

Presentation

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The year 2017 marks the 4th centennial of the death of Francisco Suárez, a key figure in the unfolding of Modern philosophy. As a good Scholastic theologian, the depth and breadth of the topics he focused on are indeed laudable. Recently, interest on this Spanish thinker has grown exponentially, in particular with regard to his contributions to metaphysics and international Law. His anthropological input, however, is perhaps lesser known. This monographic volume of *Scientia et fides* aims to bring into the light this aspect of the Suarezian *corpus*.

The Eximius Doctor did not manage to fully systematize his Psychology, even if during his early teaching spell at Segovia he wrote a detailed commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*. A few months before passing away he started a full revision of this youthful project, but sadly, as P. Baltasar Álvarez comments (*De opere sex dierum*: "Ad Lectorem"), the task remained unfortunately unfinished.

As a preparation for his centennial, the research group on Classic Spanish Thought of the University of Navarra sponsored a series of commemorative events. In May 14–15, 2015, it held the workshop 'The *De anima* treatise of Francisco Suárez and its projection in Modern philosophy'. This volume publishes the proceedings debated during those days, now edited as research articles.

The volume opens with two introductory papers. In the first one, Professor Jean-Paul Coujou (Institut Catholique de Toulouse) tackles the speculative foundations of the “science of the soul”, wherein corporeity plays a central role as a merging point between ontological universality and existential concreteness. “Being social” means to exist in the world, with others, by nature, and shaping history together. In this way we can link existence and temporality through the persistence of being.

In my own paper (José Ángel García Cuadrado, Universidad de Navarra) I focus on the study of some of the principal sources of Suarezian psychology: the medical treatises of the Renaissance. On the one hand, we may appreciate in them the importance of the *experiential* as the method of psychology. On the other hand, the influence of the Galenic doctrine of the harmony of faculties can be appreciated in the works of Francisco Vallés. While this theory can be interpreted as a prelude to a pre-established harmony (typically rationalist), Suárez moves away from such a mechanistic reading and favors a biological reading more in accord with Aristotelianism.

The following two articles deal with sensible knowledge. Daniel Heider (University of South Bohemia) focuses on Suárez’s theory of visual perception. According to his reconstruction, Suárez parts from Aquinas’ views regarding sensible species. Moreover, he upholds a naturalist conception of light closer to the perspectivist tradition of Roger Bacon. Suárez moves away from Cartesian ideas in his treatment of the ontology of colors, which he conceives as permanent qualities, independent from any reflection of light.

José Ángel Lombo (Università della Santa Croce) focuses on the active synthesis of sensible faculties and their physiological dimension. The Eximius Doctor will end up reducing the internal senses to a single potency that apprehends all perceptible realities, immediate or absent, present or past, whether in a speculative or practical mode. In the end, it seems like he is arguing for a unification of experience. Suárez’s proposal, certainly original and justified, is still not without difficulties, which are noted here.

In his article, Juan Fernando Sellés (Universidad de Navarra) carries out a comparative study of the theories of the agent intellect. Suárez and others deny there is a real distinction between this faculty and the possible

intellect: some admit a merely formal or mental distinction, while others hold the difference is only nominal. These stances, however, do not seem to truly correspond to the Stagirite's mind: a real distinction is needed because the difference between both intellects reveals noetic dimensions that are hierarchically different from each other. Indeed, without the immaterial active faculty, the immaterial passive potency would not be able to elicit its act. "Agent" and "possible" are predicated of distinct realities; one in a predicamental level, and the other one in a transcendental sense.

Next, we have five papers centered on Suárez's theory of action. Alejandro Vigo (Universidad de Navarra) investigates the good as the object of the act of the will. The starting point of any volition is a judgment about goodness, which provides, in turn, the starting point for any deliberation. The aspect of good (*ratio boni*) marks the first step from cognition to willing; the *ratio finis*, on its part, signals the transition from willing to deliberation. In this way, the role of the intellect (both theoretical and practical) is highlighted within the complex system of volition, and the voluntarist reading of Suarezian psychology is strongly moderated.

