UNA VOZ DIFERENTE
EN LA EDUCACIÓN MORAL
CHARACTER EDUCATION AND MORAL EDUCATION IN ARISTOTLE AND ROUSSEAU

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Social and political concern about the individual's behavior in society is the focus of growing interest in the field of education on an international scale. The issue, however, is not new in a society that is constantly diagnosing itself as suffering from one form of crisis or another. Education programs that attempt to address this problem have been called by different names: 'character education', 'moral education', 'civic education', 'values education', and 'social education' among others. Experts, who are inclined to espouse an integral model of education, make us recall—whether deliberately or not—ideas from the past. This paper will discuss the concept of paideia in relation to the moral and civic dimensions of education as it is developed in the works of Aristotle and Rousseau. The reason for this is twofold: first, while representing different epochs, both have had great repercussions in the history of western culture, as well as, on the history of education; and second, both offer us models of education that continue to be relevant in our time.

1. DIFFERENT NOMENCLATURE: CHARACTER EDUCATION OR MORAL EDUCATION

Aristotle and Rousseau differ in terminology when referring to this particular aspect of education: character education and moral education, respectively. This difference, however, cannot be merely attributed to the linguistic peculiarities of their respective epochs. Rather, each term moral or character actually represents a different way of understanding what the education process consists in. Aristotle in using the term character is referring to an individual’s personality, which influences how the individual would act in different circumstances. This tendency to behave in a particular way is a combined product of nature and of ethos that has been directed, fostered and reinforced by others through a process called character education. In contrast, for Rousseau, the term moral has to do with the individual relating with others in order to act and to live. To form the individual, the intervention of other people is necessary and this activity is what is considered educational.

These two perspectives do have some things in common; but they also have significant differences. A point of agreement is that Aristotle, like Rousseau, does not think that an individual can develop completely without the help of other human beings. Similarly, for Aristotle, character education is always moral, in the same sense that Rousseau gives it, because he cannot conceive of any individual without any social relation. It cannot be said, however, that Rousseau’s concept of what is moral, which he limited to the social sphere, completely coincides with the idea of Aristotle. In the Aristotelian conception, to be a man in the full sense of the word is to be good both as an individual and as a citizen and this is what constitutes a good life. On the other hand, for Rousseau, to be a man is to be an individual human being that is meant to live and to be on his or her own. However, given the stage at which man has evolved in time, he or she is now required fortuitously to live and to be with others. Hence, by the force of circumstances, the individual has undergone a transformation from a being for himself or herself to a being for himself or herself that is compatible with the being for himself or herself of other human beings. It, therefore, seems that Rousseau admits a stage in which it is possible for the individual to develop outside of human society. Other human beings are necessary only for the material things and only while the individual lacks required maturity. Besides, education is considered in the negative sense, that is, its role is to remove the obstacles that may impede the development of character, which when left unhampered is supposed to develop spontaneously in man. This kind of education is what Rousseau calls character education that is qualified as distinct from moral education. Thus, in Emile, his principal work on education, he divides the process of education in two stages: pre-moral and moral.

In summary, from the Aristotelian point of view, character education is always moral because to form the individual to be a complete human being is to make him or her good. In contrast, for Rousseau, moral education is directed at enabling the individual to conserve his ‘natural’ character in spite of having to live in society. Hence, it seems that Rousseau would divide the character education of Aristotle into two stages: first, an education oriented towards forming the individual’s character—negative education—and second, an education that is more properly called moral education.

2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NOTIONS OF EDUCATION, INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIABILITY

The diverse anthropological foundation that defines the relationship between sociability and individuality and that sustains the respective postures of Aristotle and Rousseau is the basis for the distinction between character education and moral education. This anthropological foundation directly concerns education because the relative priority given to educational purposes related to what is social or what is individual depends on it. Besides, it is related to the essence of educational activity in general. Education is always a relation among persons: the educator and the learner. Sometimes, however, more emphasis is placed on the importance of the learner’s self-education, that is, what the individual assimilates, what he or she makes his own and how he matures and grows. This is the case with Aristotle and Rousseau. Consequently, both may appear to give little or no importance to the activity of the educator; but this is far from the truth. Even in Rousseau’s concept of negative education that espouses the non-direct intervention in the individual’s process of maturation, the activity of the educator is not considered peripheral. In Rousseau’s conception of the process of education, the educator intervenes, except that it is done indirectly. Thus, in a certain sense, it may also be considered as positive education. It may be rightly claimed, therefore, that all education—including the stereotyped situation created by Rousseau that includes a mentor with his own pupil—is a process that always involves a social relation. This is the reason why the
anthropological perspective about human sociability influences the way education is conceived.

