whereas the good which the lover wills for the beloved is that he may grow in likeness to God through an increase in virtue. Whereas a virtuous man is accidentally more loveable –as having a greater likeness to God– the primary reason on account of which one man should love and respect the fundamental dignity of others is not dependent on the personal virtues –real or apparent– of the others. Intrinsic human dignity is the basis for the social intercourse on which human solidarity is based.

1.2. Ordered communion

The divine Trinity is not a communion of distinct natures, but an ordered communion of distinct persons in one nature. An order of nature in the Trinity, as we have seen,66 arises from the fact that the immanent procession in the mode of will presupposes the processions in the mode of nature and intellect.67 The circulatio of creation68 reaches its perfection in the intentional order, in the knowledge and love of the creature for each person of the Trinity. When a created person turns towards God and responds to His gift of self, a similitudo of the self of God «returns» to Him in the moral life of the person in grace.69

The created person has a primary or ontological goodness in what he has received in his nature –the exitus– and a secondary or moral goodness insofar as the perfection of that gift is realised in him –the reitus. «The good
is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the
good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he
is good, by reason of his perfect virtue.»

If there is a likeness in man to God, therefore, it is not only by a comparison of natures. Man’s highest likeness to
God consists in an operation, which follows on his nature, as the act of a person.
«As God’s substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect
of some operation. Wherefore, happiness or bliss by which man is made most
perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an
operation.»

While man’s nature is intrinsic to the imago Dei, it is qua person
–living in a communion with other persons in a common nature, ordered to
God– that the specific likeness of man’s nature to God is attained. The perfec-
tion of his communion in God, in fact, involves operations which transcend
human nature, but which are nevertheless the operations of a human person,
aided by infused grace.

This communion of created persons with God is not a unity of essence,
but a consonantia amoris, or a union of persons in love. The perfection of char-
ity in the divine essence overflows in the analogous participation of created
persons in that communion –the Father knows each created person in the
Son and, with the Son, loves him in the Spirit. Every created person is thus
related to each of the divine persons, as he subsists in his proper mode in the
divine essence and as indwelling the other divine persons.

Although the analogous notion of «person» is of a distinct subject, habens esse, divine persons are radically different from creatures in the sense in
which they «have» being and thus in their relationship with good. The divine
persons are distinguished by a relation of origin, not by a delimitation of be-
ing, whereas creatures have a finite mode of being qua likeness, which is from
–and towards– another.

Just as the Spirit is the nexus of the communion of the divine persons, his
«convocation» of created persons to union with God also establishes a fellow-
ship (consociatio) among them which is the objective ratio of their social love.
This unity of rational creatures –of each within himself, with others in the
same order, and with God as their common principle– is a participation in
the ineffable unity and simplicity of the peace of God, which he communicates
to creatures in his likeness, as an overflow of the divine unity. It is devolved
by God to those closest to him, such that they in turn become a cause of unity
in the lower orders of rational being, leading them to God as their first cause
and ultimate end.
The importance and radical nature of this personal communion among men is underlined by the comparison St. Thomas makes with the union of soul and body. Although our body is nearer to our soul than to our neighbour, as regards the composition of our own nature, as regards participation in beatitude, our neighbour's soul is more closely associated with our own soul, than even our own body is. Thus, it is in keeping with natural law for one person to expose himself to a danger to his bodily health—but not to his spiritual health—in order to protect the bodily or spiritual health of others. «Maiorem hac dilectionem nemo habet, ut animam suam quis ponat pro amicis suis» (Jn 15:13). A man’s soul participates in beatitude directly, his body by way of overflow.

His life in common with other men is therefore the context in which man, aided by grace, realises his natural vocation in a communication of self. «Now a man attains perfection in the corporeal life in two ways: first, in regard to his own person; secondly, in regard to the whole community of the society in which he lives, for man is by nature a social animal.» This communication follows from the natural interdependence of human persons, because men thereby help one another and depend on one another for what they lack. The intrinsic order of the human community—following the divine exemplar—implies that a communication of self is not only a giving but also a receiving of good and that the good is only truly received when it in turn is communicated.

Just as the nature itself of each person has its exemplar in the mind of God, so the communication of a perfection of that nature to others is a participation in God’s providence for the use and perfection of that nature in each person. «In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end, which is the divine goodness. This good of order existing in things created, is itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behoves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence.»

The love of neighbour in this communication is propter seipsam, but the ratio of that love is necessarily bound up with the common destiny of men as imago Dei. Man cannot truly be loved by another as a means, or for the sake of a private end apart from God, even if that private end is one he has chosen for himself. The love of neighbour is ordered to the love of God, which in turn is
the reason for loving one’s neighbour. «The reason for loving is indicated in the word «neighbour», because the reason why we ought to love others out of charity is because they are nigh to us, both as to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity for glory.»

Although the love of others for their own sakes is incompatible with an evaluation of those others in relation to exclusively private ends, it does not preclude an accidental distinction of persons, based on circumstance, provided it be in relation to the common good. Just as it is praiseworthy for a citizen to endanger his own life for the protection of others, it is also reasonable to distinguish persons –for relevant purposes– on the basis of their relation to the common good and to the final end of man.

1.3. Prudence and justice

The procession of the Son in the mode of nature and of intellect is the ratio and exemplar of the disposition of the likeness of God in creation, especially insofar as that likeness proceeds as person –that is, a specific likeness as \textit{imago Dei}, a created principle from the divine principle. The procession of the Spirit in the mode of will and love is the \textit{ratio} and exemplar of the reciprocal love –\textit{conformitas}– between the created person, as image of God, and his creator, in which his likeness is perfected in the reception and use of the gift and by which he can ultimately possess God. It is also the exemplar of virtuous communication, leading towards solidarity –\textit{consonantia}– between created persons. «God is the cause of things by His intellect and will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his craft. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will.»

God establishes a \textit{communion} of human persons, as a likeness of the divine \textit{consonantia} (a) by communicating a divine idea as a common nature to be perfected in man –together with the ideas of the individuals of that species– and (b) through his loving providence for each man, moving him towards the perfection of that likeness.

The first mode of communication, by which each man is \textit{imago Dei}, follows the \textit{ratio} of the first immanent procession –the \textit{generatio} in the mode of
intellect and nature\textsuperscript{93}– of the Word as the perfect Image of the Father. From this mode, all men have a common nature and common first principles of human intellecction.\textsuperscript{94} These common principles and common end are the foundation of justice and truth –as eternal law– in human affairs. However, the free will of the individual is not fixed by his nature on any particular means to the last end, but seeks that end in every choice.\textsuperscript{95} Men have an inclination to the love of God, as apprehended by their nature, but in such a way that the human will is not determined to a good which is not its ultimate Good.\textsuperscript{96} Natural principles guide human acts to their end, but they do not supply the role of practical reason of the agent in commanding personal operations.\textsuperscript{97}

The second mode –by which each man is moved towards a \textit{similitudo Dei}– follows the \textit{ratio} of the second immanent procession, the \textit{spiratio} in the mode of will of the Spirit as the mutual Love of the Father and Son.\textsuperscript{98} A \textit{willingness} to communicate follows from a love of the natural good of the person, which in turn leads to a \textit{solidarity} among persons having a common nature. This is the sphere of love and providence\textsuperscript{99} –from this mode, the \textit{similitudo} of the \textit{imago Dei} is perfected in each man.\textsuperscript{100}

There is thus both a good of will (prudence) and a good of nature (justice) in the rational creature. Concord among men requires a right use of reason and a good will, informed by the corresponding virtues –prudence, as to the selection and use of the means, and justice as to the participation of each person in those means. «Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only \textit{what} a man does, but also \textit{how} he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things; namely, the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue [justice] which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence.»\textsuperscript{101}

Man communicates in the mode of will, therefore, in freely choosing the good for self and others, in acts of service by which he uses well the goods communicated to him by God. In order to actually \textit{communicate} the good, however, he must respect the equal causality of others and love the good for
the other in the same manner –that is, as a free rational person and with an order of proximity– as he loves it for himself. The capacity to communicate and the willingness to exercise that capacity are the constitutive elements in a communion of created persons.

Justice, in its widest sense –as applicable analogously to God and to man– is a measure of equality in relations between persons. Insofar as the persons who give and receive are considered on an equal basis, justice lies in a quantitative or at least a proportionate equality in the material or moral goods given and received, whereas if the persons who give and receive are not considered as equal (e.g. whole to part), then justice lies in a proportionate equality in the goods received by each part according to its position or merit in the whole.

The underlying focus in justice, therefore, is the participation of persons in the good –or in the means to the good– so far as that is affected by the action or communication of one person with respect of another. It does not determine the use or application of the means to attain the end, but it ensures that, in personal communication, each person has or retains the appropriate means –inter alia, a proportionate share in the use of material goods and of the inferior species which are ordered by divine Wisdom to the benefit of the human species. More generally, since a good operation requires a due perfection of nature, whatever concerns the realisation of a necessary perfection in man is something due to the person –and therefore protected by justice in mutual relations– whereas his use of that perfection is his own participation in the good.

«The order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii, 4) ‘We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it’.»

St. Thomas compares creation to the design, construction and maintenance of a house –the work of divine production and disposition– whereas the use or habitation of the house is compared to the order of the whole to its final end, by the divine work of providence. The operations of man are thus a participation in divine providence –in the use of creation, or the habitation of the house. The first requirement in such operations is that they respect and preserve the disposition of nature received from God –man is a tenant or steward in the house, he does not have authority to remodel it. Since this disposition of nature is provided by God for the sake of the end, the respect
due by man in his operations to the principles of natural law is also part of this ‘vertical’ order of creation to its end.

The principles of justice in mutual relations are a part of this vertical order, but they do not suffice to ensure that man’s operations attain that end. The complete rectitude of an act involves three truths—in doctrine, of life and of justice. «Justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated according to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of justice differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life a man lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man observes the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to another man.»

The veritas vitae—by which «a man lives aright in himself»—requires that his love and use of his perfections, talents and temporal goods be well ordered to his end. As we have already seen in various ways, a true love of those goods in himself necessarily involves that he have regard also to their potential to contribute to the good in others. Rectitude in the use of these means is the domain of prudence, understood as a responsible participation in the providence of God for men.

St. Thomas teaches that the principal mean or measure of virtue in a human communication is either (a) in respect of the person to whom the communication is made—in so far as something is presented to him as a matter of justice—in which case equality is the measure, or (b) in respect of the person making the communication, in so far as he gives something of his own or of himself—whether in material goods, in truth, affection or friendship—to the other, in which case his own good is its measure. The good of the human species is served in each case, but the good of the species is properly communicated when the agent acts, not from a debt of justice, or even of gratitude, but to foster the good of others. In this latter case, he communicates a love for the common good and in consequence a will that his participation in that good also serve that good in others.

Relationships of justice are not sufficient to attain the good of human society, because the bond that distinguishes a perfect society is not simply the avoidance of harm or the restoration of the status quo—a pact of non-interference, compensation and retribution—but a real reciprocation of communication in the good. «It is not enough for peace and concord to be preserved among men by precepts of justice, unless there be a further consolidation of mutual love. Justice provides for men to the extent that one shall not get in the way of another, but not to the extent of one helping another in his need.
One may happen to need another’s aid in cases in which none is bound to him by any debt of justice, or where the person so bound does not render any aid. Thus there came to be need of an additional precept of mutual love amongst men, so that one should aid another even beyond his obligations in justice.»

Whereas justice maintains equality in relations between persons in respect of their access to the means, another virtue is needed to give effect to the ratio and implications of that equality of access, by positively seeking to use those means for the common good. The point of this virtue—which we can identify as solidarity—is that, precisely because men are equal, the good sought by the agent, in his use of the means, is a good to be loved also for others who come within the scope of his actions.

1.3.1. Civil and paternal government

In a short treatise known as De Regimine paterno, St. Thomas illustrates another aspect of the relationship and distinction between justice and solidarity. He draws a distinction between the care or government of others typified by the rule of the king and that typified by a father. «The father has care of the child, not only in his relations with other men, as the king has care of him, but also in his individual concerns, as has been shown above of God. And this with good reason, for a parent is like God in giving natural origin to a human being. Hence divine and paternal government extend to the individual, not merely as a member of society, but as a person subsisting in his own nature by himself.»

The government of the community, represented by the king, necessarily attends to that which is common to men—their specific natures—in their relations with one another, but not per se to their individual natures or to singular matters. A father, on the other hand, is concerned with fostering the individual good of his child, a good which he naturally identifies with his own. In this, he participates in the providence and government of God who fosters the good of the species, not only as a multitude, but also in each individual.

The participation by man in the government of others by God is mediated through external signs, by which some persons become external secondary principles of the perfections of others and in that way are bonded to them as cause to effect. «Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that «God turns all things to Himself because He is the cause of all»: for the effect must needs always be directed to the end of the
agent. Now it is evident that a benefactor, as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural order requires that he who has received a favour should, by repaying the favour, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And, as stated above with regard to a father, a man owes his benefactor, as such, honour and reverence, since the latter stands to him in the relation of principle; but accidentally he owes him assistance or support, if he need it.»

This natural bond between cause and effect is strengthened by every communication of good—as final end—from one person to another. It is this potential for social bonding that is at the heart of human solidarity.

