
How to cite this article:

AZPIROZ, M.L., "Framing as a tool for mediatic diplomacy analysis: study of George W. Bush's political discourse in the "War on Terror", *Communication&Society/Comunicación y Sociedad*, Vol. 26, n. 2, 2013, pp. 176-197.

Framing as a tool for mediatic diplomacy analysis: study of George W. Bush's political discourse in the "War on Terror"

El framing como herramienta de análisis de la diplomacia mediática: estudio del discurso político de George W. Bush en la "Guerra contra el Terror"

MARÍA LUISA AZPIROZ

mazpiroz@alumni.unav.es

Doctora en Comunicación. Universidad de Navarra (Spain) 31080 Pamplona.

Submitted: Nov 27, 2012

Approved: Dec 17, 2012

ABSTRACT: Public diplomacy is an international political communication activity to which States and other organizations resort in order to achieve political objectives abroad and to establish positive relations with foreign publics. It is an activity that has evolved to adapt to the new global context, adding new characteristics and giving place to the so-called "new public diplomacy". One of the different variants of public diplomacy is mediatic diplomacy, whose end is to get the public diplomacy's message transmitted by institutional media or to get a positive coverage by foreign media. This article proposes a specific process to apply the framing theory as a tool for political discourse analysis, an essential

element of mediatic diplomacy. The process is applied to George W. Bush's political discourse during the first months of the "War on Terror".

RESUMEN: *La diplomacia pública es una actividad de comunicación política internacional a la que recurren Estados y otras organizaciones, con el fin de lograr objetivos políticos en el exterior y establecer relaciones positivas con públicos externos. Se trata de una actividad que ha evolucionado para adaptarse al nuevo contexto global, incorporando nuevas características y dando lugar a la denominada "nueva diplomacia pública". Entre las distintas variantes de diplomacia pública se encuentra la diplomacia mediática, cuyo fin es lograr que el mensaje de la diplomacia pública se transmita a través de medios institucionales o reciba una cobertura positiva en medios de comunicación extranjeros. Este artículo propone un proceso específico para aplicar la teoría del framing como herramienta de análisis del discurso político, elemento fundamental de la diplomacia mediática. Un proceso que se aplica al discurso político de George W. Bush en los primeros meses de la "Guerra contra el Terror".*

Keywords: Public diplomacy, "new public diplomacy", mediatic diplomacy, political discourse, framing, "War on Terror", Bush.

Palabras clave: diplomacia pública, "nueva diplomacia pública", diplomacia mediática, discurso político, framing, "Guerra contra el Terror", Bush.

1. Introduction

In the last decade, the interest for public diplomacy has been notably intensified in the academic and diplomatic arena. The renewed relevance that the United States granted to public diplomacy after 9/11 and the emergence of a new conception of this activity, that has been called "new public diplomacy", have contributed to it. This article considers mediatic diplomacy as a fundamental component of both the more traditional public diplomacy and of the "new public diplomacy". Therefore it addresses, in the first place, the characterization of mediatic diplomacy inside the broader and more debated concept of public diplomacy. Secondly, the so-called Bush Doctrine and the public diplomacy strategies developed during the "War on Terror" are explained, paying special attention to the role that mediatic diplomacy played on them. The third part addresses the empirical use of the framing theory in the analysis of political discourse, a fundamental element of mediatic diplomacy. Based on the contributions of Jim A. Kuypers, Robert M. Entman and Stephen D. Reese, a specific process of analysis is proposed. Finally, the process is applied to the analysis of Bush's discourse in two case studies located in the first months of the "War on Terror": the first one spans from 9/11 to the beginning of the Afghanistan War, and the second one includes the months before the beginning of the Iraq War.

2. Public diplomacy and mediatic diplomacy

Public diplomacy is an international political communication activity. Teresa La Porte, for example, has defined it as “the art of cultivating public opinion in order to achieve foreign policy goals [...]”¹. From this more instrumental perspective, which prevails in the practice of traditional public diplomacy, the activity is understood as a tool to serve the image and foreign policy interests of those who perform it (mainly states and international organizations, like the European Union). It is understood that those who perform it are worried about the opinions and behaviors of other countries’ citizens because of their importance for their interests, since other countries’ citizens influence the decision-making and actions related to foreign policy of their respective governments or organizations.

The allusions to a “new public diplomacy” come up in parallel with the evolution that traditional public diplomacy experiences to adapt itself to the new global context. Some innovative traits attributed to “new public diplomacy” are the incorporation of new technologies, the further promotion of dialogue, the active involvement of non-governmental agents, the aim of encouraging nation-building and the incorporation of practices from marketing and public relations². Regarding this last trait, it is important to note Juan Luis Manfredi’s contribution. Aware of the changes in the international arena affecting public diplomacy, Manfredi bets on the development of communicative strategies in line with foreign policy and that correspond to an ordered pattern with mission, vision, objectives and results measurement. This includes the identification and analysis of relevant audiences, the design of campaigns and construction of messages, the execution of campaigns and an evaluation of results³. The process is very similar to the process followed in marketing and public relations campaigns.

For Kathy P. Fitzpatrick, the most prominent feature of “new public diplomacy” is its more discursive perspective of the activity itself: the emphasis would be placed on cooperation, understanding and mutual benefit. Accordingly, Fitzpatrick has defined “new public diplomacy” as “the management function that establishes and maintains mutually beneficial relationships between an organization and the publics on whom its

¹ LA PORTE, María Teresa, “The Power of the European Union in Global Governance: A Proposal for a New Public Diplomacy”, *CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Paper 1*, Figueroa Press, Los Angeles, 2011, p. 13.

² Cfr. SEIB, Philip, *Toward a New Public Diplomacy. Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009; CASTELLS, Manuel, “The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance”, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 616, n° 1, 2008, pp. 78-93; COWAN, Geoffrey, ARSENAULT, Amelia, “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy”, *The Annals of the American Academy and Political Science*, vol. 616, n° 10, 2008, pp. 10-30; NOYA, Javier, *Diplomacia pública para el siglo XXI. La gestión de la imagen exterior y la opinión pública internacional*, Ariel, Barcelona, 2007; FITZPATRICK, Kathy R., “Advancing the New Public Diplomacy: A Public Relations Perspective”, *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, vol. 2, n° 3, 2007, pp. 187-211; MELISSEN, Jan, *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005; VAN HAM, Peter, “Branding Territory: Inside the Wonderful Worlds of PR and IR Theory”, *Millenium-Journal of International Studies*, vol. 31, n° 2, 2002, p. 249-269.

³ Cfr. MANFREDI, Juan Luis, “Hacia una teoría comunicativa de la diplomacia pública”, *Comunicación y Sociedad*, vol. 24, n° 2, 2011, pp. 199-225.

success or failure depends”⁴. Contributions like that of Fitzpatrick raise a number of questions about the basis that should guide public diplomacy (or “new public diplomacy”): Should public diplomacy look for the achievement of foreign policy interests (instrumental perspective) or the aim should be to achieve a network cooperation in which relations were managed to obtain mutual benefit (discursive perspective)? Is it possible to combine both perspectives?

Beyond the distinction between traditional public diplomacy and “new public diplomacy”, or between the instrumental and discursive perspective, it is important to note that there are different types or variants of public diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy and mediatic diplomacy are present since the beginning of public diplomacy; nation branding and niche diplomacy are more recent. Cultural diplomacy is characterized by the realization of cultural and educative activities; mediatic diplomacy resorts to the media as the main channel to promote political discourse; nation branding tries to convey a favorable image of a country⁵ and niche diplomacy develops strategies aimed to influence or to acquire prominence in specific ideas or themes, as well as in specific audiences.