For Aristotle, the education of character is something natural to human beings because man is naturally sociable. Moreover, he thinks that it is only possible to be truly human if the individual relates with other persons. Besides, given the right conditions, this relationship would lead the individual to become a good man or woman. In this context, it is natural or it is to be expected that some persons have the task of telling the others how they should act. Correspondingly, given that the norms of conduct respect the nature of things, the others have to acknowledge the authority of those who can instruct them about how to become better. In the context of the polis, this implies that everyone has the responsibility to participate in the education for life. Thus, it can be seen why character education and civic or political education are so tightly interwoven.

In the theory of Rousseau, the tension between the individual and the society leads to a conception of education that is viewed from two conflicting prisms. On one hand, education is seen as an indispensable means to seek the equilibrium between man’s individuality and sociability. On the other hand, it is considered a threat to the moral autonomy of the individual because authority involves an imposition of arguments and value judgments of one person over another. Rousseau did not doubt that education is an aspect or a consequence of the sociability that man has to acquire, given the historical evolution of humanity. But he speaks of education as a process of denaturalization: first, the individual will have to learn to live for himself—the pre-moral stage—and then, to learn to live for himself with others—properly called the moral stage. This culminates in civic education. Rousseau affirms the continuity between the two stages; at least, he attempts to show that it is so. In fact, this effort could be gleaned in his description of the initial phases of the education process. But his idea that the individual should be left to mature by himself or herself in the first years of life led him to advocate that the child be allowed to treat the other people as things. His insistence on this requires that he exclude any consideration of what is moral during this first stage.

In the first stage, the child’s psychological development takes place at the margins of what is considered moral. Then, there is a division and a progress from what is psychological to what is moral, from the natural to the civic or social, from the maturation of the individual to the moral and social function of this maturation. This idea raises a problem: if both processes do not harmonize from the outset, they may be irreconcilable later on or at most they may obtain an artificial equilibrium that would be in constant danger of being ruptured anytime. Nevertheless, it has to be kept in mind that although Rousseau calls this first stage as pre-moral, it is still education, that is, the mentor intervenes; the preceptor is not passive like an inert object. Rousseau tries to be consistent with this posture. For example, his recommendations on the kind of language that the mentor could use and the situations that must be simulated or provoked reflect the kind of active involvement required of the educator. Consider also the importance that Rousseau gives to the educational function of language. According to him, without language, it would be very difficult for the child to develop his or her reasoning powers. However, to develop the language abilities of the individual, the child must be able to communicate with other individuals, although, at that early stage, the child may fail to recognize those individuals as other ‘I’.

3. THE DEFINITION OF EDUCATION IN ARISTOTLE AND IN ROUSSEAU

Let us now consider the definition of education in each of them. It has to be kept in mind that whenever Rousseau talks about education, he is referring to moral education. Education for him is the education of nature, of man and of things. In contrast, for Aristotle, it is the education of nature, habit and instruction or reason. Both affirm that education interrelates or coordinates the aforementioned elements in order that it may effectively fulfill the intended ends. Both also understand nature as referring to the innate endowments of an individual. Likewise, they agree that this initial endowment includes what is common to the human specie as such, as well as, characteristics peculiar to every individual, which has to be given special attention. Given their shared understanding of nature, both also coincide in their insistence in favor of individualized education, referring to attention given to each individual. It must be pointed out, however, that their ideas do not always coincide. Rousseau, given his conception of what is natural, leads him to insist that nature should be allowed to develop spontaneously by the removal of obstacles, assigning only an indirect role to the educators. In contrast, Aristotle gives high premium to the direct and positive intervention of the educator that gives impulse to the development of nature.

4. BN, X, 9, 1179 b; Pol., III, 13, 1332 a.
The other elements in the definition of education mentioned above highlight different factors in the educational process. The education of things, one of the permanent criteria in Rousseau’s pedagogy, refers to the experience that the individual acquires as he relates with the world, whose essential facet is cognitive. In reality, this is a continuation of or is parallel to the education of nature. Education at this level is primarily concerned with preparing the environment so that the individual could draw out the maximum cognitive benefits from his surroundings. However, neither the education of nature nor that of things is moral. In contrast, the education of men, which involves their instruction on how they could use the developed organs, is concerned with morality. Some authors have criticized this proposition as tantamount to learning through conditioning combined with a little instruction. Besides, they have pointed out that in this situation the learner is being manipulated completely.