1.3.2. The order ad invicem

The ontological unity of the principle of good in all men is reflected in their natural inclinations to the same good—inclinations which are proper to their nature, not to their individuality or free will per se. This unity of principle implies that the actions of the multitude should be referred to their common human nature in all that has to do with the principles of operation and the end to be attained, whereas the application of those principles to the means to be used in individual circumstances—within the parameters of that nature—is moved by the virtue of prudence in each participant.

Beyond the notion of justice among fundamentally equal persons in society, the perfection of the human species also requires an organic unity of persons in respect of all of those accidental dimensions of human life in which men are unequal. Following the Dionysian notion of a concretio of human persons in a common good, St. Thomas notes that the order ad invicem among men in a virtuous community has three characteristic relationships—superior to inferior, equal to equal and inferior to superior—understanding each of these in the context of the underlying equality of the persons concerned. «According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), «love moves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relationship; it turns the inferior to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the superior to watch over the inferior» and in this respect beneficence is an effect of love. Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to honour Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love, to bestow good things on us.» It is this network of relationships, based on a common love for the good, that constitutes the organic unity—the solidarity—of the community and allows it—in each of its members—to reach its end.
From the primary relationship of equality and these three categories of contingent causality, St. Thomas –again following Dionysius– derives a total of four categories of persons whom an agent may love in respect of the good: (a) he loves himself, as participating in the good (b) he loves his cause—in which he participates—as principle of his good (c) he loves his effect—which participates in him—as a fruition of his good, and (d) he loves his like, as communicating with him in attaining his good, which neither attains alone. These relationships can also be understood as four ways in which we love our own good—as in self, as found in one’s like, as a part loves the whole, and as the whole loves its parts. Thus, the parents in a family are in a position of superiority (and thus of responsibility) with respect to their children. Each parent with respect to the other and each child with respect to the other is in a position of equality (and thus of co-operation). Finally, each child is in a position of inferiority (and thus of docility) with respect to its parents.

The direct relation of each created person to God and his fellowship with others, who also enjoy that direct relation, establish the *duplex consonantia* proper to human nature. «Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God.» The ‘vertical’ order of human persons to God—in common with all of creation—and the ‘horizontal’ order of persons *ad invicem* are not independent sets of relations, but two dimensions or principles of every human relation. Thus, the ‘vertical’ order is the source of relations of justice among fundamentally equal human persons. Given that each one is called to the same end, *propter seipsam*, he should treat others (in the horizontal order) as his equals and companions, never as a means to his own end.

There could not be a natural order among parts, however, if they were all identical—nor could one identical part communicate its good to another. The ‘horizontal’ order, therefore, is based on interdependence and distinction—and thus ‘inequality’—between the members of an organic community, as a part of its perfection as a whole. This order *ad invicem* is a good for each one, just as the distinction of functions and the health of a body are necessary for each of its members. It is not just a relation of parts to a whole, however, but a *dynamic* order—an inclination and movement toward a common end and a co-operation of parts for the sake of that end. The horizontal order presupposes the vertical order—it is *because* human persons are essen-
tially equal and free that they can co-operate with each other in respect of accidental differences.

There is thus an important distinction—as between the vertical and horizontal dimensions—in the concept of «order» and in the related notion of something *due*. The human person—who is *propter seipsam*—is not ordered to other created persons (or to a collectivity) as a means to their end. He is, however, ordered to God as his own end, as part of the perfection of the likeness of God in the universe,¹⁴¹ and—for the sake of his participation in that order—he is also related as an equal to other persons in a common nature.

The horizontal order is thus infused with a vertical dimension. Some persons represent, on a contingent basis, aspects of the vertical dimension in the lives of others—for example, in the rule of law, or as the origin of life—and a relation of order, based on government, paternity etc., is thereby established. The relation of a child to its parents does not alter their mutual equality as persons, but it adds a vertical dimension between them, which is part of the horizontal order *ad invicem* of the human race. There is also a horizontal order between the parents of the child, who have jointly undertaken the responsibility of founding a family. Their mutual decision and co-operation—an exercise of human freedom—is of a kind which is distinctive of the horizontal order *per se*. That order is based on the free and responsible use of human talents and resources, for the perfection of the individuals concerned, in the context of a fitting contribution to the development of the human community.

The general responsibility to use one’s talents and resources for the good of others is something «due» to God as the author of those gifts and thus to the human community for whose benefit they are intended by God’s providence.¹⁴² To this extent, it is part of the vertical dimension of the duplex consonantia. The particular exercise of that responsibility, however, is not *per se* determined by nature or by justice—which tend to one thing—but is a matter of personal freedom and prudent judgement, in which contingent needs and variable circumstances are evaluated by each person. It is in the exercise of this freedom—especially in the whole field of human work and creativity—that man directs himself to God and to others in love and service.

The responsible use of freedom in human work and in the use of material resources—subject to the requirements and parameters of the vertical order—are thus a perfection and communication of self in the service of others. This is the essence of the horizontal «order» of men *ad invicem*—it has the character of order and love of God insofar as it is for the sake of man’s vertical order to his
end, and it has the character of love of neighbour insofar as it is a prudential use of the available means to that end for self and for others.

1.3.3. Civic friendship

The perfection of human communication in society—sometimes described as civic friendship—requires in the members of that society an operative love of the good per se and thus of its realisation in others. Such communication necessarily presupposes relationships of justice, because one cannot love the good per se if one wilfully deprives another—to whom it is due—of the possibility to attain or enjoy that good.\textsuperscript{143} The use by an agent of the temporal goods and human perfections in his possession will be perfect—and will communicate that good—insofar as he has regard, not only to what is due to another in justice, but also to the human perfection that can be induced in others by his use or application of those goods and resources.

Civic friendship can be understood as a set of relationships in which the good is communicated, not according to the measure of equality, but according to some measure of love of the same good for all.\textsuperscript{144} This communication is a rational love, a work of reason and thus of prudence.

In the measure of friendship, one’s intensity of love for another depends on his proximity to oneself, whereas the perfection of the good which one loves for him depends on his proximity to the good. «Now the order of nature is such that every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on the things which are nearest to it (...) therefore we ought to be most beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.»\textsuperscript{145} Again, those who are closer to God are loved that they would have a greater good than those further away, while those closer to the lover are also loved more intensely than those further away.

Civic friendship, therefore, is not a casual union based on personal likes or dislikes, but a union based on the reciprocated love of a natural good—an ethical love—which each one loves for others as his equals in relation to their common end.\textsuperscript{146} Solidarity can be regarded as the operative bond in this civic friendship, because it is a practical love for the common good—and thus a prudent choice of the means—, which leads each one to act in the interest of others, as he does in his own interest.\textsuperscript{147} It is not a vague goodwill or aspiration, but the diligent use of the goods and perfections already possessed as means to a common end. That diligence gives rise to the personal relationships which
are the matter of civic friendship. «Both justice and friendship, therefore, deal with the same reality, that is human communication, so that where there is justice there is a possibility of friendship. (...) And this must mean that the perfection of human societal communication is not justice, but friendship. This conclusion, therefore, shows that the philosophy of friendship and love is at the root of society; that is, it is the goal of any real human life in the city.»

The relationship between solidarity and civic friendship may also be understood by analogy with the relationship between Christian apostolate and supernatural charity. The essence of the apostolic love of another is to want for him the same supernatural good –union with Christ– that one desires for oneself and already possesses in some measure in grace. In fact, one cannot truly love or attain one’s own union with Christ other than in his Church –and by means of his sacraments– in the fellowship of those called to the same supernatural end. That fellowship in supernatural goods is a friendship based on charity. The analogue in human society is a fellowship in human good based on natural love, which leads to civic friendship. Just as the life of the Church requires an apostolic spirit in its members –the use of the grace possessed– so the good of human society requires a solidary spirit –by which each person wants for the other the human good he wants for himself and, insofar as he possesses that good, communicates it to others. Again, as justice in the Church safeguards the access of the members of the Church to the means to salvation, but is not sufficient to ensure the adequate application of those means, so justice in human society safeguards the access of the members of society to the means to the natural end of man but is not sufficient to ensure the adequate application of those means.

Solidarity presupposes and perfects the role of justice in respect of the means to attain the common good and, as such, binds the members of society to that common good in a true civic friendship. However, that bond is not simply a sense of gratitude for a material favour received, nor is it an altruistic spirit in respect of the distribution of material goods. Such attitudes would be compatible with a love of the other as useful to one’s own possession of the good. Solidarity goes further –it requires an ethical love of the good per se.

1.4. The Good of Others

The communication by God of a participation in esse, as a likeness of the divine essence, is received in the creature as a good, such that the creature also has a disposition to communicate its own nature. Following Diony-
St. Thomas teaches that it is of the very ratio of being –considered as good– that whatever possesses good, naturally wills to communicate its likeness. «Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things tend. (...) For the creature is assimilated to God in two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good.» The good is not communicated by creatures as esse, however, but under its ratio as final cause, because creatures only communicate in forms, whereas God alone communicates a participation in ipsum esse –which is his own «form» or essence.

To communicate a good –as final end– to another is proper to one who possesses that good as a perfection of his own nature. Understanding a good quality as a perfection of nature implies an awareness that the same good is also a potential perfection in others of the same nature, to whom it might be effectively communicated. To have a true perfection, therefore, implies a certain responsibility –before God as author of the perfection, to self as having the perfection and vis-à-vis others who lack that perfection– to communicate the perfection so far as possible. This individual responsibility is all the greater according as the perfection is more necessary, the possibility of communicating more real and the alternatives less suited to the task.

The nature of this responsibility is that of a man who is a principle of other men. The notion of a principle is of a person who possesses the good of other persons in a virtual manner in his own perfection and who, for love of that good itself, wills to communicate it to others, as being potentially one with him in the good. The proper object of the will is the good per se –its use and enjoyment– not merely its individual possession, but it cannot be used or enjoyed unless possessed. «Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love’s object. Now the proper object of love is the good; because, love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the thing beloved, and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper cause of love.» If man qua person is not the good itself –«No one is good but God alone» (Mk. 10:18)– then that perfection which is a good in him is potentially a good also in others who have a
like nature and capacity. He loves those who are one with him in nature because of their capacity to communicate in that good with him.\textsuperscript{162}

To love the good in this way implies a relation to the source from whom one has received the good\textsuperscript{163} –a created principle possesses and enjoys the good as a nature which he has received from another, as something to be further communicated by him. A good which can be loved in this way is a \textit{communicable} good –not something material, which diminishes when shared. It is a good that perfects a supposit as its \textit{end}, in accordance with its nature, whether as something desired, or as already possessed and enjoyed.\textsuperscript{164}

1.4.1. Man as principle of men

God, in his wisdom, provided for the perfection of \textit{all} men by communicating perfections to some so that they would be the \textit{principles} of those perfections in others. «Since God created things not only for their own existence, but also that they might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in their perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now man can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the body, but also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others.»\textsuperscript{165}

God has impressed in man’s intellect a natural inclination to the good,\textsuperscript{166} that allows him to apprehend the good in himself and in others,\textsuperscript{167} as parents naturally apprehend their own good in their children, and a virtuous citizen is prepared to suffer personal loss for the good of the city.\textsuperscript{168} «First, because man is naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many, as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. (...) Secondly, if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 \textit{Pt}. 4:10, «As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another.» Wherefore Augustine says (\textit{De Civ. Dei} xix, 14): «Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of counsel»: and (\textit{De Civ. Dei} xix, 15): ‘The natural order of things requires this; and thus did God make man’.\textsuperscript{169}

God also endows each person with particular gifts and talents –which he has not given directly to others– and from each one he invites a proportion-
ate response,¹⁷⁰ which should also be characterised by prudence. «It was he who created man in the beginning, and he left him in the power of his own counsel.» (Sir. 15:14). At the level of nature, for example, he has provided that human beings would participate, freely and responsibly, in the generation of new human life. Parents are also the immediate principles of their children as regards what that they need for their nurture and development.

The relationship of human persons whereby one can be, in some way, a principle of good in another is the basis and ratio of the order ad invicem among individuals in the human species and, as such, a participation in the providence of God for his creatures.¹⁷¹ This participation implies that the secondary principle—one human person with respect to another—is himself a higher participant than the other in the good which he communicates.¹⁷² «God employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.»¹⁷³ Just as God, the primary principle, virtually contains the whole good of every creature, man, as a secondary principle and image of God, virtually contains some aspect of the good of others, insofar as he has a perfection and the capacity and opportunity to communicate it.¹⁷⁴

A human person is not a principle of good in others in respect of the final end itself, because the final end is not possessed by creatures in statu viae. The goods in respect of which men communicate—as secondary and contingent principles¹⁷⁵—are always intermediate goods, means to the end. By ordering his judgement and choice of the means to the final end of man, with prudence and justice, the agent communicates his rectitude with respect to the final end for himself and for others.¹⁷⁶ He communicates to others his love of the common good for them and thereby induces in them a love for the same good.¹⁷⁷ This practical love of a common good is the essence of the consortium amoris which is the goal of solidarity.

God first gave the plenitude of all necessary human perfections to Adam, in his capacity as the principle of the whole of human nature. He is the principle of all men as regards the generation of the body, their instruction and government—all of which relate to man’s role in the material universe, as the context in which to communicate the good. «The first man was established by God in such a manner as to have knowledge of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know.»¹⁷⁸
Not content, however, to have received every natural good, Adam succumbed to the temptation to arrogate to himself the very origin of that good. «When you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil» (Gen 3:5). In this he failed the essential test of an image of God—to acknowledge self as an image, not to conceive self as the origin and end. Adam already possessed and enjoyed the fullness of the good proper to man in statu viae, it remained only for him to use that perfection in the manner in which it had been given to him—as a communicable good. As a principle from a principle, that which he had received was something intrinsically communicable to others. Inasmuch as he was an image, by acting accordingly he would have led others to the divine exemplar. The role of principle is thus an intrinsic part of the vocation of man as imago Dei—a likeness to God is effective as such insofar as man, by his operation, leads others to God by communicating the good as final end—but he must first acknowledge that he in turn is also a likeness proceeding from a principle. The role of principle from a principle entrusted to Adam was derived from its divine exemplar in the Son—the true Image of God—by whom all things were made.