Mediatic diplomacy⁶, object of interest in this article, resorts to the media as the main instrument to ensure that political discourse has an echo and is transmitted abroad in a favorable way, be it in a direct way (through them, in the case of institutional media) or in an indirect way (influencing or having a positive coverage on them, in the case of foreign public and private media). Mediatic diplomacy is an activity that works in the short and medium term, and whose traditional actors are political personalities and diplomatic representatives. Among its most characteristic actions are the speeches, press conferences, interviews, comments to the media, media events and the organization of specific informative activities. The object of these actions is to promote a specific view of actuality, to defend political decisions and to provide information. In conclusion, the political message that receives media coverage abroad could be considered as mediatic diplomacy. And, if the coverage is positive, it could be considered as successful mediatic diplomacy. So, mediatic diplomacy can be understood as an essentially instrumental public diplomacy variant. However, the current generalization of new technologies and social networks, and their repercussion in traditional media, could

⁴ To define the “new public diplomacy”, Fitzpatrick adopts the definition that Cutlip, Center and Broom give for public relations, according to the symmetric bidirectional model.

CUTLIP, Scott M., CENTER, Allen H., BROOM, Glen M., *Effective Public Relations*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1985, p. 2, cited in FITZPATRICK, Kathy R., *op. cit.*, p. 190.

⁵ The book *Retos de nuestra acción exterior: Diplomacia pública y Marca España*, which addresses the challenges of the Spain Brand from different perspectives, illustrates the multiple dimensions that make up the image of a country abroad.

Cfr. ALONSO, Gabriel, MANFREDI, Juan Luis, RUBIO, Rafael (eds.), *Retos de nuestra acción exterior: Diplomacia pública y Marca España*, Colección Escuela Diplomática, 2012.

⁶ I’ve chosen the term “mediatic diplomacy” (“diplomacia mediática” in Spanish), because I wanted to make a distinction between the noun “media” (the media: radio, television, papers...) and the adjective “media” (referring to receiving coverage by the media: media coverage). Literature in this regard, mainly in English, use the terms “media diplomacy” or “mediated public diplomacy”. I consider the term “media diplomacy” more appropriate to refer to specific situations in which the media themselves take the initiative and act as diplomatic actors. I also consider that the term “mediated public diplomacy” could be more appropriate to refer to any public diplomacy initiative that receives foreign media coverage (and which does not necessarily transmit a political message, such as a cultural exhibition). To consult contributions of different authors on this respect, cfr. AZPÍROZ, María Luisa, *Diplomacia pública: El caso de la “Guerra contra el Terror”*, UOC, Barcelona, 2012.

modify the understanding and practice of mediatic diplomacy, resulting in a more discursive activity.

Returning to the previous questions it could be stated that, in reality, the instrumental and discursive perspectives of public diplomacy coexist from the beginnings of public diplomacy. Traditional public diplomacy includes activities of discursive nature, such as cultural diplomacy activities. And, while the “new public diplomacy” can give more weight to the discursive perspective, the strength and impact of political discourse is still an important element. The fact that public diplomacy serves the interests of a country or organization necessarily implies that it is an instrumental activity, but this is not incompatible with the adoption of strategies and actions typical of the “new public diplomacy” or of a more discursive perspective of the activity.

3. *The “War on Terror” and the role of mediatic diplomacy*

As stated, 9/11 made the United States’ interest in public diplomacy reappear. So, the “War on Terror” was accompanied by public diplomacy strategies, whose message relied on the Bush Doctrine. The term Bush Doctrine is employed to refer to the ideas on security and foreign policy that supported the “War on Terror” actions and the United States’ public diplomacy message⁷. It can be summarized in three premises. First, the United States does not make distinctions between terrorists and those who support or harbor them: nations will have to choose between fighting terrorists or sharing their fate⁸. This gives place to a fight against an enemy that may include both terrorist groups and states. The second premise is based on the National Security Strategy of September 2002⁹, which was applied to the Iraq War. The document containing the strategy suggests the possibility that the United States conduct “preemptive strikes”¹⁰ if it is necessary for security reasons, so is must be prepared to

⁷ Cfr. SINGH, Robert, “The Bush Doctrine”, in BUCKLEY, Mary, SINGH, Robert, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism. Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge, New York, 2006, pp. 12-32; BOTES, Marina, *The Public Diplomacy of the United States of America in the War on Terror*, Dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2007. <http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-11192007-141127/unrestricted/dissertation.pdf> [access November 10, 2012].

The term Bush Doctrine became popular to refer to the military and security strategy of Bush Administration in the “War on Terror”.

⁸ Cfr. BUSH, George W., *Decision Points*, Virgin, London, 2010.

⁹ Cfr. MILITARY EDUCATION RESEARCH LIBRARY NETWORK. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, 17/09/2002. <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf> [access November 10, 2012].

¹⁰ Authors like Alastair Finlan note that neither the National Security Strategy of 2002 nor Bush talked ever about “preventive strikes”, but about “preemptive strikes”. According to Antony J. Blinken, the distinction between “preventive” and “preemptive” is important, since the idea of a “preventive war” is much more controversial than the idea of a “preemptive war”, and it is more stigmatized in international relations. For Blinken, the difference would lie in the imminence factor: a “preemptive war” is developed against adversaries that are an imminent threat or are about to attack, while a “preventive war” is developed against adversaries that could be a threat or could attack in the future. Although Bush Administration talked about “preemptive strikes”, in the months before the Iraq war the critical sectors considered that the Bush Doctrine defended “preventive strikes”. Many claimed that such strikes are contrary to international law; therefore they constitute aggression and are illegitimate.

Cfr. FINLAN, Alastair, “International Security”, in BUCKLEY, M., SINGH, R., *The Bush Doctrine and*

stop rogue states and their terrorist allies before they are able to threaten or to use weapons of mass destruction against the country and their allies and friends¹¹. That is to say, the “War on Terror” would be done on the offensive and not on the defensive, attacking enemies abroad before they could attack at home. The third premise of the Bush Doctrine is based on the same document, which also links terrorism to the lack of elements like freedom, democracy and free enterprise. A governance model based on these elements would be the only sustainable model and the one the United States should promote in order to achieve national success, to end terrorism and to secure peace.

The “War of Ideas” (2001-2005), the first public diplomacy strategy of the “War on Terror”, tried to improve the image of the United States abroad in order to conquer “the hearts and minds” of the moderate Muslims against terrorism messages, as well as to achieve international cooperation in the “War on Terror”. In order to do that, it was necessary to design the United States’ message properly, spreading the values of its culture in a successful way and explaining its policies¹².

The second one, the “Transformational Diplomacy” (2005-2009), is developed after the military intervention in Iraq in the spring of 2003 and after the outbreak of scandals such as the torture of prisoners in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo or the knowledge of the existence of secret prisons and CIA flights in Europe. Therefore, the aim was to transform global attitudes towards the United States and its policies, promoting understanding among cultures and religions and convincing about the success and convenience of the “War on Terror”. The strategies also pleaded for a democratic transformation of countries, especially in the Middle East, and to accomplish this transformation through the development of civil society and the collaboration with it (nation building)¹³.