When Aristotle talks of habits, he alludes to the action of the subject practicing those habits. When he talks of instruction, he is referring to the education of the practical reason. It is possible then that Rousseau would regard the education of habit in Aristotle as equivalent to his education of nature and of things and, partly, as education of men, that is, if Aristotle’s habits involve relationship with other men. Instruction, which is very limited in Rousseau’s thinking, may also be education of men. Note, however, that from the Aristotelian point of view, the education of men is not separate from the education of nature or of things. This is because he does think that human maturation would be possible outside of a social context. In contrast, Rousseau perceives a danger in an imbalance between the education of nature and of things, on the one hand, and the education of men, on the other hand; and this is precisely what he wanted to address. On the contrary, Aristotle believes that these three elements of education have unity. Besides, he considers habit and instruction as natural, though not in the sense of being spontaneous. However, since Rousseau thinks differently, he wanted to draw out a plan that tries to harmonize natural education with civic or moral education, which he sometimes calls national education. In contrast, Aristotle thinks that all education is natural and encompasses everything that is by nature good for man, consequently including civic education.

4. THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF EDUCATION

Both Aristotle and Rousseau speak of five stages that correspond to what might be regarded as distinct periods. Each period is distinguished by the attainment of a new quality in human action. Nevertheless, while Aristotle thinks that education is a continuing process that lasts throughout one’s lifetime, Rousseau maintains that it should end once the individual has reached maturity. The classical *paideia* is a process in which the individual learns to be human in the best way possible, attaining complete goodness and happiness; hence, Aristotle’s *paideia* never ends. For although he speaks of education as taking place in the period between infancy and adulthood, his ethical and political description of the human being leads us to conclude that education, understood as a process of acquiring perfection, never ends. This conception of a lifetime education is better appreciated when he insists on the formative value of friendship and of the political relations among the citizenry. Aristotle sees the end of educational activity in the good man and the good citizen, the wise man, the individual who has attained happiness. The teleological conception of human nature is the basis for looking at education as a continuous process.

Rousseau, on the other hand, strictly limits education to the period between infancy and adulthood. Once moral autonomy has been attained or the individual is self-sufficient, education would no longer be possible without infringing upon the freedom of the individual. In the final analysis, no matter how much it is concealed, education always involves a dependence on the will of another. Rousseau tends to focus on what he calls the original natural condition of man with the intention of preserving its spontaneous growth. Hence, he emphasized the importance of the infancy period, which the Greeks ignored. But once the subject is already endowed with the capacity to conserve his or her own natural condition, then the need for education ends. Perhaps an exception to this is the educational role he concedes to law and customs, which seem to serve the same function in the ideal society based on a social contract and in the Greek *polis*. In both cases, law and customs provide some form of moral and civic education for adults, which implies that education lasts during one’s lifetime. Besides, for both, the law is the embodiment of the way the citizens ought to conduct themselves to keep society a suitable place to live in for everyone. The law, then, strengthens the foundations of a stable society and even complements what some citizens cannot themselves fulfill due to a lack of education. Nevertheless, the two perspectives differ fundamentally. In the case of Rousseau, the law is an instrument for keeping the integrity of society such that if the citizens were perfectly educated, the law would no longer be necessary.
In contrast, for Aristotle, the law determines the way in which the common good can be incorporated in the lives of the citizens. This process always has room for improvement since the interior growth of each individual that enable one to live well can be perfected interminably.

5. THE PRACTICAL DIMENSION OF EDUCATION

Aristotle stresses the practical dimension of character and civic education. He affirms that one learns to be good by doing good deeds; one learns to be virtuous by practicing good habits; one learns to be a friend by having friends; and one learns to seek the common good by doing what the common good demands. The educator can facilitate this process by disposing, by guiding and by accompanying the learner. Disposing means strengthening or reinforcing the positive human tendencies and suppressing the inappropriate ones. Guiding means suggesting or proposing worthwhile objectives and giving reasons not only as to why certain objectives are worth pursuing, but also why other objectives are not suitable. Accompanying means watching over, caring, loving and sharing. This is how parents teach, but it is also how teachers, friends, legislators and statesmen teach. Hence, everyone in the polis should participate in the task of educating. For what is essential in the social relationships in the city is not economic subsistence but the activities that promote the interior growth that enable every citizen to work towards his or her proper end: being a good person and having a good life.