The material world—through man’s natural relationship with it in the composition of his soul with his body—is the means given to human persons to communicate perfections of good to one another. Whereas God creates ex nihilo, man can cause the becoming of things, and even of forms, in likeness to God. As the works of God are perfect, man—as a steward of God—should also seek a perfection in his work. A perfection in work, however, depends on a perfection of form as the principle of operation.

Man has his being and his form from another and he acts in that form. The perfection of his form, therefore, comes from his solidarity with the principle of that form—with God as his primary principle and with the human community as the proximate principle of his being and development. To act as one with other persons means to communicate in matter—which, of itself, distinguishes but does not divide—such that all men act as though one in their common form. This is to act with others as one principle in regard to the use of matter, in the stewardship of creation.

Man, therefore, is not a sole principle in the communication of good—just as he receives from a plurality, he communicates with and to a plurality of persons. The human vocation is a single responsibility to be fulfilled by a multitude of persons, acting as one, each contributing according to his means. As the three divine persons, as one principle, communicate good to man, he in
turn co-operates with others as one principle in the secondary communication of that good. Man therefore lives and works in a consonantia with others –being given «a helper fit for him» (cfr. Gen. 2:18) implies an order ad invicem in a common task– in achieving his personal perfection in the communication of good, as a steward of material creation. This consonantia requires a practical coordination among men, which in turn requires the exercise of prudence and thus the virtue of solidarity. The unity of men as one principle of operation in the world is thus a specific likeness in man to the consonantia amoris of the divine persons.

1.4.2. Participation in providence

As the exitus of creatures from God is in accordance with the plurality of species in his creative design, so their reitus is governed by his providence. His universal government of creation imparts to every creature a certain impulse –whether natural or voluntary– towards the good. Some things are moved necessarily and others contingently –in either case the effect is provided for by God. If a particular cause should fail to attain its effect, that failure is nevertheless due to some other particular cause, which also acts under divine government. Thus even the disorder of sin –because it is rectified by divine justice– does not impede the accomplishment of the divine will.

Among the higher creatures, the closest to God are those that exist, live, and understand in the likeness of God. The perfection of divine providence is shown in this –that higher creatures also participate in the government of the lower, in accordance with the nature of each. In his goodness, God gives them the power not only to be principles in respect of other things, but also to have the same manner of communicating good as he himself has –that is, according to the judgement of their will, and not according to any necessity of their nature.

The communication of good through external acts of instruction, government, inspiration and example is thus a part of the self-providence willed for the human species by God. This secondary providence in man, however, comes under the care of divine providence, such that –for those who love God– all things work together for the good. Nor is that communication in vain –it does not follow from the infallibility of God’s universal providence that the secondary providence of creatures is deprived of its efficacy. On the
contrary, divine providence moves one person to provide for another in such a way that both can be perfected thereby.\textsuperscript{196}

While each person –created for beatitude– is provided with the natural and supernatural means he needs to attain his end, from the fact that a rational creature can only attain beatitude in grace, by the exercise of a free will\textsuperscript{197} –and that he is created as such by God– it follows that God’s providence countenances that some rational creatures will choose to reject beatitude.\textsuperscript{198} God’s antecedent will for the beatitude of all rational creatures is not thereby frustrated\textsuperscript{199} –rather it is that, having created them with a free will and given them sufficient means, God respects their misuse of that faculty for the sake of the greater glory and beatitude of those who use it well to gain eternal life. Thus if one person falls, St. Thomas teaches that another is given his place\textsuperscript{200} –and even his merits\textsuperscript{201}– to complete the number of the elect\textsuperscript{202} and thus to achieve the perfection of the universe.\textsuperscript{203} «Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution.»\textsuperscript{204}

From the very fact of created freedom, therefore, it is evident that there is a real distinction between the subsistence of a created person and the good to which he is called. If the beatitude of each rational creature were a necessary good, God could not –without contradiction– create in him a free or contingent will with respect to the attainment of that good. Yet a rational creature cannot merit the good other than by the free operation of his intellectual faculties, aided by grace.\textsuperscript{205}

In consequence, the good of a particular created person cannot be an absolute property of his individual nature, but something which is participated by him as a person.\textsuperscript{206} In exercising the role of principle with respect to others, therefore, man communicates a good of which he is neither the author nor the arbiter, but which he discerns as a fitting means to attain the common human good.\textsuperscript{207}

1.4.3. Man’s other self

A true communication of good requires, in the principle, an identification between his good and that of the recipient. «By the fact that anyone loves
another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own.»

Love of the good in self –as one’s own perfection– is the paradigm in which one’s love of the other participates, because the perfection of one’s own nature is the proper object of the will of the person. «You shall love your neighbour as yourself» (Mt 22:39b). The other is loved as being one with self in that nature, because it is proper to the perfect possession of good to enjoy the company of others who share the good. This is clearly seen in the immanent divine love and in the love of God for creatures –the good that is loved by God for the creature is God himself, as God also loves himself.

However, there is this difference between the love of one created person for another in the same nature and the love of the divine persons for one another: a created person needs to communicate that good with another like to him in nature in order to enjoy a perfection of that nature (nullius boni sine socio est io-cunda possessio), whereas –as we have seen– a divine person communicates with others because he enjoys a perfection of his nature.

One who already has a perfection of nature does not love the other as someone from whom he desires to receive that perfection, but as one with whom he communicates in that same perfection, either in act or in potency. The love of the principle for the one who receives from him, therefore, is properly a love of friendship or a ‘paternal’ love, whereas the love of the one who receives from the principle is initially a love of concupiscence, a desire for his own good. According as the recipient becomes more like his principle in the communicated good, however, his love also tends towards true friendship.

Our natural experience provides –in the relationships between parents and children– a striking example of this notion of identification. Parents see the good of their children –especially when they are very young– as simply identified with or included in their own, whereas children initially look to their parents as the sole providers of all their needs. It requires a certain maturity in the child to begin to love its parents with a true love of friendship. «Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him.» The love of a principle for what proceeds from him is stronger...
than that of like for like, because whatever proceeds from another is in some way part of the other, whereas that which is equal does not have a potency to be part of another. These natural family relationships educate us in the fundamental reality of human sociability—we are not self-contained or atomised individuals, but persons who realise their human nature in communion with others.

The essence of the notion of *identification* is that every perfection of human nature—in its constitution or operation—is a perfection of being, which in principle is a good for all those who share the same nature and who thus have the same capacity for the good. The power of parents to participate in the generation of human life is a transmission of a perfection of human nature in its constitution, and the power of a teacher to educate a pupil is a transmission of a perfection of that nature in its operation. Other «goods» and perfections, which are not *per se* communicable, pertain only to an individual, either because of their materiality—such as food and other temporal goods—or from the individuality of the human soul and the individual graces it receives from God. However, insofar as these goods and perfections also lead the individual to his final end, they also serve the common good and contribute to the communication of good to others.

One who truly *has* a perfection, therefore, sees the good of others of his own nature—who lack that perfection—as virtually included in his own perfection, insofar as he can communicate that perfection to them in some way.216 His love for his own perfection—*qua* good—is the basis for a *natural love* for the same good in others, with whom he wills to communicate it.217 Where this good is present in the other *in potential* and not in act, he desires the perfection of that potential in the other, as though it were his own perfection.218 That which is loved in the other—*qua* person—is not the imperfection or perfection of his nature as such, but his very capacity to receive perfection and thus to participate in and communicate the good.

This mode of relationship with others can lead to the highest form of friendship, because it does not regard the qualities of the beloved for what they can give to the lover, but considers the needs of the beloved and what the lover can do for him. If that love is reciprocated by the recipient—in a *redamatio*, a response in love—a true friendship results.219 The «equality» on which this friendship is based is simply that between *persons* as such—because of their *capacity* for good—while prescinding from their actual merits or perfections of nature. The ultimate instance of this *identification* is the friendship
and mercy of the divine persons, in their absolute good, for created persons—capax Dei—in their absolute poverty of being and good. This relationship of creature to Creator is the exemplar of identification—of willing the good of another as one with one’s own—but a likeness of this identification is also found among creatures, insofar as one rational creature is, actually or potentially, a principle of good for another.

The objective capacity of a created person to include others in this way within the scope of his personal good depends of the perfection of the person—in the first instance in respect of his nature, but ultimately in relation to ipsum esse, in which all limitations disappear. Man, in the original integrity of his nature, had a capacity to identify with the good of others of his species with a natural love, as part of the providence of God for the communication of good among men. «Now what is one with a thing, is that thing itself: consequently everything loves what is one with itself. (...) What is generically or specifically one with another, is one according to nature. And so everything loves another which is one with it in species, with a natural affection (dilectione naturali), in so far as it loves its own species.» This natural love, however, was based on man’s natural love of God as the first cause of all—which love was perverted by original sin. Man nevertheless retains a natural inclination—as a first principle of natural law—to communicate the good with others and in particular with those who are closer to him, but he needs an acquired virtue to love their good as his own, even imperfectly, and the assistance of grace to love it in a perfect way.

Man’s willingness to love his good as potentially realised in others is the test of the quality of his love for the good itself. If his love is limited to that aspect of the good which is individuated in his person, his love is not for the good per se, but for his individual possession of that good. «Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not.» Identification, as a quality of love, means that it is truly the good itself that is loved, such that it includes not only one’s own perfection of nature but also the perfection of others, as virtually contained in that good. Thus a teacher loves not only the perfection of his nature represented by his command of the science of his discipline, but also its potential to inform others—which leads him to desire the communication of that knowledge to his students for the sake of their perfection. Identification is based on a relationship of «superior» to «inferior» in respect of the good in question—the relationship is absolute as between Creator and creature, but it is relative and contingent between creatures. If the role of the superior in the
relationship is to provide for the inferior as for self, the role of the inferior is to accept that providence with gratitude and docility. 228 These relationships are based on the natural love of interdependent human persons for their common nature. 229

1.4.4. Communication in matter

We have already discussed the two factors which configure intermediate goods as the immediate end of the operation of man 230 –his rational nature, which he has in common with all men; and primary matter, the underlying subject of every material form in creation. 231 Matter is the basis for continuity and unity in the generation and development of the corporeal element in the composition of each human person and in the whole human race. Human souls –and thus the intellectual principles of human nature– are numerically multiplied within the same species, because of the individuation and unibilitas of the human soul in composition with a material body. 232 The soul is the principle of that which is common to men, in their operation and end, whereas the body is the medium through which individual men communicate the good.

A human agent communicates to others the external signs of his intellect –his conceptions of truth– and of his will –his dispositions towards apprehended goods. 233 This material mediation involves an intrinsic individuation of the good –a distinction between my good and your good– and it also implies that a true communication is not perfactive as good unless it is actively received and accepted as such. The communication of a perfection from one man to another is not like the communication of good from God, or even from an angelic source. One man cannot directly perfect the spiritual form in another –he can provide the means, offer advice, inspiration and instruction– but the appropriation of the good depends on the free will of the recipient. This communication is received by another insofar as he forms intelligible concepts of these signs, understands them as true, wills them as good and in turn communicates them to others.

Evidently, not all possible human perfections are of equal weight or necessity, nor is every speech a true enlightenment of another. 234 Man should love his neighbour in what concerns the truth about his final end and in the use of the means that are ordered to that end. 235 The communication of self therefore requires discernment and prudence in each party to the communication. If the conceptions communicated are false, or the agent’s will in their
regard is defective, the communication is either erroneous or malicious. Such a communication may be «authentic» in the sense that it communicates a «self» that is in error –and it may be effective, if that error is shared by the recipient– but it would not properly be a communication of self.

The communication of self among rational creatures is possible only insofar as it accords with what they have in common. Whereas an error may be made common, the nature of the self of a rational agent is not determined or defined by that error. An erroneous «self» is not communicable qua self because neither the cause nor the effect has a nature that corresponds in reality to the signs communicated. The human value of inter-personal communication depends, therefore, on the adequacy of the conceptions of truth and on the suitability of the temporal goods which are communicated, from the point of view of the image of God in man.

The perfection of the possession of a resource or temporal good by a person is in its operation or use,236 as the perfection of the construction of a house is in its habitation.237 God orders temporal goods to a created person, not as though the person were the end, but in order to lead the person to his end in God.238 Thus, the prudent use of temporal goods, in accordance with the final end of man, perfects an agent in relation to his end239 and the external effect of his rational operation is a diffusion of good –as final end240– to other persons within his range of communication.