The academic community has shown consensus in the consideration that the instrumental perspective was in general dominant in the public diplomacy developed by the United States during the “War on Terror”¹⁴. During the “War of Ideas”, apart from the political discourse, mediatic diplomacy initiatives were launched. For example, the creation of specific agencies to coordinate communications (such as the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Influence or the White House’s Office of Global Communications); of institutional mass media that alternated information with entertainment and were aimed mainly at a Muslim and young audience (such as *Radio Sawa*, *Radio Farda*, *Al*

the War on Terrorism. Global Responses, Global Consequences, Routledge, New York, 2006, pp. 150-164; BLINKEN, Antony J., “From Preemption to Engagement”, *Survival*, vol. 45, n° 4, 2003, pp. 33-60; SHUE, Henry, RHODIN, David, *Preemption. Military Action and Moral Justification*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

¹¹ Cfr. MILITARY EDUCATION RESEARCH LIBRARY NETWORK, *op. cit.*

¹² Cfr. BEERS, Charlotte, “The United States, Europe, and the Muslim World: Revitalizing Relations after September 11”, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15/05/2002. <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/us/10377.htm> [access November, 10 2012].

¹³ Cfr. AZPÍROZ, María Luisa, *op. cit.*

¹⁴ Cfr. CULL, Nicholas J., “Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past”, *CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy*, Figueroa Press, Los Ángeles, 2009; LA PORTE, María Teresa, “La diplomacia pública americana. Lecciones para una comunicación internacional”, *Comunicación y Sociedad*, vol. 20, n° 2, 2007, pp. 23-59; SNOW, Nancy, TAYLOR, Philip M., “The Revival of the Propaganda State: U.S. Propaganda at Home and Abroad Since 9/11”, *International Communication Gazette*, vol. 68, 2006, pp. 389-407; SNOW, Nancy, *Propaganda, Inc. Selling America’s Culture to the World*, Seven Stories Press, New York, 2002; HOFFMAN, David, “Beyond Public Diplomacy: Weapons of Mass Communication”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, n° 2, 2002, pp. 83-95.

Iraqiya or *Al Hurra*); and of institutional publications (such as *Irak: From Fear to Freedom*, *Irak: A Population Silenced* or *Iraq's Voices of Freedom*). The “Transformational Diplomacy” included initiatives such as the reality road *On the Road in America*, starring young Muslims travelling the United States; or the creation of a Rapid Response Office to follow world news about the United States and to offer a coordinated and consistent message to foreign publics. There was an attempt to take more advantage of new technologies in order to encourage interactivity in the media, in line with the “new public diplomacy” and with a more discursive perspective. However, the possibilities of dialogue were not exploited enough, and messages remained unidirectional¹⁵.

In any case, political discourse pronounced in speeches, press conferences and interviews, especially that of George W. Bush because of its content and global media coverage, constituted the main asset of mediatic diplomacy during the “War on Terror”, as well as the backbone of the United States’ public diplomacy in general¹⁶. Therefore, stopping to analyze it is of great interest. The empirical application of the framing theory is a good option for it¹⁷.

4. Use of framing in discourse analysis

In the field of Communication, framing is the process by which different actors use the language to define and construct interpretations on issues and to connect it with a broader context¹⁸. In Political Communication, framing is the process by which political actors (politicians, the media, social movements...) select and establish priorities when interpreting and explaining reality¹⁹, appealing to symbols and ideas shared by the members of the same society²⁰. Politicians turn to framing constantly, in order to give explanations and communicate their ideas and proposals to citizens.

The framing theory can be applied to the analysis of political discourse employing different methodologies (quantitative, qualitative or mixed) and identifying different variables, such as framing mechanisms or reasoning mechanisms/functions of framing.

¹⁵ Cfr. TAYLOR, Philip M, “Can the Information War on Terror be Won? A Polemical Essay”, *Media, War and Conflict*, vol. 1, n° 1, 2008, pp. 118-124.

¹⁶ Although some of Bush’ speeches were theoretically aimed at a United States audience (such as his speeches at the Congress), their content and international media coverage allow considering them also as mediatic diplomacy actions.

¹⁷ According to Robert M. Entman and the “cascading activation model”, an exhaustive study of mediatic diplomacy and its impact employing the framing theory should include the analysis of political discourse, an evaluation of its influence in the media and of the media’s influence in the audience. Also how influences work upwards in the cascade and other type of influences, such as private pressure or global media news frames. In my thesis, I analyze Bush’s speech and its influence on the Spanish press.

Cfr. AZPÍROZ, María Luisa, *op. cit.*; ENTMAN, Robert M, “Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case”, *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, vol. 13, n° 2, 2008, pp 87-102.

¹⁸ Cfr. KINDER, Donald R., NELSON, Thomas E., “Democratic Debate and Real Opinions”, in CALLAGHAN, Karen J., SCHNELL, Frauke, *Framing American Politics*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2005, pp. 103-123.

¹⁹ Cfr. ENTMAN, Robert M., “Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case”, *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, vol. 13, n° 2, 2008, pp. 87-102.

²⁰ Cfr. SÁDABA, Teresa, *Framing, el encuadre de las noticias. El binomio terrorismo-medios*, La Crujía, Buenos Aires, 2008.

The so-called framing mechanisms are the focal points that serve to identify a particular frame²¹. For example, the use of key words and phrases, descriptions, metaphors, examples, historical and cultural references that, because of its symbolic content or repetition, are attributed to a specific frame. For its part, reasoning mechanisms (causal analysis, consequences and effects, appealing to principles) provide justifications or arguments for the adoption of certain frames²². Robert M. Entman talks about four functions of framing (which turn out to be very similar to reasoning mechanisms): problem definition, causal analysis, remedy and evaluation²³. The interrelation of the four functions of framing results in frames: narratives with which to promote a number of interpretations. According to Entman, the more relevant functions of framing are problem definition, because it predetermines the rest of the frame; and remedy, because it directly promotes support (or opposition) to public policies²⁴.

This article applies a qualitative analysis methodology that proceeds as follows:

First, and based on the frame analysis system proposed by Jim A. Kuypers, the themes²⁵ related to the “War on Terror” about which the United States president talks in the selected speeches are identified, as well as the interpretations he provides. During the process of identification of themes and interpretations, framing mechanisms are indirectly found (for example, descriptions, key phrases or historical references). The most striking ones are commented in the presentation of results, either in the text or in footnotes.

Second, the interpretations found are classified according to the functions of framing they exert: problem definition, causal analysis, remedy and evaluation. Due to space constraints, Bush’s complete frame or narrative is not going to be presented, but only the two most important functions of framing according to Entman: problem definition and remedy.

Finally, and according to Stephen D. Reese, framing is considered as a process in constant activity that includes and excludes interpretations through time. The evolution of the two functions of framing, from the first case study (from 9/11 to the beginning of the Afghanistan War) to the second one (the months before the Iraq War) is described.

²¹ Cfr. TANKARD, James W, “The Empirical Approach to the Study of Media Framing”, in REESE, Stephen D., GANDY, Oscar H.J., GRANT, August E., *Framing Public Life. Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ, 2001, pp. 95-106. According to Tankard, in the identification of framing mechanisms in the media, attention is usually paid, for example, to the location of informative or opinion pieces, to the elements with more impact (front pages, collective headings, headings, leads, photographs...) or the presence of different sources.

²² Cfr. GAMSON, William A., MODIGLIANI, Andre, “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach”, *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 95, nº 1, 1989, pp. 1-37.

