After Suárez: Physical and Intentional Causality in the 17th–18th Centuries Scholasticism*

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Abstract. The article investigates the distinction between the physical and the intentional causality that appeared in the 17th century scholasticism in the course of polemics with the traditional Aristotelian classification of causes and with the conception of causality developed by Francisco Suárez. The introduction of the distinction between physical and intentional causation was motivated by the insufficiency of the notion of causality, adopted in ancient and medieval natural philosophy to describe the causal processes in the sphere of conscious human activity. The authors of the 17th century took as a base two concepts carefully elaborated by Suárez, that is, the concepts of influxus and of metaphorica motio, and, starting from them, introduced an additional concept of influxus intentionalis.

Keywords: physical / intentional causality; 17th century scholasticism; Francisco Suárez; influxus intentionalis.

Introduction

There is a widespread view that the Aristotelian classification of causes, that is, their division into material, formal, efficient (“the primary source of the change and rest”) and final – remained almost the only undisputed classification until the dissolution of Aristotelian science and philosophy
by the end of the 18th century.¹ And yet, scholastic philosophical texts that were created in post-Suárezian era in the 17th- first half of the 18th centuries give a different picture. First, although the Aristotelian classification did certainly retain its dominance, it was recognized alongside with several classifications of causes that were based on the different – and multiple – criteria. One of the examples of this is a detailed classification presented by the Bavarian Jesuit Antonius Mayr (1739) in the Philosophia peripatetica: causes are divided into internal and external; both are further divided into potential (in actu primo) and actual (in actu secundo); further, the external cause is divided into appropriate and inappropriate, direct and indirect, etc. Only at the end of this series Mayr mentions “the most famous division of causes into genera, which belongs to Aristotle” (Mayr 1739, Pars II, d. III, q. 1, art. 2, n. 809, 329–330; n. 810, 330; n. 816, 332)².

Second, there is a special problem related to the understanding of causality that arises within the early modern scholastic science of the soul. One of the most notable features of the treatises De anima written by generations of scholars after Suárez was splitting the fundamental concept of life into that of physical life (a mode of life that is characteristic of the vegetative level of living things, as well as of the acts of sensation, intellect and will as taken in their physiological basis and actual production) and of intentional life (acts of sensual and intellectual cognition, of appetition and will, taken in their content)³. This division of life and living things into two modes, widely accepted in the community of scholastic philosophers by the second quarter of the 17th century, demanded a thorough study of specific characteristics of each of these two modes, including the kind of causality that operates in the areas of physical and intentional life respectively.

¹ So, even recent works are moving into the context of those four causes, with different accentuations (Carraud 2002; Fink 2015).
² All translations from Latin into English are mine. – G.V.
³ Arriaga 1639; De anima, disp. II, sect. I, subsect. I, § 6, p. 562: “Respondeo... distinguido duplicem vitam, aliam physicam, intentionalem aliam. Intentionalis vita est idem quod cognitio et appetitio... Alia vita est physica... et quam plantis concedere intendimus"
1. Statement of the Problem

From the point of view of the science of the soul, there was one fundamental problem with the “most famous division of causes” that went back to Aristotle. This problem was summed up by another 18th century scholastic author, a Bavarian Benedictine Veremund Gufl (1750), in this way: “A lot of controversy and confusion arises from the fact that there is a general belief in the quaternary of the physical causes of Aristotle” (Gufl 1750, Pars I, tr. II, a. 3, § 3, n. 484, 265). In fact, the Aristotelian classification was well suited to describe causality in the world of natural bodies, the world that constituted the subject matter of ancient and medieval physics. That classification, however, could not account for the causality in the world that was built, defined and directed by meanings, especially in a period when the distinction of the two modes of life was being conceptualized. A purely naturalistic scheme of causes inevitably had to undergo deformation when one tried to apply it to the processes of knowing and goal-setting carried out in the mode of intentional life.