It is natural to man, considered as part of his species, to have and to use material resources, but to have this particular resource, here and now, does not belong per se to his specific nature but to his individual nature. «There are two ways in which something is said to be natural to a man; one is according to his specific nature (ex natura speciei), the other according to his individual nature (ex natura individui). And, since each thing derives its species from its form, and its individuation from matter, and, again, since man’s form is his rational soul, while his matter is his body, whatever belongs to him in respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of his individual nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his body, considered as part of his species, is to be referred, in a way, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular soul.»241

Every human person, therefore, has both an individual principle and a common principle –the individual principle is from matter and concerns the
engagement of the human race with the material universe in the overall order and perfection of the universe. The inequality of human persons comes from this distinction as regards individual principles, not from their human natures per se. Accidental inequalities are for the sake of the communication of good, in an organic unity of men. God willed, therefore, that man would thus attain a specific similitude of the divine essence, while \textit{in statu viae}, participating in and imitating the divine communication of good in providence. That participation involves \textit{working} –using one’s talents and resources– for the good of others as for one’s own, as God himself provides for the good of his creatures.

1.4.5. The role of natural law

The first inductive principles of the intellect and the natural inclination of the human will to its natural good,\textsuperscript{242} –whereby man has «a natural inclination to its proper act and end»\textsuperscript{243}– are a participation in the eternal law, by means of \textit{natural law}.\textsuperscript{244} The natural love of God –as part of the order of original justice– was destroyed by sin,\textsuperscript{245} but as a natural inclination to virtue –\textit{synderesis}– it remains a part of human nature, weakened but not destroyed by sin.\textsuperscript{246} «\textit{Synderesis} is said to be the law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of human actions.»\textsuperscript{247} A human act is the product of a practical syllogism, in which intellect and will evaluate practical circumstances according to these general principles and values.\textsuperscript{248}

The whole thrust of divine providence –as known in the natural law– is that the rational creature may \textit{do} and \textit{prosecute} the ‘practical’ good which is within his nature, so as ultimately to enjoy the ‘theoretical’ good which perfects and transcends his nature. «This is the first precept of law, that ‘good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided’.»\textsuperscript{249} To be a principle of good in others is to participate in this divine providence in the highest sense, but that participation can only be effective insofar as it is active. A person, moved by love of a good (e.g. knowledge, justice) which is a perfection of his nature, who neglects or acts against that perfection in others, wills his own \textit{possession} of a ‘practical’ good and not the good of his nature \textit{per se}. As we have seen, a love of the good in others is part of the image of God in man –it is proper to a rational creature that its intellectual appetite or inclination be for the good \textit{per se} and not merely for its own good (as animals also act by natural instinct for the good of the species, as part of the order of the universe).
The natural first principles and values are common to the human species—every human act is, in its genesis, solidary. «Although actions are of individuals, yet their first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing.» Differences arise in (a) the attachment of the will to different goods as pertaining to the end, and (b) in the derivation of singular and contingent conclusions from universal and necessary principles. These differences are a consequence of the freedom which is essential to the moral perfection of man—it is by his intelligent co-ordination and resolution of such differences in society that man perfects himself in his relations with others and in his rectitude with regard to the good itself of his species.

It requires a particular virtue, therefore, to apply the natural inclination effectively to the practical service of the good in others. «As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue.»

1.4.6. Human freedom

The communication of good is contingent for its effectiveness on the freedom of the parties to the communication. The first and final cause of a created person is external to him, but it acts in him in such a way that the person is free—he is his own cause—in respect of his response. That freedom is essential to the perfection communicated to him by his Creator—without it, man would not be an image of God as a rational being but as one moved by natural principles alone.

A human community is founded on a common interest or inclination—in the case of a natural community, this is the role of the natural inclinations—which provides the basic dynamism to move it towards an objective which is simultaneously personal and social. Each member of the community moves himself freely towards that end—the natural inclinations are not an external «violence» but, as it were, a «gravitational force» in his own nature—but he also requires certain habits or virtues to achieve that objective.

The rectitude of the will entails a disposition to love the good to which the person is directed by the first cause and to love the truth about the end—the good as final cause, as apprehended by the intellect. Every act of reason
and will in man is based on that which is in him according to his nature: every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally and every act of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. The intelligible truth about the good, therefore, is found in the first instance in the natural inclinations, which act as first principles of order to the end. In order to attain his end, the agent ought to measure his action with reference to those general principles.

Human reason, however, does not have a full participation in the divine government—it has a finite and imperfect participation, according its own mode. The apprehension of a creature, according to its nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to that nature. Although the intellect is disposed to adhere to a truth once perceived, the will can accept or reject a posited truth about the good, unless the good in question is perceived as absolute. Just as, on the part of the speculative reason, man has a knowledge of certain general principles, but not a proper knowledge of each single truth, so too, on the part of the practical reason, he has a natural participation in the eternal law, according to certain general principles—the habit of synderesis—but not as regards the particular determinations of individual cases. To achieve a virtuous human act, in addition to a rectitude of will man also needs the counsel and command of prudence—moved by synderesis—to produce the «practical syllogism» which causes the human act.

We have noted, however, that the end towards which man is moved by his natural inclinations is both personal and social and that he moves himself in freedom—as his own cause—in respect of the determination of particular human acts in accordance with common principles. If, then, every man is his own cause, one man—as an individual—cannot also be the cause of another, in this sense, without depriving him of his essential dignity as a rational being. On the other hand, the common good of a community cannot be attained without exercising some form of causality in respect of others and such causality necessarily involves judgements of practical reason about the good. Honest prudential judgements—based on the natural inclinations—may differ from one person to another, even if everyone in the community is formally united in a will for the good of the community. If prudence were the only virtue by which we could ascertain the means to the end, how could legitimate differences be resolved without infringing the dignity of the members of the community?

We can distinguish two distinct components in a human act: the specification of the proposed act (intellect) and the decision whether or not to act
The final causality of the good can therefore be considered under these two aspects—one, the universality of the good that is apprehended by the reason, and the other, the free response of the will to that good. Of these two, the universal good is inherently objective and social, whereas the response of the will is subjective and personal.

The common good moves the agent through the specification of his act, which is apprehended by his intellect—in the form of principles or teaching—as the good of the community of which he forms part. His practical reason therefore judges the possible good to be done, taking into account not only the internally generated conclusions from natural first principles—a subjective participation in the eternal law—but also the relevant external principles, rules or laws presented to the intellect as requirements of the common good. This is the function of study, investigation, informed discussion and reasoned debate in human affairs. «Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in so far as they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true: but they are the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are the object of the appetitive power, that is, considered as good.»

The freedom of the rational agent lies in his will, in his choice to act or not to act in favour of the specified good. The will of the agent is not determined by the apprehension of a particular good—it can always prefer an alternative, or decide not to act—unless the good in question is perceived as absolute. Human dignity does not require that the intellect of the agent be free from influence or that his reason be the source of the good which it apprehends—on the contrary, the intellect seeks a universal truth—but that the will of the individual be free from violence (a force contrary to its nature) in choosing an apprehended good.

1.4.7. A concord of wills

The communication of good as something received implies that it is not simply at the discretion of its immediate principle—not every operation of man is per se a communication of good, even if in his own estimation it appears to attain some good. The notion of solidarity requires that the communication of good should respect the objective origin and end of human good.

Man participates in the communication of good, not as an inert or irrational instrument, but as a person endowed with intelligence and free will. His role as principle for other men is secondary, but nevertheless real—he imitates
the wisdom of God in having a measure of self-government and exercising personal judgement in his operation. The providence of God—the communication of good from the first principle—takes account of this secondary communication. The quality of man’s discernment—as a principle of others—with regard to the means to be used will depend on (a) his having a formal rectitude of will with regard to the good itself, recognising it as something beyond self and common to others, and willing it accordingly, and (b) the perfection or material rectitude of his understanding and will as regards the relationship of a particular good to the common good and the scope of those included in that common good.

A human will is good and in accordance with reason whenever it wills something which is naturally known as good and as directed to the natural end of man. «The will tends to its object, according as it is proposed by the reason. Now a thing may be considered in various ways by the reason, so as to appear good from one point of view, and not good from another point of view. And therefore if a man’s will wills a thing to be, according as it appears to be good, his will is good: and the will of another man, who wills that thing not to be, according as it appears evil, is also good.»

Because of the limitations of the human intellect and the contingency of material circumstances, the natural inclination is not sufficient—even in original justice—to produce a uniform conclusion, such that men would necessarily agree on the means to be employed to achieve a common good. «Now a thing may happen to be good under a particular aspect, and yet not good under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as stated above. And therefore it comes to pass that a certain will is good from willing something considered under a particular aspect, which thing God wills not, under a universal aspect, and vice versa. And hence too it is, that various wills of various men can be good in respect of opposite things, for as much as, under various aspects, they wish a particular thing to be or not to be.» This potential for discord in regard to the common good means that it is not enough that each man orders his own powers and uses material things in accordance with reason, but that there be due order and some form of government in the use of temporal goods in society.

Concord in society and moral rectitude in man’s personal actions require not only that he obey the ordinances of government, however, but that he himself takes into account the common good when choosing between possible natural goods. «A man’s will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he refer it to the common good as an end: since even the natural appetite of
each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is the end that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever is directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man will some particular good with a right will, he must will that particular good materially, and the Divine and universal good, formally. Therefore the human will is bound to be conformed to the Divine will, as to that which is willed formally, for it is bound to will the Divine and universal good; but not as to that which is willed materially, for the reason given above.»

There is thus in man a natural basis for concord in the formal object of human action, but potential for discord in the election of the material object –the means to be employed towards the common end. «We can know in a general way what God wills. For we know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the aspect of good. Consequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a will conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing willed. But we know not what God wills in particular: and in this respect we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.» In order that man’s self-government and use of free will would conform to divine providence, therefore, two general criteria must be observed –one, that whatever is fitting to the nature of the human species as such must be respected in human acts; the other, that whatever is provided by God for the use or service of men must be diligently applied by each one for that end.

The first criterion –the concept of justice– is a rectitude of will in regard to the end. This requires man to acknowledge and respect in his actions the true equality and dignity –in respect of the common end– of all those affected by his action. The second criterion is a rectitude of will in regard to the means. This requires man to acknowledge that the means he employs in his actions –whether his own individual gifts and talents, or the external resources of material creation– are committed to his prudence for the sake of a common ultimate end. Again, the first criterion is rooted in the common rational nature of man –in which all human persons are substantially equal– which reveals the final end of man, whereas the second is rooted in the individual corporeal nature of man, in which men are accidentally and contingently unequal.

St. Thomas relates these elements to each other in the concept of the «just man», in whom, that he may profit spiritually from his works, there must be prudence —«ratio iudicans de particularibus agendis»—, based on synderesis —«intellectus universalium principiorum»—, based in turn on the divine law —«lex divina seu Deus.»
1.5. The Communicable Good

The communicable good has three dimensions, corresponding to the elements which comprise the good of human nature and of every created being:

– It has measure or mode, insofar as human persons communicate in the generation and preservation of human life.
– It has species, insofar as they communicate in the knowledge and love of man, and of God as his origin and end.
– It has order, insofar as they communicate in the use of material creation as a means to that end.

The natural inclination to good –its origin, or measure, in man– is the habit of synderesis. The acquisition and maintenance of the good of the will –its form, or species, in man– is the work of the moral virtues. The operation or use of the good –its order to the end of man– is the work of prudence.

A well-ordered human operation, in its relation to others, should reflect these three characteristics of created good:

– It should spring from a love of the person –that is, it should will or affirm the being of other persons, as fellow subjects of the good.
– It should contemplate the truth of the person –i.e. understand and respect the nature, equality and dignity of other persons as capax Dei– and of the created good.
– It should love the good for the person –the good of the end (beatitude) and of the prudential means to the end.

1.5.1. Measure

In the first place, man owes his very being –his origin and his added perfections– to God. The notion of a good received by a created person from God entails a recognition that the person himself is invited to participate in some way in the contemplation of God, who alone is good. The contemplation of the divine essence implies a specific horizontal communion among men, a duplex consonantia –one cannot love the divine consonantia for oneself unless one also loves it for others of the same nature. «Whoever loves a person must, as a consequence, also love those loved by that person and those related to him. Now, men are loved by God, for He has prearranged for them, as an ultimate end, the enjoyment of Himself. Therefore, it should be that, as a person becomes a lover of God, he also becomes a lover of his neighbour.»
This reality is the basis for every other aspect of a person’s existence, because it entails that his true self, his ultimate good, is not something of his own choosing or exclusive to his person, but something indivisible which is willed for him and equally for others—as a free gift—by the infinite love of his Creator. If this is not fully acknowledged in practice, the person tends to seek the good in himself and for himself, to realise «self» in isolation from God and thus to reject the fulfilment intended for his personality and existence by God.

Human nature was communicated once and for all to Adam, together with the potency to communicate that perfection to others in his own nature. That secondary communication included the power to co-operate in the generation of human life in its corporeal dimension and to foster and perfect that life, through engagement in the stewardship of material creation. With the free co-operation of secondary human causes, therefore, God communicates a distinct participation in being—the individual creation of a human soul—to a human person, in a common corporeal and rational nature. Every new human being is, in a sense, ‘elected’ to membership of the college of human persons with the co-operation of other members of that college. He thus inherits participation in the original human vocation, first entrusted to Adam, and in the common patrimony of human culture in which that vocation has been lived. Participation in that common human good, as we have seen, unites the intellect and will of each member of the collegium to God as his natural end—and thereby to the other members of the college—even more closely than his soul unites his body to that end.285

Natural interdependence is not limited to the material needs of the members of a particular group or generation. No individual, family or community can exist or flourish without reference to its antecedents—physical and cultural—or without the awareness that its actions affect those who will succeed it. The most natural and compelling experience of this inter-generational dependence and responsibility is the family. Children, as human persons, are not appendages to the personal good of their parents. They may be said—in a sense—to perpetuate the lives of their parents, but in reality it is the human species itself that is perpetuated. When Socrates begets a son, the principle of the act of generation is human nature—not in general but as it is individuated in the person of Socrates. (Were human nature itself—as common to all men—the principle of generation, then all men without exception would generate, as they all desire happiness.) Nevertheless, when parents beget children, they do not «duplicate» themselves, they generate other members of the hu-
man species, each having the same nature but with a distinct participation in human good. Independently of the will of the parents, therefore, the generation of children is per se a natural good of the human species—including that of the parents—, and thus also a good of the parents as agents, when they act in accordance with reason.