²³ Cfr. ENTMAN, Robert M, *Projections of Power. Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2004, p. 6.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

²⁵ “A theme is the subject of discussion, or that which is the subject of the thought expressed. The frame, of course, is suggesting a particular interpretation of the theme”.

KUYPERS, Jim A., “Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective”, p. 302, in D’ANGELO, Paul, KUYPERS, Jim A., *Doing News Framing Analysis. Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Routledge, New York, 2009, pp. 286-312.

5. George W. Bush's discourse in the "War on Terror": two case studies

To analyze Bush's discourse, a fundamental part of mediatic diplomacy in the "War on Terror", two case studies have been chosen. The first spans from 9/11 to the beginning of the Afghanistan War, and the second one includes the months before the Iraq War. The political discourse about the two main military interventions of the "War on Terror" takes place in these periods. Besides, these are two interesting cases to compare, taking into account the different reception Bush's discourse had in different places of the world. The analysis of the two case studies allows also checking how the United States' political discourse evolves, from the global commotion generated by the terrorist attacks to the international crisis regarding the possible Iraq War.

For the first case study, statements and speeches that allow observing how the message of the "War on Terror" was initially shaped have been selected. Bush's statements on September 11, 12 and 13, 2001, are the first ones after the terrorist attacks, and some key ideas that supported the war against international terrorism are stated on them. The speech to both houses of Congress on September 20, 2001, has been included because it is the first one the President pronounces before the nation's political representatives after 9/11, because a political strategy is already configured on it and because of the symbolism it contains. The announcement of the start of the Afghanistan War on October 7, 2001, has been considered as relevant because it represents the official beginning of the "War on Terror". Finally the speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 10, 2001, is included because the President addresses the "War on Terror" message to political representatives from the entire world.

The material selected for the second case study includes, first, the State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, because it represents the beginning of the debate about Iraq: the existence of an "axis of evil" formed by Iraq, Iran and North Korea is pointed out for the first time. Also the speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 12, 2002, since Bush focuses almost exclusively on explaining to the international political representatives the threat that Iraq represents. To see how the political discourse on Iraq evolves, the State of the Union speech, pronounced on January 28, 2003, has been included. Finally, the statements and press conferences of the Azores Summit hold on March 16, 2003, are included because it is the last time, before the Iraq War, that Bush explains to the international community the threat that Hussein's regime represents²⁶.

In order to confirm that the speeches analyzed had international media coverage and can be considered as mediatic diplomacy, their coverage in the main Spanish newspapers (*El País*, *El Mundo* and *ABC*) at that moment was taken as reference. Information, opinion and analysis pieces alluding to the speeches and statements that constitute the analyzed sample, the two days after these were delivered, were counted:

	12,13,14,15 September 2001	21,22 September 2001	8,9 October 2001	11,12 November 2001	30,31 January 2002	13,14 September 2002	29, 30 January 2003	17, 18 March 2003
<i>EL PAÍS</i>	10	3	5	5	3	8	10	14
<i>EL MUNDO</i>	11	6	3	2	3	6	8	19
<i>ABC</i>	6	3	4	3	6	5	6	11

²⁶ See references of the speeches and statements analyzed at the end of the bibliography.

5.1. First case study: 9/11 and the Afghanistan War

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, marked, both in the United States and in many other countries, a turning point in the perception of threats to global security. The policy priorities of the Bush Administration were drastically modified: from 9/11 and for the rest of his term, the first objective and main concern of the United States government would be the fight against international terrorism, a fight that Bush named with the expression “War on Terror”. The United States discourse focused on Osama Bin Laden, mastermind of the attacks and leader of the Islamist terrorist group Al Qaeda, and on the “War on Terror”, a defense strategy against terrorism whose first initiative would be the military intervention in Afghanistan. This was to get Bin Laden and the terrorists, to defeat the Taliban government, considered a terrorist accomplice as well as illegitimate and brutal with the Afghan people, and to bring democratic freedom to that country.

–Main themes identified: 9/11, terrorists, terrorism, Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, weapons of mass destruction, Taliban regime, Afghanistan, “War on Terror”, United Nations resolutions, Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

–Problem definition:

According to Bush’s discourse, the 9/11 events are “more than acts of terror”: they are “acts of war”²⁷. It’s the “war of the 21st century”²⁸, declared against the United States but also against the entire “civilized world”²⁹, against freedom-loving people “everywhere in the world”³⁰, since a shared civilization is threatened³¹, the way of life that freedom and democracy provide³².

For the United States, the first direct attack since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 takes place on 9/11. The vulnerability of its defense system is revealed³³. For the “civilized world” in general, it is a new kind of war, because it is declared by a new kind of enemy: international terrorism.

According to Bush, the terrorists are the heirs of the murderous ideologies of the 20th century, such as fascism, nazism and totalitarianism, and they will follow their same path: disappearance³⁴. They sacrifice human lives to advance their radical views, and they neglect all values in their eagerness to gain power³⁵. They are distinguished from

²⁷ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team”, 12/09/2001.

²⁸ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Pledges Assistance for New York in Phone Call with Pataki, Giuliani”, 13/09/2001.

²⁹ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People”, 20/09/2001.

³⁰ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Remarks by the President...”, *op. cit.*

³¹ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush Speaks to United Nations”, 10/11/2001.

³² Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Statement by the President in his Address to the Nation”, 11/09/2001; “Remarks by the President...”, *op. cit.*

³³ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*

The parallelism between 9/11 and Pearl Harbor was especially suggestive for the American people, since in both cases there was an attack against civilian and military objectives from the air, unprovoked and with the predictable result of a war.

³⁴ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*

³⁵ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*

previous enemies because they attack and then they hide³⁶. Bush points at “a collection of terrorist organizations informally affiliated and known as Al Qaeda”³⁷, also responsible for the bombings of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and for the attack against the United States navy destroyer *USS Cole* in 2000. This group and their leader, Osama Bin Laden, are linked to many other organizations in different countries, such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. All of them form a “global terror network”³⁸ that exploit poverty and despair and trains its member in camps where the tactics of terror are taught³⁹. Few countries meet the rigorous criteria of brutality and oppression of terrorists, so everyone is a potential target⁴⁰. The definition of the new enemy is completed in the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 2001, when Bush points at a new danger that threatens the civilization shared by all, and whose perception has been intensified following Bin Laden’s statements in an interview with a Pakistani newspaper. The same terrorists who want to end the way of life that freedom and democracy provide, search “weapons of mass destruction” to turn their hate into holocaust⁴¹. If they got these weapons, be them chemical, biological or nuclear, nothing could prevent them from using them.

But Bush highlights that the enemy is not only international terrorism: it is formed also by the governments that support it⁴². The main accused is the Taliban government of Afghanistan, a country where the worldview of Al Qaeda is realized⁴³:

...we condemn the Taliban regime. [...] It is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder⁴⁴.

So, the Taliban regime is doubly denounced. On the one side, because it is an ally of Al Qaeda and a sponsor of international terrorism. Furthermore, it has condemned the Afghan people to misery and starvation, besides brutally restricting all kinds of freedom⁴⁵.

–Remedy:

Bush’s consideration of 9/11 attacks as acts of war allows him to respond in terms of war, the “War on Terror”, which includes the possibility of applying military solutions. It is important to note that a war against “terror”, a more symbolic word and with more resonance than “terrorism”, allows including a broader and more undefined enemy, which includes both terrorists and states⁴⁶.