Rousseau shares this practical approach, insisting that one can only learn by doing and with the educator accompanying the learner. The process takes place naturally or spontaneously from within the individual, who has to learn by overcoming obstacles. He, however, does not talk of giving guidance, in the sense of predetermining goals and objectives. Nevertheless, the fact that he recommends that the educator keeps watch over the learner’s internal process of growth means that imposed objectives do exist, except that they are hidden. He further insists that to let the individual be and grow as he or she is, with freedom, one could not have any pre-conceived models. There is, however, a contradiction between what he says and what he describes as his conception of education. This is because one could not be neutral in education and Rousseau’s project demonstrates this fact. Although his intention is ‘to leave alone’ everything that arises from the nature of the learner, what he describes to be the praxis of his model of education fails to follow this criterion. There is, in fact, only one situation in which the educator should abstain from giving any guidance, that of specifying standards of behavior. Thus, Émile’s tutor avoids teaching desirable forms of conduct; whereas, educators inspired by the Aristotelian paideia do show their pupils the desirable behavior.

6. CONCLUSION

Both Aristotle and Rousseau present models of how moral and civic education could be approached. Their works contain sufficient indications in order to draw out the more fundamental issues that ought to be taken into consideration when studying this subject. In this paper, we have discussed the meaning that each author gives to character education and moral education. This is a reasonable starting point for any further analysis.

ABSTRACT

LA NOCIÓN DE EDUCACIÓN DEL CARÁCTER O MORAL SEGÚN ARISTÓTELES Y ROUSSEAU

La preocupación social y política por el comportamiento de los individuos en sus relaciones sociales ha suscitado en el ámbito educativo internacional un interés creciente. Se han desarrollado programas de formación que reciben denominaciones diferentes: educación del carácter, educación moral, educación cívica, educación en valores, educación social, etc. Resulta necesario para reflexionar sobre esta temática conocer qué han expuesto algunos autores del pasado que han influido más notablemente en el desarrollo del pensamiento pedagógico. Aristóteles y Rousseau son autores excelentes para este propósito comparando de paso etapas diversas como son la clásica y la moderna. Las nociones y denominaciones que utilizan para referirse a la dimensión moral de la educación son: educación del carácter en Aristóteles, y educación moral en Rousseau.

Desde el punto de vista aristotélico, la educación del carácter es siempre moral porque hacer del individuo un ser humano pleno es hacerle bueno. Viendo el tema desde la perspectiva de Rousseau, la educación moral busca que el individuo conserve su carácter ‘natural’ aun viviendo en sociedad. Rousseau dividiría la educación del carácter que promueve Aristóteles en dos etapas, la educación del individuo, que es formación de su carácter –educación negativa– para después pasar a una educación progresiva moral. En la raíz de la distinción entre educación moral y del carácter encontramos las diversas bases antropológicas que sustentan Aristóteles y Rousseau por las que establecen cuál es la relación entre sociabilidad e individualidad. El Estagirita destaca la posible armonía entre estas dimensiones humanas planteando la educación cívica como
LAS CONCEPTCIONES PSICOLÓGICAS DEL YO
EN LA POSTMODERNIDAD:
IMPLICACIONES PARA LA EDUCACIÓN MORAL Y CÍVICA

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1. INTRODUCCIÓN: LAS CONSECUENCIAS DE LA MODERNIDAD EN LA VISIÓN DEL YO

Uno de los centros de mayor interés científico de la Psicología ha sido el estudio de diferentes aspectos ligados al yo o si mismo (self)—autoconcepto, autoestima, autoconsciencia, autonomía, autorrealización, autocompresión, autorregulación, identidad, autocontrol, autopresentación, autodefensas, etc.—. Este interés deriva del supuesto de que nuestro funcionamiento psicológico—la forma en que percibimos y sentimos, nos motivamos y actuamos— depende en gran medida de cómo nos definimos. El autoconcepto, término al uso para designar la teoría que cada uno va construyendo de su identidad personal, es decisivo en la comprensión de la conducta de un individuo. Se puede decir que se convierte en una especie de profecía autocomplida (self-fulfilling prophecy). La preocupación por el autoconcepto se ha popularizado tanto, que hoy estamos inmuneados de libros, artículos, que constantemente nos recomiendan "encuentra a ti mismo", "sé tú mismo", "realízate", "definete a ti mismo" y nos ofrecen numerosas sugerencias y consejos para elevar nuestra autoestima, desarrollar nuestro potencial personal, aliviar nuestras crisis de identidad o guiarlos en la exploración de nosotros mismos.

De hecho se ha afirmado que la preocupación por el yo se halla especialmente hipertrofiada en la época actual. Buena muestra de ello ha sido el fuerte movimiento en favor de la autoestima que se inició en América hace algunos