The point of this observation is that it confirms an important feature of the notion of human solidarity. It is of the essence of human good that it is not defined by matter (potency), or by individuation (limitation), but by its measure or mode of imitation of the divine essence. Good is a dimension of being, not of individuation—the man and his wife were both naked, and were not ashamed (Gen. 2:24). Matter distinguishes human persons numerically, but of itself it does not divide them—the man and his wife were both naked, and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons (Gen. 2:25). Division comes from original sin—they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons (Gen. 3:7). The natural good of the actions of parents in generating and rearing children is not primarily an individual or self-interested good, but an interpersonal good, a good for their children, for the community and for the human species as such. Parents contribute to the building up of the family and the human community and in turn participate in the benefits of membership of those communities. They act as one with others and with God as co-principles of the human good.

The fact that parents are moved to this human good by a natural inclination does not deprive their actions of moral value—on the contrary, natural inclination is the basis of the rationality and moral integrity of their voluntary actions. We have in this basic human experience, therefore, a clear example of a natural inclination of the human will to a good which is a fundamental human good per se—an intelligible good of human nature—and not only a good pertaining to the individual agent. It is an inclination to the exercise of a natural power or potency with which the parents are endowed, but which is not exclusively or even primarily for their own benefit. The human virtue lies in the exercise of the will to give effect to that inclination in a rational—i.e. intelligent, prudent—way. Seen in this light, therefore, responsible parenthood is an example of the human virtue of solidarity in practice. We can also see in this example that the providence of God for mankind is mediated through the characteristics of the rational nature of man, and that man participates in that providence—as imago Dei—by conforming his actions to human reason.
1.5.2. Species

The second element of the reality of created good –its species– is that the gift of being is not a formless or anonymous existence. The ontology of the divine harmony requires in created participants a perfection of the nature –the realisation of its potential and capacity– in which they are loved in the divine exemplar, because nothing defective can participate in the intimate life of God. That nature or species is a mode of participation in being as a person –a subject who has being with intrinsic potential and with finite characteristics– in whom the divine essence is imitated.

An intellectual nature imitates the divine essence in its capacity to know and love God and the likeness of God in creation. Because of the unity of nature of their intellective principles, the intellectual perfections acquired by one human being are co-natural to every member of the human species, albeit limited by the extent to which they can be communicated through sensible signs.

Corporeal things are known insofar as their essences are abstracted from matter—the potential of man’s nature in this regard is quasi-infinite—and thus the object known is a perfection in the knower. This is the secondary perfection of the intellectual nature—the use or enjoyment of its being. «Hence, it is said in III De Anima, that the soul is, ‘in some manner, all things’, since its nature is such that it can know all things. In this way it is possible for the perfection of the entire universe to exist in one thing. The ultimate perfection which the soul can attain, therefore, is, according to the philosophers, to have delineated in it the entire order and causes of the universe. This they held to be the ultimate end of man. We, however, hold that it consists in the vision of God; for, as Gregory says: ‘What is there that they do not see who see Him who sees all things?’»

Material creation serves man as a means or disposition to know and contemplate God, as first cause and final end, and such knowledge can in principle be communicated from one man to another. The human intellect—which is actuated and knows itself by its interaction with its material environment—has its ultimate perfection in this contemplation of God. «The end of the intellectual creature, to be achieved by its activity, is the complete actuation of its intellect by all the intelligibles for which it has a potency. In this respect it will become most like to God.»

This is the perfection of likeness in the imago Dei in man—the contemplation of God as first cause and final end of creation is the perfection proper to
his species.

No individual person can actually attain this knowledge unaided, although knowledge of essentials was given as a gift to Adam for the instruction and government of men. Men advance in this perfecting knowledge by co-operation with and instruction of others. A person who has such knowledge — and who uses it for love of his end — has a perfection in himself which is ordered to the good of his nature. He communicates a good, therefore, when he co-operates in the instruction and education of others, in the development of culture and in the study and dissemination of these truths.

As the knowledge of God is to the human intellect, so the love of God is to the human will. Just as man can communicate the means to know God to another, he can also inspire another to love God. His participation in providence is mediated through his corporeal nature and is therefore very limited by comparison with the providence of God. Man cannot communicate good as a moral perfection to another, but in his words, judgements and external actions he communicates good as a three-fold truth about man — veritas doctrinae, veritas vitae, veritas justitiae — and thus as final cause. Insofar as the recipient shares the virtue of the agent, he makes his own the instruction and example transmitted and is united with the agent in the common good of the species.

It follows from the distinction between the interior and exterior dimensions of human nature, that such communication is mediated through speech and other corporeal signs, concerning what is «useful or harmful, just or unjust», because man is by nature social. The interior principle of knowledge and loving in each person is his own active intellect and will — the instruction received from another is a secondary, exterior principle. St. Thomas illustrates this with the example of a teacher instructing a pupil.

The substance of what is communicated in general by the veritas vitae in the agent is a practical judgement about the rectitude of the means to the end — the conformity of a human act and of a temporal good to the truth of the natural law. «The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is true, not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else is said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure, namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity to that law.» To attain this «rule or measure» is a work of prudence, as to the action in itself and as to its communication. Insofar as the judgement of the agent is true, it has a solidary effect — it binds the agent to the common end and moves others to the good. It perfects the likeness of the imago Dei in him and therefore represents the good to others. Bad example or scandal has an opposite effect. Communication of good may
or may not be effective in others, because they are free to accept or reject it. However, the act of solidarity perfects the agent even if it is not reciprocated by the other, but it perfects both if it is fully reciprocated. If men habitually acted in this way, a concord of wills would be established in society –at least as regards fundamental values– and social mores and human culture would fulfil their role in leading men to their final end.

1.5.3. Order

The third element –order– follows immediately from the second. The first and most important good that we communicate to others –before knowing their distinctive but accidental personal qualities– is the gift of our love of our shared final end. We thus affirm their dignity and that together we achieve the perfection of our common nature in an indivisible contemplation, which each one will enjoy in accordance with his capacity. Love of created goods –of personal talents, powers and possessions– as a means for ourselves and for others to this good of contemplation, disposes us to use and communicate them prudently –principally in the context of human work and precisely as a means to this end. This communication implies an active co-operation and concord of the participants in that end –the gift of being does not bear the fruit of contemplation until it is in act, until it is used by the recipient in accordance with its reality, its orientation to perfection and contemplation. Co-operation and concord in social life and in the use of material goods –the stewardship of creation– form part of the process by which the gift of being is perfected in each man and in the ultimate unity of mankind in beatitude.

The material resources of the world are a temporal good intended by God for the sustenance, development and perfection of the human species as a whole. «A corruptible thing is not ordered to man for the sake of one individual man only, but for the sake of the whole human species. A corruptible thing could not be of use to the whole human species except by virtue of the thing’s entire species. Therefore, the order whereby corruptible things are ordered to man requires the subordination of individuals to their species.»306 Material resources can only be applied to their end by a multitude of men, extended over time and space, and co-operating with each other –according to common principles of knowledge, distribution and exchange– such that they act ultimately as a single administrator of a single resource.
Common principles of justice in mutual relations—based on human nature—do not suffice to determine that this particular resource should be used in this way by this particular person, here and now, in preference to other persons in equal need (unless in a particular case some prior responsibility has been established in accordance with those principles). Within the criteria and guidance provided by these common principles, therefore, it is the responsibility of each individual to act with prudence in the application of the particular temporal goods within his control as a means to the end for which they are intended.

In circumstances of particular need, for example, the good of the human species requires that contingently available resources be applied—by those who have them—to alleviate that need in others so far as possible in the circumstances. When someone with such resources acts prudently to apply them to alleviate a need in others, his possession and use of the resources is shown to be well ordered to the good of the human species in him—it is a perfection of virtue—and he communicates that perfection to others in his act. The *communicable* good is a perfection of the human species; the medium or occasion of the communication is the application of the resource, which of itself may be an incommunicable material item. The act of communication makes the agent good and his action good. Its effect—*qua* good—on the recipients depends on how they receive it. If they have the same virtue as the agent, they will receive the material good also as a communicable good of the human species. They will thus be united to the agent as being one with him in the same good of their common species—as one principle with him in the use of material resources for the good of mankind. The binding together of the parties to the communication—as one in respect of the final end of man—will have been effected. Since unity is the natural end of the human species, the communication of good—*qua* final cause—by the agent will have achieved its object.

Personal bonds of friendship and kinship are important incentives to this unity, because they strengthen our natural solidarity with others. True friendship is oriented to the only good that can unite mankind. «The principle of solidarity, also articulated in terms of ‘friendship’ or ‘social charity’, is a direct demand of human and Christian brotherhood.» The joy of friendship is itself an anticipation of and participation in the joy of communion with the divine persons, because God communicates his love to us through other per-
sons. For the same reason, satisfaction in the use and contemplation of material things, e.g. the wonders and beauty of nature and of human art, are an anticipation and participation in the divine contemplation. A friendship or use of material goods which lacks this rectitude, however, lead to an unjustified partisanship—a social or personal manifestation of a disordered egocentricity which disrupts human solidarity.

1.6. Human Solidarity

In the abstract, the notion of human solidarity is that the plurality of human persons in the collegium of men acts as one principle in the attainment of the natural good of the human species, just as all men—in Adam, as their principle—acted against that good in the Garden of Eden. Man participates in this solidarity when—through his interdependence with others and as a secondary principle of good in others—he diligently uses the talents and resources for which he is responsible to that end.

Human solidarity is also the natural foundation for the supernatural unity of the faithful and the communication of good with Christ in the Church and in beatitude. In that sense, the plurality of human persons in the Church acts as one principle in the attainment of the good precisely insofar as they are united to Christ, in whom the good itself is realised.

«Every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or evil, done to the member of a society, redounds on the whole society: thus, who hurts the hand, hurts the man. When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to another individual, there is a twofold measure of merit or demerit in his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the individual to whom he has done good or harm; secondly, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the whole of society. Now when a man ordains his action directly for the good or evil of the whole society, retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by the whole of society; secondarily, by all the parts of society.»

A part naturally loves the good of the whole of the common form which is its proper good. The «whole» in the case of man is the realisation of the full potential of the human form or nature, which can be attained in the collegium of the species, but not in the individual man. Man is therefore perfected both in himself and in society. Each person participates in this good by com-
municating some aspect of the good of the human species to others, receiving such communications as ordered to that good and co-operating with others in such communication. The communicable good of the species in each case is distinguished from the sensible goods, signs or actions through which the communication is mediated.

The good which is the object of man’s act of communication has two aspects: (a) the good of the human species, not as though that end were attained directly by his act, but as an end to which his act is ordered, inasmuch as it is one in principle with the acts of others which are similarly ordered to that end, and (b) a particular perfection of the human species in the agent—communicated to a finite range of individuals—as a means to the good of the human species in them. His communication of good may also involve the distribution of some material goods or the provision of a material service—these are not of themselves communicable goods, but the medium or occasion for such goods. In acting for the good of the human species, he is communicating the good of the nature which he has in common with all men. In communicating a particular good or perfection which he possesses, he is communicating the means to attain that good.

The human good is communicable because it transcends the limitations implied in the numerical individuation of human persons, to allow each one to participate in a good of the species which is common to all. It may be mediated through matter—the corporeal dimension of man—but the good itself is achieved in the unity of persons as a single principle of operation in respect of the final end of man. That unity of operation—idem velle—is the natural basis for the friendship of men in society and with God which will be perfected in beatitude.316 It corresponds to the unity of the divine idea of the human species and thus participates in the paternal providence of God for individual men—imagines Dei—as members of that species.317

1.6.1. The virtue of solidarity

In the present analysis, therefore, solidarity is understood as a perfection of prudence in its social dimension. In its highest form, prudence is the perfection of moral life,318 because it «takes counsel, judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man’s whole life.» It involves a commitment to the diligent use of the means to attain the common good—as one’s own good—and to communicate with others to that end. «The common good corresponds to the highest of human instincts, but it is a good that is very difficult to attain
because it requires the constant ability and effort to seek the good of others as though it were one’s own good.»

The characteristic of the *virtue* of solidarity is that the agent takes into account that whatever resources and talents may be at his disposal—whether personal talents, material goods or other forms of power or influence— are perfections of his nature which he has received from others (from God, in the first instance) and which in turn are also for the sake of the good in others, within his natural range of communication. The object of the virtue is the agent’s responsible *use* of resources to serve the common good of his community, insofar as he himself possesses some means to contribute to that good.

Man’s virtuous *use* of resources, as means to an end, presupposes his rectitude of will in respect of the choice of the end and of the participation of others in that end. As we have seen, the rectitude of justice is part of the *imago Dei* in man, whereas a commitment to solidarity pertains to the perfection of his likeness to God.