³⁶ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Remarks by the President...”, *op. cit.*

³⁷ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*

³⁸ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*

³⁹ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush Speaks to...”, *op. cit.*

⁴⁰ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush Speaks to...”, *op. cit.*

⁴¹ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush Speaks to...”, *op. cit.*

The use of the term “weapons of mass destruction” referring to chemical, biological and nuclear arms has an important symbolic potential, since it refers to the possibility of killing a large number of people.

⁴² Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*

⁴³ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*

⁴⁵ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*

⁴⁶ The first days Bush use the term “War on Terrorism”, but since September 16, 2001, he substitutes it for the term “War on Terror”.

Therefore, the “War on Terror” is a strategy of fight against terrorism, on multiple fronts. Bush describes it as a war in which freedom faces fear⁴⁷; in which, as in the Second World War, the “civilized world” struggles to defend its way of life and its principles, which along with freedom are progress, pluralism and tolerance⁴⁸. The “War on Terror” is based on the idea that to achieve peace those who threaten it must be pursued⁴⁹, destroying terrorism wherever it grows⁵⁰. From the outset, Bush talks about a war that will be long⁵¹ and that will be won “through the patient accumulation of successes”⁵². It will therefore be a different war, which will go beyond retaliation and isolated strikes⁵³. It is for this reason that Bush rejects any comparison with the quick war against Iraq on 1990 or with the air war over Kosovo on 1999, where not a single soldier was lost⁵⁴. Thus, the “War on Terror” begins with Al Qaeda and Afghanistan, but goes beyond: it is about defeating the “global terror network”⁵⁵, and not only through military actions, but using all the possible resources⁵⁶.

The United States president says that the obligations that the new conflict creates to the international community are defined in the Resolution 1.373, adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on September 28, 2001⁵⁷. Such obligations involve taking energetic measures against terrorist funding, sharing intelligence with other countries, coordinating efforts to enforce the law and preventing the terrorists from possessing weapons of mass destruction. But Bush goes further in the diplomatic arena, and requests democratic nations a full engagement against terrorists, without exceptions or excuses. He also requests them to collaborate in an agenda of peace and prosperity throughout the world, which would work as an alternative of opportunity and hope against terrorism⁵⁸.

Regarding the specific case of Afghanistan, on September 20, 2001, the President demands the Taliban government to take a series of immediate measures, “not open to negotiation or discussion”, if it doesn’t want to share the fate of the terrorists⁵⁹. These measures consist of handing over the leaders of Al Qaeda, releasing unjustly imprisoned foreigners, closing terrorist training camps and letting the United States verify that they are no longer operational. Since these demands were not met, on October 7, 2001, Bush announces the beginning of the military intervention in Afghanistan (the “Operation

⁴⁷ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*; “President Bush Speaks to...”, *op. cit.*

⁴⁸ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Presidential Address to the Nation”, 07/10/2001.

⁵⁰ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*

⁵¹ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Remarks by the President...”, *op. cit.*; “Presidential Address to...”, *op. cit.*

⁵² Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Presidential Address to...”, *op. cit.*

⁵³ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*

⁵⁴ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*

⁵⁵ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*

⁵⁶ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Presidential Address to...”, *op. cit.*

⁵⁷ The Resolution 1.373, of September 28, 2001, completes the Resolution 1.368 of September 12, 2001, which legitimates the struggle against terrorism just one day after the attacks.

Cfr. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, “Resolution 1.373 (2001)”. [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1373\(2001\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1373(2001)) [access November 10, 2012].

⁵⁸ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush Speaks to...”, *op. cit.*

⁵⁹ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Address to a Joint Session...”, *op. cit.*

Enduring Freedom”)⁶⁰. The targets are the terrorist camps of Al Qaeda and the military installations of the Taliban regime. The United States President notes that another important part of the campaign will be the humanitarian aid to the Afghan people: while striking military targets, they would drop food, medicines and supplies⁶¹. Once defeated the Taliban government, the United States, along with other countries, with the United Nations and with development banks, will help rebuild the country. And it will work with the United Nations to support a post-Taliban government that represents all the Afghan people⁶².

Finally, the President sees the importance that making a proposal for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has for the “War on Terror”. The United States wants a return to negotiations, and that both Israel and Palestine live as two states, in peace and security. But this requires that both renounce forever “to incitement, violence and terror”⁶³.

5.2. Second case study: the months before the Iraq War

In the State of the Union address of January 2002 George W. Bush noted the existence of an “axis of evil” consisting of regimes susceptible to use weapons of mass destruction and the terrorists to whom these could be delivered, and he specifically mentioned Iraq, Iran and North Korea. This marked the beginning of an intense international debate that would be extended until March 2003. The debate focused on the alleged link to terrorism and the possession of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq, as well as the possibility of a military intervention in the country. The discourse with which the United States President defended his stance on Saddam Hussein’s regime during the months before the attack was of key importance to foreign policy, because divergences on how best to proceed in Iraq marked a before and after in the United Nations, in the United States relationship with different members of the European Union and in the stance of international public opinion regarding Bush Administration’s “War on Terror”⁶⁴.

–Main themes identified: “War on Terror”, terrorists, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Saddam Hussein, United Nations Resolutions, United Nations, Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

⁶⁰ The military operation was initially called “Operation Infinite Justice”, but Bush Administration decided to change it for “Operation Enduring Freedom” due to the objections of practitioners of Islam, who argued that only Allah can provide infinite justice.

Cfr. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/infinite-justice.htm> [access November 10, 2012].

⁶¹ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “Presidential Address to...”, *op. cit.*

⁶² Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush Speaks to...”, *op. cit.*

⁶³ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Bush Speaks to...”, *op. cit.*

⁶⁴ Many works address the international crisis over Iraq. Cfr. NIKOLAEV, Alexander G., HAKANEN, Ernest A., *Leading to the 2003 Iraq War. The Global Media Debate*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006; BARBÉ, Esther, *¿Existe una brecha transatlántica? Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea tras la crisis de Irak*, Catarata, Madrid, 2005; ALBA, Santiago, *Washington contra el mundo*, Foca, Madrid, 2003; KRASNO, Jean E., SUTTERLIN, James S., *The United Nations and Iraq. Defanging the Viper*, Praeger, Westport, CT, 2003.

–Problem definition:

Bush's discourse on Iraq falls within its strategy of the "War on Terror", "the first war of the 21st century", which confronted the United States and the rest of the "civilized world", defenders of global security and democracy, with "twin threats": terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of dictators⁶⁵. Terrorists and outlaw regimes accept no laws or morality, and their violent ambitions are limitless⁶⁶.

In November 2001, the United States President had already warned about the possibility that terrorists used weapons of mass destruction. Now, the search and possession of these kinds of weapons by outlaw regimes makes the danger even greater. The regimes of Iraq, Iran and North Korea, which are part, along with the terrorists, of what Bush calls "axis of evil", could use weapons of mass destruction to blackmail other countries, spread terror and commit mass murder. They could also give or sell those weapons to the terrorists, who would use them without hesitation⁶⁷.

Specifically, with respect to Iran, Bush says it is a country where there is no freedom, human rights or democracy. And regarding the North Korean government, he claims that it is an oppressive regime that condemns its people to live in fear and misery, a regime that has been developing nuclear weapons to inflict fear and win concessions on the international scene⁶⁸.

The United States President insists specially in the case of Iraq: he considers that it is clear that Saddam Hussein "has something to hide" from the civilized world⁶⁹.