Mauricio Lecón (Universidad Panamericana) delineates the notion of the will as first created motor. He intends to show the metaphysical grounding for the thesis that the will is the first motor of human action, as an efficient cause undetermined by any external extrinsic cause, i.e. the will as not determined by God, the intellect, the law, or fate. All these active principles are, at most, a necessary condition for the act of the will, or even something that may determine practical judgment at the representational level, but they are not capable of affecting the will itself. On the other hand, Suárez's theory of potency and act allows us to explain the existence of an efficient cause capable of determining itself, for the act does not make the potency more perfect. Therefore, the will may be denominated agent and patient of its own action.

Sebastián Contreras (Universidad de los Andes) writes about practical reason and the first principle of natural law. Practical reason begins its activity with the apprehension of the first principle of natural law: do and pursue good, and avoid evil. This is an underlying standard in every level of

practical knowledge, one and the same for every human being, and a sign of reason's normative power and capability to give sense to the acts of the practical intellect. On the other hand, the principle of synderesis is a moral precept, and is not derived from nature: nature grounds natural law, but it is not the natural law because moral norms are precepts of the divine will, and they oblige only insofar as they manifest God's legislative power.

Another aspect of Suárez's action theory is found in the paper of David González-Ginocchio (Universidad Internacional de la Rioja), in which he analyses the psychological presuppositions of the law. Once we know our own nature and our own world, reason is able to suggest more or less concrete ends, thus establishing the principles of action. This implies recognizing the peculiar primacy of the intellect in the genesis of the law: not regarding its compulsory nature but the formulation of its content. The will is able to self-determine itself through practical judgments articulated by reason, or, in the case of a legislator, through the promulgation of a law. Without the previous intellectual moment, human action would be unintelligible and in the end impossible. In this way, along with the other papers presented in this volume, we are able to draw a theory of action that is far from the voluntarism often attributed to Suárez by the influence of Scotus.

The *use* of the will is the subject of the article by Idoya Zorroza (Universidad de Navarra). From the analysis of various acts of the will we realize there is a will (to use and rule) not because human beings live in total indetermination, but rather because in a full openness to reality their fulfillment is not guaranteed without the intervention of an apprehensive faculty. Therefore, the rule over what is real is related to the achievement of one's own good, as realized in a specific way by rational beings. The requisite for dominion is, therefore, a peculiar way of having and eliciting one's own acts, which are our own insofar as we are free. In the end, this rule rests on the divine image given in human beings.

Professor Galina Vdovina (Russian Academy of Sciences) carries out an investigation of intentionality in Suárez's philosophy within the greater context of 17th century gnoseology, particularly the distinction between physical and intentional causality. This difference grows from the insuf-

iciency of Aristotelian causality as an explanatory framework to describe human action. The authors of the 17th century take two Suarezian notions as their base: *influxus* and *metaphorical motio*, and introduce a third one: *influxus intentionalis*. This is also a “metaphorical” form of causality, but still real insofar as it determines human acts (cognitive and volitional). Intentional causality is grounded, and up to a certain point, inseparable, from physical causality.

The paper from Antonio Ñahuincopa (Huancavelica, Perú) deals with a point that receives little attention in Suarezian psychology: Aristotle’s views on the immortality of the soul. It is a common topic in 16th century Scholasticism, linked to the problem of the rational demonstrability of immortality. Here we may find two of the greatest themes of anthropology: the immateriality of knowledge and free will. Suárez handles diverse arguments rigorously and in detail, concluding that the Stagirite did not explicitly held the immortality of the soul, but still we may deduce rational arguments from his principles that conclude in favor of it. Suárez thus sets himself in opposition to the views of Cajetan, and moves closer to Aquinas.

Finally, Salvador Castellote (Facultad de Teología, Valencia) studies the metaphysical category of relation as applied to human beings, both in their relation to the cosmos and in the relation between knowledge and known object, as well as in the body-soul relation. This last form of relation needs an explanation that goes beyond natural sciences. For Suárez, in man, the soul-body relation must be explained within the phenomenology of human action as *action vitalis*.