Although solidarity, in that sense, is founded on justice, it is considered in the social teaching to be, in its own right, a «fundamental social virtue» and a «new horizon» opened up by Christian anthropology, which perfects our understanding of human justice. «In fact, the Church’s social doctrine places alongside the value of justice that of solidarity, in that it is the privileged way of peace.» As a virtue and a moral responsibility, it is distinguished from justice by its emphasis on the responsible *use* of one’s goods for the sake of others—precisely because they are one’s equals— whereas justice *per se* seeks to achieve or maintain equality by rendering something which is *due* to another.

While virtues which are directed to others can be considered as annexed to justice, the virtue of solidarity is not primarily concerned with relations with others, but with the diligent *use* of goods and human perfections in society. The relations of unity and friendship which follow on the practice of the virtue are a consequence, not directly the object of the virtue.

St. Thomas teaches in fact that the perfection of moral virtue lies not only in the rectitude of the agent’s will in respect of the common good, but above all in the prudence which moves him to *act* on that good will with *solicitude*—for his own good and the good of others— in respect of the resources and perfections available to him. «If a man do what is just, what he does is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence.»
The object of the virtue of solidarity, considered in its formal aspect, concerns, not *per se* the exercise of *authority* in favour of the common good, but the *communication* of the means to the common good of man to others precisely insofar as it is also the good of every human person in each of his individual actions. «The common good is the end of each individual member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each part.» It is not a matter of directing the actions of others –through the exercise of authority– to the common good, but of drawing others to the good, as final end, by communicating intermediate goods to them, i.e. by directing one’s own actions, in cooperation with others, to the common good. It includes the reciprocal virtue of allowing oneself to be drawn to the good and of cooperating with others in this regard.

This communication of good applies in the first instance to the acts of the individual person, but it extends also to the acts of a multitude insofar as they are also directed by individuals. To act in a manner which is consistent with a love for the common good –seen as one’s own good– is to act with prudence with respect to the end of all human life, of which one’s own life is a part. «Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man’s entire life, and the end of human life. (...) Only those are simply prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life.»

It is this quality of prudence that marks it as solidary –it participates in the government or providence of God, whereby he directs each person and the whole of mankind to its proper end. It is a form of «government» in the sense that the communication of intermediate goods –through mutual interdependence– itself leads or counsels others, in freedom, to their final end.

To understand how this notion of solidarity is related to the virtue of prudence and its the subjective parts, as described by St. Thomas, we need to consider the *end* proper to each part of the virtue. Using a criterion of human government, he distinguishes the individual good, the good of the family, and the good of the city or kingdom as distinct ends of human choices, each involving a different species of the virtue of prudence. The personal virtue in the prudent ruler differs according as he is concerned with directing his own affairs, those of his family or those of a city or kingdom.
specifically. Again, the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided into various species according to the various kinds of multitude. (a) There is the multitude which is united together for some particular purpose; thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that governs this is called «military.» (b) There is also the multitude that is united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a home or family, and this is ruled by «domestic prudence»: (c) and such again is the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of which is «regnative prudence» in the ruler, and «political prudence», simply so called, in the subjects.»

If we take «governs a multitude» in the sense of the exercise of human authority (which seems to be implied in the above division), then solidarity _per se_ is not included in the second category of subjective parts of the virtue. It has some of the characteristics of _political_ prudence, but with the difference that its object is not directly the care of the community _simpliciter_—such as pertains to a person exercising authority in public office or to a subject of that authority—but to the diligent _use_ in the service of the common good of the means and perfections which the individual or group may come to possess (e.g. human knowledge or expertise). It can also be seen as a perfection of _domestic_ prudence, in that the solidarity individual regards others (not just his spouse or children) as being potentially included in his own good—as a parent does in respect of his family—and he thus exercises a form of «paternal» care in their regard.

On the other hand, «rules himself» is too narrow a description of a virtue which includes in its object the communication of good to others, whether in individual actions or in those of a multitude (e.g. in international relations). Solidarity is not limited to _individual_ prudence—the first category of subjective parts of the virtue—because it has as its object the common good, seen as one’s own good, in the action of the individual or group.

Nevertheless, in each of these subjective parts of prudence—based on the modes of human government—there is a necessary relation between the proximate good, which is the direct object of prudence, and the common good. In the light of the exponential growth in communication and interdependence in modern society, it is clear that one can be a secondary principle of good in another—and thus participate in his ‘government’—in a wide variety of ways. It is this aspect of the perfection of practical reason that is at the heart of solidarity. We have considered in some detail how, in the teaching of St. Thomas, every human choice which is guided by true prudence is moved
not only by the true good of the individual, family or society for which it is directly intended, but also—and inextricably—by the effect of that action on the common good.

It seems appropriate, therefore, to understand the virtue of solidarity as an implicit perfection of each of the species of prudence in the medieval scheme—self, domestic, military, political and regnative—and thus as a common element which perfects and transcends the classical division. We can describe the virtue of solidarity as social prudence, a perfection of the virtue of prudence which encompasses in its object the good of everyone for whom the agent (whether an individual or a multitude) is a potential principle, on the basis of a natural proximity, authority or interdependence in society. It extends also to the reciprocal virtue in those who are the beneficiaries of a communication of good, because the virtue reaches its fruition in the bonds of friendship it establishes among the members of society. In a sense, the society in question is the whole of mankind, because the point and ultimate perfection of the virtue is to act as one principle with others in the use of the means given by God to mankind to attain the good of the human species. «For imperfect beings tend solely to the good of the individual; perfect beings to the good of the species; more perfect beings to the good of the genus; and God, who is the most perfect in goodness, to the good of all being.»

We have seen that the employment of personal talents and powers in the service of others, as envisaged by this virtue, is inherent in the creative design of God for man—it would have been part of the social life of man even in the state of innocence. By imitating God in this way, man grows in likeness to God and the image of God is perfected in him and in the community of men. He is more closely united to others in the common good and the bonds of friendship in human society are strengthened. His personal good converges with that of other men in the perfection of the image of God in each one.

The virtue of solidarity is therefore an intrinsic part of the moral life of every human person. As with other moral virtues, however, it is only effective in respect of the ultimate perfection of man when it is elevated by grace. Although in its origin it is a human virtue, when the commitment of solidarity to the common good is elevated by grace, it becomes a fully Christian virtue, closely related to charity. «Solidarity is undoubtedly a Christian virtue. In what has been said so far it has been possible to identify many points of contact between solidarity and charity, which is the distinguishing mark of Christ’s disciples (cfr. Jn 13:35).»
1.6.2. Ut omnes unum sint

If the goal of solidarity depends on human freedom and virtue, the reality of sin is obviously an obstacle to its realisation.\(^{348}\) Notwithstanding the loss of the grace of original justice,\(^{349}\) however, the possibility of human solidarity has not been destroyed. The natural inclination to human good –an integral part of human nature– has not been corrupted, even if its attainment is made more difficult. The role of the virtue of solidarity –in the order of redemption– is to serve as the basis in human nature for the supernatural virtue of fraternal charity, without which the elevated goal of man cannot be attained.\(^{350}\)

When Adam failed, the role of headship in human nature –so far as it concerns the final end of man and of creation– was taken up and perfectly fulfilled in the humanity of Christ. «If we take the whole time of the world in general, Christ is the Head of all men, but diversely. For, first and principally, He is the Head of such as are united to Him by glory; secondly, of those who are actually united to Him by charity; thirdly, of those who are actually united to Him by faith; fourthly, of those who are united to Him merely in potentiality, which is not yet reduced to act, yet will be reduced to act according to Divine predestination; fifthly, of those who are united to Him in potentiality, which will never be reduced to act; such are those men existing in the world, who are not predestined, who, however, on their departure from this world, wholly cease to be members of Christ, as being no longer in potentiality to be united to Christ.»\(^{351}\)

A key aspect of the notion of solidarity developed in this study is that one person can only be a principle of good for another if he in turn acknowledges the true origin and end of that good. Man is not himself an absolute good, but he communicates a good which he has received –a *bonum receptum*– just as he is not *ipsam esse*, but communicates an *esse receptum*. Because the good he communicates does not originate in himself, his love for the good also leads him to co-operate with others as co-principles in its communication. These relationships –of a principle or co-principle to one who proceeds– structure the organic unity of interdependence in society. The ultimate fruition of the good of solidarity –of many acting as one principle– is the perfection of charity in the society of the blessed in beatitude, in which each person loves the others as himself and rejoices, therefore, not only in his own good but in the good of each of the blessed as though it were his own.\(^{352}\)

The solidarity of Christ with mankind is the absolute perfection of this virtue. «Thus whichever road is taken, unless indeed we halt on the way, we
always end by coming to the principle of solidarity. This illuminating principle was not only perceived but clearly formulated by the Fathers of the Church. All of them say in about the same words that Jesus Christ had to become what we are, in order to make us become what he is; that he became incarnate in order that the deliverance should be accomplished by a man, as the fall had been accomplished by a man; that Christ, as redeemer, comprises and summarises all humanity.»

We can see fulfilled in Christ, therefore, the whole «logic» of solidarity in the creative design of God for man’s beatitude —«Ut omnes unum sint, sicut tu, Pater, in me et ego in te» (Jn. 21:17). The organic unity of men with Christ —so well described by St. Paul— is not found among the angels, although there is a communication of knowledge in beatitude, from superior to inferior, among them. As man has his origin from a principle, he attains his end by choosing to live in solidarity with that principle, through his union with intermediate principles and by acting as a principle for others.

«The Eucharist is never an event involving just two, a dialogue between Christ and me. Eucharistic communion is aimed at a complete reshaping of my own life. It breaks up man’s entire self and creates a new «we». Communion with Christ is necessarily also communication with all who belong to him; therein I myself become a part of the new bread that he is creating by the resubstantiation of the whole of earthly reality... The Church is of her nature a relationship, a relationship set up by the love of Christ, which in its turn founds a new relationship of men with one another.»
Notes

1. Cfr. Cardona, C., La Metafisica del Bien Común, Madrid 1966 for a valuable anthology and commentary on texts in St. Thomas which deal with this topic.
2. Cfr. chapter III-2, page 192
3. Super Ioan., cap. 5, lect. 3.
4. STb I, q. 15, a. 2. See also Div. Nom., cap. 4, lect. 11.
5. De Pot., q. 10, a. 2 ad 6. See also Sent. I, d. 29, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2.
7. Cfr. Sent. I, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1 s.c. 2.
10. Sent. IV, d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 1.
13. STh I, q. 103, a. 6.
14. Torrell, J.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas. Vol 2. Spiritual Master, Washington DC 2003, p. 281: «Communicatio, which Thomas found in the Latin translation of Aristotle, corresponds to the Greek’s koinônia, which means common possession or community. And koinômas is the member who takes part in the values and goods that form this community.»
15. STb II-II, q. 26, a. 4 ad 3.
16. Cfr. chap III-2.6, p. 212
18. Sent. III, d. 29, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1.
19. Sent. III, d. 29, q. 1, a. 6.
20. Sent. III, d. 29, q. 1, a. 6.
21. STb I-II, q. 19, a. 10.
22. Sent. III, d. 29, q. 1, a. 6, ad 4.
23. Sent. III, d. 29, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3.
24. STb II-II, q. 31, a. 3 ad 2.
25. Cfr. STb I, q. 93, a. 6 ad 1.
26. STb I-II, q. 85, a. 1.
27. Cfr. STb I, q. 37, a. 1.
28. Bieler, Causality, op. cit., pp. 16-17: «The analysis of human action Aquinas presents in the Summa theologiae I-II, qq. 6-17 makes it clear that the structure of human action, which is determined by the described traits of the four forms of causality, enables us to be free not in spite but because of a specific nature. The most fundamental difference Aquinas develops there is the difference between the specification and the execution of an act which are paralleled with the interplay between intellect and will... The interplay between intellect and
will makes it possible that although we strive for God by nature we can choose not to do it explicitly and so oppose our own nature.»