First, he says that the Iraqi government fails to comply with United Nations resolutions, seeks weapons of mass destruction and supports terror. It could provide these arms to its terrorist allies or use them itself, making the 9/11 attacks "a prelude to far greater horrors"⁷⁰. In addition, he claims that Hussein's regime represses its people. In the Azores Summit it is recalled that Hussein started two wars of aggression against his neighbors, has turn Iraq into an international pariah and oppresses his citizens, thus representing a serious threat to the security of the region and the world.

Second, Bush claims that the Iraqi breach of United Nations resolutions during twelve years challenges the authority and the foundational role of "the world's most important multilateral body", that is to struggle for peace making deliberations more than words and resolutions more than wishes⁷¹. The Iraqi regime represents the kind of aggressive threat that the United Nations was created to fight. Besides, Saddam Hussein's gestures are designed to divide and drag the international community to a perpetual negotiation, never providing a real and concrete cooperation leading to disarmament. It can't be allowed that in Iraq will happen the same as in North Korea, where there was a

⁶⁵ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "President Bush: Monday 'Moment of Truth' for World on Iraq", 16/03/2003; WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "Statement of the Atlantic Summit: Commitment to Transatlantic Solidarity", 16/03/2003.

⁶⁶ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly", 12/09/2002.

⁶⁷ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "President Delivers State of the Union Address", 29/01/2002; WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly", 12/09/2002; WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "President Delivers 'State of the Union'", 28/01/2003.

⁶⁸ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "President Delivers 'State...'", *op. cit.*

⁶⁹ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "President Delivers State...", *op. cit.*

⁷⁰ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "President's Remarks at the...", *op. cit.*

⁷¹ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "President's Remarks at the...", *op. cit.*; "President Bush: Monday...", *op. cit.*

mistaken confidence on negotiation to avert the country from developing nuclear weapons⁷².

During the months of debate on Iraq, the United States President continues linking the “War on Terror” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: he recalls that the common security is also threatened by this ethnic and religious strife that is ancient but not inevitable⁷³.

–Remedy:

According to Bush’s discourse, the “War on Terror” seeks to end with the terrorists and with those who harbor them. Also to prevent regimes seeking weapons of mass destruction from threatening the United States and the world. To do so, terrorists and their sponsor states must be prevented from achieving the materials, technology and experience necessary to develop weapons of mass destruction. Thus, overall, removing training camps and bringing terrorists to justice is proposed. Effective missile defenses must also be developed, in order to protect America and its allies from a sudden attack. These measures make necessary a large increase in defense and intelligence budget devoted to security in the foreign and domestic field⁷⁴.

Regarding the specific case of Iran, Bush expresses his support for the aspirations of the population to live in freedom, to choose their government and to determine their fate. As for North Korea, he says he is working with countries in the region to find a peaceful solution and to show the North Korean government that nuclear weapons will only bring isolation, economic stagnation and difficulties⁷⁵.

Bush focuses his message on proposing solutions to the threat posed by Iraq. In his speech to the United Nations, he proposes five points that Hussein’s regime must meet if he wants peace and a last chance to disarm. These points are related to the performance of the resolutions issued on Iraq by the United Nations. First, eliminating all weapons of mass destruction and related material. Second, ending all support to terrorism, as required to any state. Third, stopping targeting sectors of the Iraqi civilian population. Fourth, releasing, giving explanations and collaborating regarding the Gulf War detained and disappeared personnel. Finally, ending illicit trade outside the “Oil for Food” program, accepting the United States administration of funds for the program, so that the money will serve to the benefit of the Iraqi people⁷⁶.

In January 2003, Bush considers that Hussein has missed the last opportunity given by Resolution 1.441, adopted on November 8, 2002. This resolution demands the Iraqi dictator to obey the disarmament obligations if he doesn’t want to expose himself to “serious consequences”. But Hussein hasn’t given explanations to the inspectors about the weapons of mass destruction, showing his contempt for the United Nations and the world’s opinion. Documents and materials are being hidden to the United Nations inspectors, and Iraqi intelligence officers pose as the scientists that inspectors have to interview while the real scientists are intimidated about what to say. The only explanation to all these maneuvers is a desire for domination, intimidation or attack by the Iraqi regime. To demonstrate the United States’ accusations Bush announces that, on February 5, Secretary of State Colin Powell will show the United Nations Security Council information and intelligence evidences of the Iraqi regime’s illegal weapons

⁷² Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Delivers ‘State...’”, *op. cit.*

⁷³ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President’s Remarks at the...”, *op. cit.*

⁷⁴ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Delivers State...”, *op. cit.*

⁷⁵ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President Delivers ‘State...’”, *op. cit.*

⁷⁶ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, “President’s Remarks at the...”, *op. cit.*

programs, its attempt to hide the weapons from the inspectors and its links with terrorist groups⁷⁷.

In March 2003, the Azores leaders insist that Hussein must comply with the resolutions imposed by the United Nations Security Council, especially with Resolution 1.441. This implies proving that he doesn't have and is not developing weapons of mass destruction, letting the inspectors do their job in Iraq without any obstacle. The resolution warned that if Iraq did not disarm it would be disarmed by force: after four and a half months trying to get Hussein to cooperate, the Iraqi regime has not disarmed. The Azores leaders also remember that in the draft resolution they presented to the United States Security Council on March 7, 2003⁷⁸, the date March 17, 2003, was established as the deadline for the Iraqi President to fulfill the resolutions, disarm and avoid the "serious consequences" mentioned in Resolution 1.441. Therefore, they establish that if these conditions have not been met once the deadline has arrived, Hussein has two options: to leave the country or to face disarmament by force. Thus, responsibility for what happens in Iraq rests solely on him⁷⁹. This is not a declaration of war, but the last chance offered to Hussein to achieve a political solution to the Iraqi problem⁸⁰.

According to the Azores leaders, the military presence in Iraq in order to ensure safety, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, the delivery of humanitarian aid and the reconstruction of the country, will be temporary, although the commitment to support the Iraqis will be long-range⁸¹. To do this, they ask for the help of the international community: they intend to work in partnership with international institutions, allies and donors, and to adopt the United Nations resolutions that may be necessary after the conflict⁸².

Thus, to get a better future for the Iraqi people, the Azores leaders issue a joint declaration in which they pledge to work for an economic and democratic reconstruction that gets to achieve a free Iraq, respecting its territorial integrity and the members of ethnics and religious groups⁸³. And they propose to ensure, through the United Nations General Secretary, that the "Oil for Food" program is met: Iraq's natural

⁷⁷ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "President Delivers 'State...'", *op. cit.*

To read Powell's statement before the United Nations Security Council cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council", 05/02/2003. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html> [access November, 10, 2012].

⁷⁸ On February 24, 2003, The United States, the United Kingdom and Spain presented a draft resolution to the United States Security Council, which declared that Iraq had failed to meet the last opportunity to disarm granted by Resolution 1.441. On March 7, 2003, they included a deadline for Saddam to prove he had fully disarmed: March 17, 2003. That date was also the last day for the Security Council to vote for or against the draft resolution. On March 17, 2003, the draft resolution was finally removed without been voted in the Security Council, and Bush gave Saddam Hussein a final ultimatum of 48 hours to go into exile and avoid war.

To read the draft resolution of the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain, on March 7, 2003. Cfr. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, "Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution". <http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/res-iraq-07mar03-en-rev.pdf> [access November 10, 2012].

⁷⁹ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "President Bush: Monday...", *op. cit.*

⁸⁰ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "President Bush: Monday...", *op. cit.*: "Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People", 16/03/2003.