29. *Sent. IV*, d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 1.
30. *STh I*, q. 60, a. 4 ad 3.
32. *STh I*, q. 60, a. 5.
34. Cfr. *ScG III-I*, p. 95 (Bk III, chap. 24, no. 6).
35. *STh I-II*, q. 94, a. 2.
37. *STh I-II*, q. 94, a. 1 ad 2.
38. *De Ver. (I)*, p. 227 (q. 5, a. 6 ad 4).
39. *STh I*, q. 60, a. 1.
41. *Sent. III*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 6.
42. *ScG III-I*, p. 128 (Bk. III, cap. 117, no. 6).
43. *Sent. II*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 1 ad 2.
44. *STh I*, q. 19, a. 2.
45. *STh I*, q. 60, a. 5 ad 1.
46. *ScG III-I*, p. 95 (Bk III, cap. 24, no. 6).
49. TORRELL, *Spiritual Master*, op. cit., p. 279-80: «*Sociale* translates *koinônikon*, a term used by the Stoics to mean that man is the citizen not merely of some city, but of the *oikouménê*, the entire inhabited world of his time.»
50. *Sent. Eth.*, lib. 9, lect. 10, no. 15.
56. *ScG*, lib. IV, cap. 50, no. 10.
59. *Sent. III*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2 ad 1.
60. *Sent. III*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2 ad 1.
61. Cfr. *STh II-II*, q. 26, a. 5.
63. *STh I*, q. 20, a. 2 ad 1.
64. *STh I-II*, q. 105, a. 2.
65. *Sent. Eth.*, lib. 9, lect. 10, no. 15.
66. Chap. II-4.4, p. 149.
69. *De Ver. (I)*, p. 63 (q. 2, a. 2 ad 2): «God returns to His essence in the highest degree, for He provides for all, and, because of this providence, in a sense He goes forth and out into all things, although in Himself He remains unmoved and uncontaminated by anything else.»
NOTES

70. *STh* I, q. 93, a. 9.
71. *STh* I-II, q. 55, a. 2 ad 3.
72. *Sent*. I, d. 32 q. 1 a. 3 s.c. 1: «Contra est quod dicitur *Joann.* 17, 22: *ut sint unum in nobis, sicut et nos unum sumus*. Non enim loquitur ibi de unitate essentiali tantum; quia illo modo Deo non unimur; sed de unitate consonantiae, vel amoris, quod est spiritus sanctus. Ergo videtur quod sicut pater et filius diligunt se spiritu sancto, ita et nos.»
73. *STh* I, q. 37, a. 2 ad 3.
76. *STh* II-II, q. 26, a. 4: «Consociatio autem est ratio dilectionis secundum quandam unionem in ordine ad Deum.»
77. *STh* II-II, q. 26, a. 1.
80. *STh* II-II, q. 26, a. 5.
81. *STh* II-II, q. 26, a. 5 ad 2.
82. Cfr. *STh* I, q. 60, a. 5.
83. *STh* III, q. 65, a. 1.
86. *STh* I, q. 22, a. 1.
87. *STh* II-II, q. 44, a. 7.
88. *STh* II-II, q. 31, a. 3 ad 2.
89. Cfr. *STh* I, q. 38, a. 1 and also *STh* I, q. 27, a. 4.
90. *STh* I, q. 45, a. 6.
91. *Quodlib* VIII, q.1, a. 2: «Tit. 1: *Utrum rationes quae sunt in mente divina per prius respiciant exemplata, scilicet creaturas, ratione suae singularitatis, vel ratione naturae specificae*. (...) Art. 2: Formae autem exemplares intellectus divini sunt factivae totius rei et quantum ad formam et quantum ad materiam: et ideo respiciunt creaturam non solum quantum ad naturam speciei, sed etiam quantum ad singularitatem individui: per prius tamen quantum ad naturam speciei... Agens autem quilibet principaliter intendit in opere id quod perfectius est. Natura autem speciei est perfectissimum in unoquoque individuo. (...) Non enim natura intendit principaliter generare Socratem... intendit autem in Socrate generare hominem... Unde exemplar quod est in mente divina primo naturam speciei respicit in qualibet creatura.»
92. *De Pot.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 12.
93. *Sent*. I, d. 10 q. 1 a. 5 ad 1.
94. Cfr. *STh* I, q. 79, a. 5 ad 3.
95. *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 5.
96. FEINGOLD, L., *The Natural Desire to See God According to St Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters*, Rome 2001, p. 663: «Natural appetite can be simultaneously directed to two final ends, only insofar as the supernatural end is desired with an elicited and imperfect (conditional) natural desire, while our connatural end is desired also with an innate (and unconditional) appetite. This shows how our connatural end can be a final end in its own order: the order of innate appetite, perfect willing, and strict proportionality. Even though our connatural end does not mark the limit of our natural aspirations, it marks the limit of our unconditional, proportionate and innate natural aspirations.»
97. *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 7.
98. *Sent*. I, d. 10 q. 1 a. 5 ad 1.
99. *De Ver.* (I), p. 205 (q. 5, a. 1 ad 6).
100. *ScG*, lib. IV, cap. 23, a. 5.
101. *STh* I-II, q. 57, a. 5.
102. $STb$ II-II, q. 79, a. 1.
103. $STb$ I, q. 21, a. 1.
104. Sent. IV, d. 46, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1 co.
105. $STb$ I-II, q. 100, a. 2.
106. Sent. II, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3 ad 2.
108. $STb$ I, q. 21, a. 1.
110. $STb$ II-II, q. 58, a. 8.
111. Sent. IV, d. 38, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 1 co.
112. $STb$ II-II, q. 109, a. 3 ad 3.
114. Sent. III, d. 34, q. 1, a. 2 (numeration added): «Operationes autem quibus fit communicatio ad alterum, secundum humanum modum regulantur (a) vel ex eo ad quem est communicatio, sicut cum ei aliqud exhibetur, quod facit justitia; (b) vel ex ipso qui ad alterum sua communicat, inquantum bonum ejus relucet in tali communicacione, ut mensura harum communicationum: quae quidem communicatio (I) vel est in hoc quod homo sua tribuit, quod facit liberalitas in mediocribus, et magnificentia in maximis donis vel sumptibus: (II) vel in eo quod seipsum alteri exhibet (i) sive per cognitionem, ut scilicet cognoscatur talis qualis est per dicta et facta, quod facit virtus quaedam quae a philosopho dicitur veritas; (ii) sive per affectionem, inquantum se delectabilem exhibet sociis, ut in ludis, quod facit eutrapelia; (III) vel in communi vita, quod facit amicitia, quae a philosopho virtus ponitur per quam homo ad unumquemque decenter se habet in dictis et factis.»
115. $STb$ II-II, q. 31, a. 3 ad 3.
116. Sent. IV, d. 46, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2 co.
117. ScG, p. 295 (Bk. III, chap. 130). Cfr. ScG (Prim.), Lib. 3: «Non autem sufficit pacem et concordiam inter homines per iustitiae praecepta conservari nisi ulterius inter eos fundetur dilectio. Per iustitiam sufficienter hominibus providetur ut unus alteri non inferat impedimentum, non autem ad hoc quod uni ab alius feratur auxilium in his quibus indiget; quia forte aliquis indiget auxilio alterius in his in quibus nullus ei tenetur secundum iustitiae debitum, aut, si forte aliquis ei tenetur, non reddat. Oportuit igitur ad hoc quod se invicem homines adiuvarent etiam praeceptum mutuae dilectionis hominibus superinduci, per quam unus aliquid ferat etiam in his in quibus ei non tenetur secundum iustitiae debitum.»
118. Note on the treatise «De Regimine paterno» (formerly known as Chapter 130 of Book III of the Summa contra Gentiles): [note omitted, cfr. manuscript of thesis]
120. ScG, p. 342 (Bk. III, cap. 130), italics added. Cfr. ScG (Prim.), Lib. 3: «Videtur autem paternum regimen aliquam similitudinem habere cum divino regimine, nam etiam pater curam habet de filio non solum quantum ad ea in quibus ordinatur ad alios, sicut rex, sed etiam quantum ad ea quae pertinent ad ipsum secundum se, quod de Deo etiam supra ostensum est. Et hoc rationabiliter accidit, nam sicut Deus ita et pater naturalem originem homini praestat. Unde divinem regimen et paternum ad aliquem hominem extenditur non solum secundum quod politicus est, sed etiam secundum quod in sua natura subsistit.»
121. ScG (Prim.), Lib. 3.
122. Quodlib. VIII, q.1, a. 2.
123. ScG (Prim.), Lib. 3: «Deus autem non solum regendae multitudinis curam habet, sed etiam de unoquoque secundum se bonum est: est enim naturae conditor et gubernator, cuius bonum non solum in multitudine, sed etiam in unoquoque secundum seipsum salvatur.»
125. $STb$ II-II, q. 106, a. 1.
126. $STb$ II-II, q. 106, a. 3.
127. STb I, q. 94, a. 3.
128. Sent. I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1. Cfr. also ScG III-I, p. 128 (Bk. III, cap. 117, no. 6); STb II-II, q. 26, a. 3.
129. STb II-II, q. 47, a. 6 ad 1.
130. STb II-II, q. 47, a. 3.
132. Div. Nom., cap. 4, lect. 6: «Deinde, cum dicit: providentiae superiorum..., enumerat ea quae pertinent ad ordinem rerum; et primo, quantum ad actionem, prout superiora provident inferioribus, quod tangit cum dicit alternae habitudines coordinatorum, idest aequalium; et prout inferiora convertuntur ad recipiendum a superioribus, perfectionem et regimen; et hoc est quod dicit: conversiones minus habentium.»
133. STb II-II, q. 31, a. 1 ad 1
134. Div. Nom. (Mar.), p. 135 (no. 407; cap. 4, lect. 9): «Unde et Dionysius hic quatuor modos amoris ponit: et primus est secundum quod inferiori suum superius; et hoc est quod dicit quia propter bonum et pulchrum et ipsius gratia, minora, idest inferiora, amant meliora, idest superiora, convertendo se ad ea, quia in eis habent suam perfectionem; secundo, ponit modum, quo aequalia amant aequalia; et dicit quod ordinatam, idest ea quae sunt unius ordinis, amant coordinata, idest aequalia communicatice, idest inquantum communicant cum eis vel in specie vel in quocumque ordine; tertio, ponit modum quo superioura amant inferiora; et dicit quod meliora, idest superioura amant minora, idest inferiora provisice, idest inquantum provident eis ut sub se contentis; quarto, ponit modum quo aliqua amant seipsa et dicit quod ipsa singula amant seipsa contentive, idest inquantum unumquodque in seipso continetur.»
135. Div. Nom. (Mar.), p. 134 (no. 406; cap. 4, lect. 9): «Et quia unumquodque amamus inquantum est bonum nostrum, oportet tot modis variare amorem, quot modis contingit aliquid esse bonum alicuius. Quod quidem contingent quadrupliciter: uno modo, secundum quod aliquid est bonum suipsius et sic aliquid amat seipsum; alio modo, secundum quod aliquid per quamdam similitudinem est quasi unum alicui et sic aliquid amat id quod est sibi aequaliter coordinatum in aliquo ordine, sicut homo amat hominem alum eiusdem speciei et sicut civis amat concivem et sicut consanguineum, consanguineum; alio modo, aliquid est bonum alterius quia est aliquid eius, sicut manus est aliquid hominis et universaliter pars est aliquid totius; alio vero modo, secundum quod, et converso, totum est bonum partis: non enim est pars perfecta nisi in toto, unde naturaliter pars amat totum et exponitur pars spoente pro salute totius.»
137. STb I, q. 21, a. 1 ad 3.
138. STb I, q. 47, a. 2 ad 3.
139. STb I, q. 47, a. 2.
142. Super Matt., cap. 25, lect. 2.
143. Phelan, G.B.; Maritain, J., Justicia y Amistad: «Finisterre» 1 (1948) 221-245, p. 244: «La concepción cristiana de las relaciones entre justicia y amistad en la sociedad puede recapitularse someramente en los siguientes puntos: 1. Toda sociedad, toda vida social, subsiste por la amistad. La sociedad no es más que otro nombre de la amistad, y las sociedades sólo se diferencian unas de otras por el tipo particular de amistad que persiguen. 2. La sociedad –o la amistad– no puede establecerse sino sobre la base de la justicia, puesto que la justicia corrige las desigualdades entre los miembros del grupo y labora por esa igualdad proporcional sobre la que descansa la amistad. 3. La justicia es, por tanto, el requisito previo y necesario, la causa dispositiva de la sociedad; la amistad es su causa formal, su verdadera alma.»
144. Sent. Eth., lib. 8, lect. 7, no. 8.
145. STb II-II, q. 31, a. 3.
146. MANZANEDO, M.F., La Amistad según Santo Tomás: «Angelicum» 71 (1994) 371-426, p. 386: «Toda amistad supone alguna ‘igualdad’. Exige, pues, un amor mutuo. De modo que añade nuevos elementos a la virtud. Para ésta basta la actividad de alguna persona virtuosa; para la amistad no basta dicha actividad; se exige además que dos personas se amen mutuamente.»

147. SELLES, J. F., La Persona Humana, Bogotá 1998, p. 190 and 196: «El vínculo de cohesión de... la sociedad no puede ser el amor puesto que, como, es obvio, no podemos amar personalmente a todos los miembros de nuestra ciudad o sociedad, ya que ni siquiera los conocemos a todos. El sentimiento filantrópico de ‘fraternidad universal’ responde a una imaginación quimérica y un consecuente deseo vano. (...) El único vínculo posible de la sociedad es la ética. (...) El bien y el mal, como se estudió, son objetivos, no subjetivos o relativos al sujeto. Lo bueno es objeto de la ética, pero no considerado estáticamente, sino en su incremento, pues la mejoría social es paralela al incremento del bien común.»


149. INTERDICASTERIAL COMMISSION, Catechism of the Catholic Church, London 2002, no. 1948: «Solidarity is an eminently Christian virtue. It practices the sharing of spiritual goods even more than material ones.»

150. Cfr. STb II-II, q. 26, a. 3.

151. SELLES, Persona Humana, op. cit., p. 198: «El corazón de la ética es la amistad. La amistad es superior, decíamos, a la justicia, pero nace de una intensificación de ella. Sin justicia no cabe amistad.»

152. Ibid., p. 196: «La interdependencia humana es necesaria, pero no sólo con vistas al aporte de productos, que hagan posible la subsistencia humana (alimentos, ropa, medicinas, etc.), sino –y principalmente– en orden a la mejora de los hombres como tales. Tal mejoría es ética.»

153. Sent. III, d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 1 ad 2: «Bonum, ut dicit Dionysius, est sui diffusivum; unde ubi cognoscitur alia ratio diffusionis, cognoscitur alia ratio bonitatis.» Also, Sent. I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 4, s. c. 1: «Sicut dicit Dionysius, bonum est communicativum sui.»

154. STb I, q. 106, a. 4.

155. STb I, q. 103, a. 4.

156. STb I, q. 5, a. 4 ad 2. Cfr. also, De Ver., q. 21, a. 1 ad 4.

157. Sent. I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 4 ad 1.


159. STb I, q. 19, a. 2.

160. Cfr. Sent. II, d. 3, q. 4, a. 1 ad 2

161. STb I-II, q. 27, a. 1.

162. STb I, q. 60, a. 4 ad 3.

163. STb I, q. 6, a. 1.

164. Cfr. De Ver., q. 21, a. 2. Also, chap II-3.4.2, p. 123.

165. STb I, q. 94, a. 3.

166. STb II-II, q. 24, a. 2 ad 1.

167. STb I, q. 60, a. 5.

168. Cfr. STb II-II, q. 26, a. 3.

169. STb I, q. 96, a. 4.


171. STb III, q. 1, a. 1.

172. STb I, q. 106, a. 4.

173. STb I, q. 23, a. 8 ad 2.


175. Quodlib. XI, q. 3.

176. STb II-II, q. 47, a. 10.

177. STb I, q. 38, a. 2.
NOTES

178. *STh I*, q. 94, a. 3.
179. *De Pot.*, q. 2, a. 1 ad 3. See also *De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 5.
182. Sellés comments that coordination in the practice of economics or politics for the common good requires the virtue of practical reason known to classical authors as prudence. Sellés, *Persona Humana*, op. cit., p. 210: «Es lugar común en economía que la falta de coordinación acarrea las más lamentables pérdidas para las empresas, las organizaciones y las sociedades. Lo mismo conviene sostener respecto de la política. Sin embargo, la coordinación es imposible sin una buena dosis de razón práctica. (...) Se trata en una palabra –como diría un clásico– de ser prudente.»
184. *STh I*, q. 22, a. 3.
185. *STh I*, q. 103, a. 8.
186. *STh I*, q. 19, a. 8.
187. *STh I*, q. 103, a. 7 ad 3.
188. *STh I*, q. 103, a. 8 ad 1.
189. *STh I*, q. 19, a. 6.
191. *De Vér.*, q. 5, a. 8.
194. *STh I*, q. 22, a. 2.
195. *STh I*, q. 23, a. 8.
196. *STh I*, q. 23, a. 8 ad 2.
197. *STh I*, q. 62, a. 4.
198. *STh I*, q. 24, a. 3.
199. *STh I*, q. 23, a. 4 ad 3.
200. *STh I*, q. 23, a. 6.
201. *Super Matt.*, cap. 25, lect. 2.
204. *STh I*, q. 22, a. 2 ad 2.
205. *ScG III-I*, p. 120 (Bk. III, cap. 113, no. 1).
206. *STh I*, q. 23, a. 7.
208. *STh I*, q. 20, a. 1 ad 3.
209. See the discussion in chap. II-5.1, p. 160. Cfr. also *STh I*, q. 60, a. 4.
210. *STh I*, q. 20, a. 1 ad 3.
212. *STh I-III*, q. 27, a. 3.
213. *STh I*, q. 60, a. 5 ad 1.
214. *STh I-III*, q. 28, a. 2.
215. *STh I*, q. 96, a. 3 ad 2.
216. *STh II-II*, q. 47, a. 10 ad 2.
217. *STh I*, q. 60, a. 4 ad 3.
219. *Sent. IV*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 2 ad 1.
220. FERNÁNDEZ BURILLO, *El Amor de Amistad*, op. cit., p. 63: «El amor de predilección puede salvar una desigualdad ilimitada. (...) Aristóteles no se equivoca al fundar el amor en la igualdad, pues las cosas no son amables con amor de benevolencia (el esclavo, en cuanto esclavo,
por ejemplo, es como un buey); se equivocó en este punto: en ignorar que el amor es capaz de elevar al inferior a la altura del superior. (...) Hablamos de un tipo de benevolencia que él no consideró.»

222. STh I-II, q. 109, a. 3.
223. STh I, q. 60, a. 4.
224. AQUINAS, ST. THOMAS, Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus (Texto Taurini 1953 editum), Corpus Thomisticum (website), Pamplona 2007, q. 4, a. 1 ad 9.
225. STh I-II, q. 94, a. 2.
226. STh I, q. 60, a. 4.
227. STh I, q. 20, a. 1.
228. STh I, q. 6, a. 1.
229. Super Eph., cap. 5, lect. 10.
231. STh I-II, q. 55, a. 2.
232. Sent. De anima, no. 3.
234. Cfr. STh I, q. 107, a. 2.
235. Sent. III, d. 29, q. 1, a. 5.
236. AQUINAS, ST. THOMAS, Homo quidam erat dives (Texto Lutetiae Parisiorum 1879 editum), Corpus Thomisticum (website), Pamplona 2007, pars 3.
238. Cfr. STh I-II, q. 114, a. 10.
240. STh I, q. 19, a. 2.
241. STh I-II, q. 63, a. 1
242. STh I, q. 60, a. 1.
243. STh I-II, q. 91, a. 2.
244. STh I-II, q. 91, a. 2.
245. De Vir., q. 4, a. 1 ad 9.
246. STh I-II, q. 85, a. 1.
247. STh I-II, q. 94, a. 1 ad 2.
248. Di BLASI, F., Practical Syllogism, Prouiresis, and the Virtues: Toward a Reconciliation of Virtue Ethics and Natural Law Ethics: «New Things & Old Things» 1 (2004) pp. 21-41, p. 41: «Practical syllogism is grounded first of all on nous. And nous, in Aristotle, refers to an intellectual objective knowledge acquired by induction. This knowledge grounds the work of logos both at the level of the major premise and at the level of the minor premise. But both the practical character and the correct working of the nous-dianoia knowledge depend on the excellence of the appetite –orexis– and always refers to, and finds its completion or perfection in, the concrete action which concludes the syllogism. Practical knowledge is, first of all, the lived moral knowledge of the rationally acting agent and only remotely it is knowledge –either reflexive or not– of first values or practical principles (major-premise level) and knowledge of suitable means (minor-premise level). Practical knowledge, properly speaking, cannot be separated from the (particular and concrete) action. A universal knowledge of the good is practical only secundum quid, as far as it is directed to the action. Otherwise it would be theoretical knowledge, no longer searching, but contemplating the good. This is a very important point: for Aquinas the intellectual (nous) knowledge of the good is not practical knowledge, because «practical» is only what relates to the action –and action relates to the means. If you are already enjoying the end, or the good, your intellectual knowledge of it is theoretical.»
249. STh I-II, q. 94, a. 2. Cfr. STh I-II, q. 94, a. 2.
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250. *STh* I-II, q. 91, a. 2 ad 2.
251. *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 7 ad 3.
252. *STh* I-II, q. 1, a. 7.
253. *STh* I-II, q. 91, a. 3 ad 3.
254. *STh* II-II, q. 108, a. 2.
256. *Sent.* I, d. 17, q. 2, a. 3.
258. *STh* I-II, q. 9, a. 1.
259. *STh* I-II, q. 19, a. 3 ad 2.
260. *STh* I, q. 117, a. 1 ad 3.
261. *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 5 ad 3.
262. *De Pot.*., q. 3, a. 7 ad 13.
263. *Sent.* II, d. 7, q. 2, a. 1 ad 2.
265. *STh* I, q. 60, a. 2.
266. *STh* I, q. 103, a. 5 ad 3.
267. *STh* I-II, q. 19, a. 10 ad 1.
268. *STh* I-II, q. 19, a. 10.
269. *STh* I-II, q. 19, a. 10.
270. *STh* I, q. 96, a. 2.
272. *STh* II-II, q. 29, a. 1.
273. *STh* I-II, q. 19, a. 10.
274. *Sent.* IV, d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 1 co.
275. *STh* II-II, q. 29, a. 3 ad 2.
276. *STh* I-II, q. 19, a. 10 ad 1.
279. Cfr. chap. III-2.1, p. 194, also *STh* I-II, q. 85, a. 4.
281. *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 5 ad 3.
282. Cfr. *STh* II-II, q. 47, a. 6 ad 3.
283. *STh* I, q. 94, a. 3
286. *Sent.* II, d. 20, q. 2, a. 3 co.
287. *STh* I-II, q. 10, a. 1 ad 1.
288. *STh* I, q. 106, a. 1 ad 3.
289. *STh* I, q. 79, a. 5 ad 3.
290. *De Vér.* (I), p. 61-2 (q. 2, a. 2 co.).
291. *De Vér.* (I), p. 61 (q. 2, a. 2.).
292. *De Vér.* (I), p. 61 (q. 2, a. 2).
293. *STh* I, q. 87, a. 1.
295. *CTh*, p. 109 (chap. 113).

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297. STh I, q. 94, a. 3.
298. Sent. IV, d. 38, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 1 ad 3.
299. Sent. IV, d. 38, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 1 co. 1.
300. STh II-II, q. 26, a. 4.
301. Sent. Polit., lib. 1, lect. 1, no. 29.
302. STh I, q. 117, a. 1.
303. STh II-II, q. 109, a. 2 ad 3.
304. Sent. III, d. 29, q. 1, a. 5.
305. Cfr. STh I-II, q. 21, a. 3.
307. STh I-II, q. 100, a. 2
308. Cfr. STh II-II, q. 23, a. 7.
309. CCC, no. 1939.
310. STh I-II, q. 1, a. 7 ad 3.
311. De Malo, q. 4, a. 1.
312. Symb., a. 10.
313. STh I-II, q. 21, a. 3.
314. Sent. II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4 ad 4.
315. Cfr. STh III, q. 65, a. 1.
316. ScG, lib. III, cap. 95, no. 5.
318. STh II-II, q. 47, a. 13
319. PCJP, CSDC, nn. 167
320. Super Matt., cap. 25, lect. 2.
321. Cfr. JP II, SRS, no. 38. This aspect of the virtue is highlighted in the Compendium. Cfr. PCJP, CSDC, no. 193: «Solidarity rises to the rank of fundamental social virtue since it places itself in the sphere of justice. It is a virtue directed par excellence to the common good, and is found in “a commitment to the good of one’s neighbour with the readiness, in the Gospel sense, to ‘lose oneself’ for the sake of the other instead of exploiting him, and to ‘serve him’ instead of oppressing him for one’s own advantage.”»
322. Cfr. chap. IV-1.1, p. 261 and STh I, q. 93, a. 9 ad 4.
323. PCJP, CSDC, nn. 202-203: «Justice... acquires a fuller and more authentic meaning in Christian anthropology. (...) The full truth about man makes it possible to move beyond a contractualistic vision of justice, which is a reductionist vision, and to open up also for justice the new horizon of solidarity and love. ‘By itself, justice is not enough. Indeed, it can even betray itself, unless it is open to that deeper power which is love’.»
324. Ibid., no. 203. Also ibid.: «If peace is the fruit of justice, ‘today one could say, with the same exactness and the same power of biblical inspiration (cfr. Is 32:17; Jas 3:18): Opus solidaritatis pax, peace as the fruit of solidarity’.»
325. Cfr., for example, CCC, no. 2407, no. 2439. Cfr. also the section Status Quaestionis (p. 26) in the Introduction.
326. STh II-II, q. 80, a. 1.
327. Cfr. CHALMETA, G., La justicia política en Tomás de Aquino. Una interpretación del bien común político, Pamplona 2002, p. 151: «El individuo, para vivir bien, debe proponerse como fin la realización del bien común de la sociedad, o sea, la vida buena o virtuosa de todos sus miembros.» Sellés observes that, as society is a necessary means for the perfection of man, it is incumbent on man to make good use of that means. Cfr. SELLES, Persona Humana, op. cit., p. 196-7: «La sociedad es el medio o la condición sine qua non de la mejoría esencial humana. Si la sociedad es medio, lo peculiar de un medio es que se use de él.»

329. *STh II-II*, q. 47, a. 3. Cfr. AQUINAS, *STh Thomas*, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics* (Litzinger, C.I.; McInerny, R., trans.), Notre Dame 1993, p. 370 (Bk. VI, lect. 4, no. 2 [1140a 25-28;1162]): «[Aristotle] says that it seems to pertain to the prudent man that he can, by the power of habit, give good advice about proper and useful goods, not only in some particular matter—for example, what things are useful for health or bodily strength—but also about things good and useful for the benefit of the total life of man.»

330. *STh I-II*, q. 57, a. 5; *ibid.*, q. 65, a. 4; *STh II-II*, q. 56, a. 1 ad 1.

331. *STh I-II*, q. 65, a. 4.

332. Cfr. *STh II-II*, q. 47, a. 11.

333. *STh II-II*, q. 58, a. 9 ad 3.

334. JP II, *SRS*, no. 40: «Solidarity therefore must play its part in the realisation of this divine plan, both on the level of individuals and on the level of national and international society.»

335. *STh I-II*, q. 57, a. 4 ad 3.


337. *STh II-II*, q. 47, a. 11.

338. *STh II-II*, q. 47, a. 11.

339. *STh II-II*, q. 48, a. 1 (numeration added).


341. *STh II-II*, q. 23, a. 7.

342. Cfr. *STh I*, q. 103, a. 4. and *STh I*, q. 94, a. 3.


344. *STh I-II*, q. 61, a. 5.


346. *Sent. I*, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1 ad 3.


348. *De Vir.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 9.

349. *De Malo*, q. 4, a. 1.

350. *De Vir.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 9.

351. *STh III*, q. 8, a. 3.


354. e.g. 1 Cor 12:12-27.

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