⁸¹ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision...", *op. cit.*

⁸² Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision...", *op. cit.*

⁸³ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision...", *op. cit.*

resources would be protected as a property, as a resource and for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Bush's discourse bets on an independent and democratic Palestine, living next to Israel in peace and security. Therefore, the United States will encourage both parts to take their responsibilities and will try to reach an agreement for the conflict⁸⁴. This proposal is repeated at the Azores Summit, where it is declared that the peace process for the pacific coexistence of both states must be done with all the necessary security guarantees and putting an end to terrorism. The appointment of Abu Mazen as Palestinian leader with authority enough to confront terrorism and consolidate the reforms necessary to carry forward the peace process is valued as positive⁸⁵.

5.3. *The evolution of Bush's discourse: from Islamist terrorism to weapons of mass destruction*

The comparison of the evolution of the themes included in the two case studies suggests that, although some themes are recurring, others are clearly linked to the Afghanistan or the Iraq War⁸⁶:

Recurring themes	Themes linked to the Afghanistan War	Themes linked to the Iraq War
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Terrorists · Terrorism · "War on Terror" · Israeli-Palestinian conflict 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Osama Bin Laden · Al Qaeda · Taliban regime · Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Saddam Hussein · Iraq, Iran, North Korea · Weapons of mass destruction · United Nations resolutions · United Nations

Bush's political discourse and its evolution in the two case studies reflect the premises and the evolution of the Bush Doctrine, as well as the aims of the public diplomacy strategy applied in the first place: the "War of Ideas".

In 2001, Bush's discourse on the "War on Terror" defines the problem in a clear and simple way: 9/11 terrorist attacks have been "acts of war" against the "civilized world" carried out by terrorists driven by hatred of freedom and democracy. The President initially focuses on Al Qaeda and its leader, Osama Bin Laden. In a few days, he adds all those governments that somehow support international terrorism to the initial description of the enemy, pointing specifically to the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. At the end of 2001, Bush introduces a new element to his problem definition, which will be the main focus of his message during the Iraq crisis: terrorists could search and use weapons of mass destruction. Based on this idea, from January 2002, the description of the enemy considers terrorists and a group of countries (Iraq, Iran and North Korea) as an "axis of evil" that search and/or could have weapons of mass destruction, in order to deliver them to the terrorists or to use them themselves. Since then, terrorism itself

⁸⁴ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "President's Remarks at the...", *op. cit.*

⁸⁵ Cfr. WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, "President Bush: Monday...", *op. cit.*: "Statement of the Atlantic Summit: Commitment...", *op. cit.*

⁸⁶ The themes "weapons of mass destruction" and "United Nations resolutions" are already mentioned in the first case study, but they are much more developed in the second one.

remains in the background against the threat that, according to the United States President, Iraq represents. So, the premise used to intervene the Taliban regime (regimes that support or harbor terrorism are also enemies) gives way to the premise to intervene the Iraqi regime (regimes who have weapons of mass destruction could give them to terrorists or use them themselves).

As a solution to terrorism, in 2001 Bush proposes the strategy of the “War on Terror”, a war on many fronts against the “global terror network” that includes terrorists and those who harbor them, and which tries to establish an agenda of peace and prosperity that works as an alternative to terrorism.

The first military initiative of the “War on Terror” is the Afghanistan War, which begins just weeks after 9/11 when the Taliban refuse to meet Washington’s demands, for example handing over the terrorists harboring in their territory or releasing foreign prisoners. As it has been seen, from January 2002 the objective of the “War on Terror” evolves, and the struggle against the “axis of evil” regimes is included as part of it, although the political discourse focuses almost exclusively on Iraq. Just as Bush carefully details the reasons why Iraq is a threat to global security, he also details in a very specific way the conditions that Hussein’s regime must meet to avoid a military intervention. These conditions are related to the implementation of the United States Security Council resolutions and with the abandonment of any link with terrorism.

In September 2002, at the United Nations, Bush sends a double message: on the Iraqi threat and on the United States commitment to diplomacy and to the United Nations proceedings. This way, a diplomatic agreement on Iraq is reached, and in November 2002 the Security Council issues Resolution 1.441, which urges Hussein’s regime to allow, for one month, the inspections required to check if there are weapons of mass destruction. However, given the lack of concrete results and the inspectors’ request of more time, an international diplomatic debate begins, in which the United States claims that Hussein is not fulfilling Resolution 1.441 and that this resolution must be enforced, by force if necessary. Finally, the Iraq war begins in March 2003 without a specific United Nations resolution, precisely in order to fulfill one of its resolutions.

6. *Conclusions*

Mediatic diplomacy is an important type of public diplomacy, in which political discourse and the media acquire the maximum relevance for achieving foreign policy objectives. It is an activity that may act directly (through institutional media) or indirectly (trying to have a positive coverage in foreign media). In all cases, political discourse aims to transmit a specific frame (directly to the audience in the case of institutional media, or to foreign media in the other cases). If the frame is received positively, mediatic diplomacy will have been successful.

To evaluate the success or failure of mediatic diplomacy in a media it is important, in the first place, to establish methods that serve to analyze the political discourse and its key aspects, as it has been done in this article. The identification of themes in Bush’s discourse is evidence that there are a series of themes specifically associated with the Afghanistan or Iraq War, and others that are associated with the “War on Terror” in general and repeated in the two case studies. Besides, the analysis of the functions of framing “problem definition” and “remedy” allows checking which framing

mechanisms have been included, how Bush's discourse has been constructed and how it has evolved introducing new themes and interpretations that signal new problems and remedies. Finally, thanks also to the previous contextual study, the analysis process verifies that Bush's frame during the first months of the "War on Terror" was coordinated with the objectives of the public diplomacy strategy "War of Ideas", and that it incorporated the premises of Bush Doctrine.

Thus, it has been confirmed that framing theory, and in particular the contributions of Jim A. Kuypers, Robert M. Entman and Stephen D. Reese, allow to design a process of political discourse analysis simple and effective. The analysis confirms Entman's assertions: the most important functions of framing are "problem definition", because it predetermines the rest of the frame, and "remedy", because it directly promotes support (or opposition) to public policies. Reese's view of framing as a constantly active process, that includes and excludes interpretations over time, is also confirmed.

To determine whether the political discourse's frame has had a positive coverage in the media object of study, it would be necessary to perform at least a second and third step, as Entman's "cascade activation model" suggests. In a second analysis, the dominant frame transmitted by the media (different frames can coexist in the same media) should be identified, and also if there is a positive reception of the political discourse's frame and why. This requires a far more laborious and complicated analysis than that of political discourse. To determine which the dominant frame in the media is, all the pieces that address issues related to the terrorist attacks and the "War on Terror" should be analyzed in this case (even if they don't refer to Bush's speeches and statements directly). After comparing the political frame and the frame predominant in the media, to determine the cause of a positive or negative reception of the political frame multiple factors should be taken into account. For example, the editorial line of the newspaper, the individual perspective of columnists and analysts, the factors that condition journalists' work the receipt of other frames or the political culture in which the media is inscribed. A third step to evaluate the success of mediatic diplomacy would consist in analyzing the influence of the media frame in public opinion.

References

- ALBA, Santiago, *Washington contra el mundo*, Foca, Madrid, 2003.
- ALONSO, Gabriel, MANFREDI, Juan Luis., RUBIO, Rafael (eds.), *Retos de nuestra acción exterior: Diplomacia pública y Marca España*. Colección Escuela Diplomática, 2012.
- AZPÍROZ, María Luisa, *La diplomacia pública estadounidense de la "Guerra contra el Terror". Análisis y evaluación de la influencia del mensaje político en la prensa española*, Universidad de Navarra, doctoral thesis defended on December 16, 2011.
- BARBÉ, Esther, *¿Existe una brecha transatlántica? Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea tras la crisis de Irak*, Catarata, Madrid, 2005.
- BLINKEN, Antony J., "From Preemption to Engagement", *Survival*, vol. 45, nº 4, 2003, pp. 33-60.
- BOTES, Marina, *The Public Diplomacy of the United States of America in the War on Terror*, Dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2007.
- <http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-11192007-141127/unrestricted/dissertation.pdf> [access November 10, 2012].
- BUSH, George W., *Decision Points*, Virgin, London, 2010.

- CASTELLS, Manuel, "The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 616, nº 1, 2008, pp. 78-93.
- COWAN, Geoffrey, ARSENAULT, Amelia, "Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy", *The Annals of the American Academy and Political Science*, vol. 616, nº 10, 2008, pp. 10-30.
- CULL, Nicholas J, "Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past", *CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy*, Figueroa Press, Los Angeles, 2009.
- CUTLIP, Scott M., CENTER, Allen H., BROOM, Glen M., *Effective Public Relations*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1985.
- ENTMAN, Robert M., "Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case", *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, vol. 13, nº 2, 2008, pp. 87-102.
- ENTMAN, Robert M, *Projections of Power. Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2004.
- FINLAN, Alastair. "International Security", in BUCKLEY, M., SINGH, R., *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism. Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge, New York, 2006, pp. 150-164.
- FITZPATRICK, Kathy R., "Advancing the New Public Diplomacy: A Public Relations Perspective", *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, vol. 2, nº 3, 2007, pp. 187-211.
- GAMSON, William A., MODIGLIANI, Andre, "Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 95, nº 1, 1989, pp 1-37.
- HOFFMAN, David, "Beyond Public Diplomacy: Weapons of Mass Communication", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, nº 2, 2002, pp. 83-95.
- KINDER, Donald R., NELSON, Thomas E., "Democratic Debate and Real Opinions", in CALLAGHAN, Karen J., SCHNELL, Frauke, *Framing American Politics*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2005, pp. 103-123.
- KRASNO, Jean E., SUTTERLIN, James S., *The United Nations and Iraq. Defanging the Viper*, Praeger, Westport, CT, 2003.
- KUYPERS, Jim A., "Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective", in D'ANGELO, Paul, KUYPERS, Jim A., *Doing News Framing Analysis. Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, Routledge, New York, 2009, pp. 286-312.
- LA PORTE, María Teresa, "The Power of the European Union in Global Governance: A Proposal for a New Public Diplomacy", *CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Paper 1*, Figueroa Press, Los Angeles, 2011.
- LA PORTE, María Teresa, "La diplomacia pública americana. Lecciones para una comunicación internacional", *Comunicación y Sociedad*, vol. 20, nº 2, 2007, pp. 23-59.
- MANFREDI, Juan Luis, "Hacia una teoría comunicativa de la diplomacia pública", *Comunicación y Sociedad*, vol. 24, nº 2, 2011, pp. 199-225.
- MELISSEN, Jan, *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005.
- NIKOLAEV, Alexander G., HAKANEN, Ernest A., *Leading to the 2003 Iraq War. The Global Media Debate*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006.
- NOYA, Javier, *Diplomacia pública para el siglo XXI. La gestión de la imagen exterior y la opinión pública internacional*, Ariel, Barcelona, 2007.
- SÁDABA, Teresa, *Framing, el encuadre de las noticias. El binomio terrorismo-medios*, La Crujía, Buenos Aires, 2008.
- SEIB, Philip, *Toward a New Public Diplomacy. Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009.
- SHUE, Henry, RHODIN, David, *Preemption. Military Action and Moral Justification*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

- SINGH, Robert, "The Bush Doctrine", in BUCKLEY, Mary, SINGH, Robert, *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism. Global Responses, Global Consequences*, Routledge, New York, 2006, pp. 12-32.
- SNOW, Nancy, TAYLOR, Philip M., "The Revival of the Propaganda State: U.S. Propaganda at Home and Abroad Since 9/11", *International Communication Gazette*, vol. 68, 2006, pp. 389-407.
- SNOW, Nancy, *Propaganda, Inc. Selling America's Culture to the World*, Seven Stories Press, New York, 2002.
- TANKARD, James W., "The Empirical Approach to the Study of Media Framing", in REESE, Stephen D., GANDY, Oscar H.J., GRANT, August E., *Framing Public Life. Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ, 2001, pp. 95-106.
- TAYLOR, Philip M., "Can the Information War on Terror be Won? A Polemical Essay", *Media, War and Conflict*, vol. 1, n° 1, 2008, pp. 118-124.
- VAN HAM, Peter, "Branding Territory: Inside the Wonderful Worlds of PR and IR Theory", *Millenium-Journal of International Studies*, vol. 31, n° 2, 2002, pp. 249-269.

Other sources

- BEERS, Charlotte, "The United States, Europe, and the Muslim World: Revitalizing Relations after September 11", Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15/05/2002. <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/us/10377.htm> [access November 10, 2012].
- GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, "Operation Infinite Justice". <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/infinite-justice.htm> [access November 10, 2012].
- MILITARY EDUCATION RESEARCH LIBRARY NETWORK, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", 17/09/2002. <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf> [access November 10, 2012].
- UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, "Resolution 1.373 (2001)". [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1373\(2001\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1373(2001)) [access November 10, 2012].
- UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, "Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution". <http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/res-iraq-07mar03-en-rev.pdf> [access November 10, 2012].
- WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVE

First case study. George W. Bush's Speeches and Statements

- "Remarks by the President after Two Planes Crash into World Trade Center", 11/09/2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911.html> [access November 10, 2012].
- "Remarks by the President upon Arrival at Barksdale Air Force Base", 11/09/2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-1.html> [access November 10, 2012].
- "Statement by the President in his Address to the Nation", 11/09/2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html> [access November 10, 2012].
- "Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team", 12/09/2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html> [access November 10, 2012].
- "National Day of Prayer and Remembrance for the Victims of the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001", 13/09/2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913-7.html> [access November 10, 2012].

“President Pledges Assistance for New York in Phone Call with Pataki, Giuliani”, 13/09/2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913-4.html> [access November 10, 2012].

“Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People”, 20/09/2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> [access November 10, 2012].

“Presidential Address to the Nation”, 07/10/2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html> [access November 10, 2012].

“President Bush Speaks to United Nations”, 10/11/2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html> [access November 10, 2012].

Second case study. George W. Bush’s Speeches and Statements

“President Delivers State of the Union Address”, 29/01/2002. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> [access November 10, 2012].

“President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly”, 12/09/2002. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html> [access November 10, 2012].

“President Delivers ‘State of the Union’”, 28/01/2003. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html> [access November 10, 2012].

“President Bush: Monday ‘Moment of Truth’ for World on Iraq”, 16/03/2003. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030316-3.html> [access November 10, 2012].

“Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People”, 16/03/2003. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030316_1.html [access November 10, 2012].

“Statement of the Atlantic Summit: Commitment to Transatlantic Solidarity”, 16/03/2003. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030316-2.html> [access November, 2012].

“U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council”, 05/02/2003. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html> [access November 10, 2012].