This deformation or, more precisely, the slow deconstruction of the Aristotelian scheme had begun long before the 17th century. It became necessary to introduce some additional distinctions into the formal cause, first distinguishing as a separate cause the causa exemplaris – a “cause-sample”, or intellectual model, according to which things are to be created. The initial samples for everything (according to the scholastics who relied on Augustine in this regard) are the ideas in God, and the secondary samples are the ideas in the material intellect, in accordance with which works of craft and art are created. Further, in the same formal cause, it was necessary to make a distinction between the form, which is adopted in the portion of matter and makes the resulting thing a thing of a certain kind, and the form that is adopted in a cognitive ability and makes the thing being represented and known. On the other hand, the Aristotelian causa finalis demanded the distinctions as well. The final cause, which acts in nature as its immanent viability leading to full deployment of natural forms (ἐντελέχεια), could barely coexist in the same concept with the final cause in the field of meaningful human actions.
By the 17th century it became quite obvious that the naturalistic scheme of the Philosopher, strictly interpreted, presupposed a pretty rough equivocal or – by the most favorable interpretation – an analogical, not univocal, concept of cause⁴. In fact, the distinction of physical/intentional causality was formed on the basis of these additional distinctions previously introduced within the Aristotelian scheme (Vdóvina 2015). In the 17th century this particular distinction was adopted (as an alternative one to the above-mentioned scheme) in the science of the soul and other scholastic disciplines (including theology) that deal with conscious and meaningful acts and actions of the intellectual and volitional beings. This distinction was created not as a scheme *ad hoc*, but rather as a way to get away from the disordered and arbitrary *ad hoc* deformations of the Aristotelian scheme; moreover, as a way to think causality consistently and adequately to the nature of its work in two different modes of life. In fact, it is the intentional causality, which is the basis of any feeling and thinking as the coherent sequences of the motivated cognitive content. This alternative classification might be embedded in the Aristotelian scheme *implicite et reductive* and, in fact, in one way or another correlated with it, but rather for convenience (as the opportunity to save references to familiar concepts) and as a tribute to tradition rather than because of a genuine theoretical necessity.

The purpose of this article is to explore different variations of the concepts of physical and intentional causality in post-Suárezian scholasticism. For these distinctions, as we will show, a crucial point is the notion of *influxus* developed by Suárez in his *Metaphysical Disputations*, that is, a real “infusion” of being. It served as a basis for the concept of *influxus intentionalis*, which was elaborated in the subsequent period.

2. Physical and Intentional *influxus*

Let us start with several definitions: they will give us a reference point for further advancement. According to an earlier text written by Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (*Disputationes a summulis ad metaphysicam*, 1617), the physical cause is that “which really, by its existing entity (*per suam entitatem existentem*) contributes to the effect, whether it is a physical cause [in the narrow sense], that is, a natural one, belonging to the natural body or whether the cause is spiritual or supernatural, vital”. Such a cause, according to Hurtado, has real causal effects. On the contrary, the intentional cause “acts” only metaphorically. It does not act by its real entity, but operates through those that are more real than itself; it just inspires action or creates the conditions for action due to the fact that it is the object of cognition: “It is therefore called *intentional cause*, because it moves as an object, that is, as it exists intentionally, in the intellect”5.

Another definition can be found in the text of the Florentine brother-minim Giovanni Battista Neri (1682):

> The cause can also be divided into the physical and the intentional one. The first is the one that by its existing entity works upon the effect; so here ‘physical’ is taken to stand for real entity... The intentional cause is that which flows into the effect not by its own entity, but by the entity of something else, that is, inasmuch as it exists in the intellect it moves the active potency to act. [Dividi etiam potest causa in physicam, et intentionalem; prima est, quae per suam entitatem existentem ad effectum concurrit; unde hic accipitur, ly physicum, pro reali entitate... Intentionalis vero causa illa, quae non influet in effectum per suam entitatem, sed per alienam, vicelicet in quantum existens ipsa in intellectu, potentiam activam movet ad agendum] (Neri 1682, 180).

5 “Causa physice influens est *qua realiter per suam entitatem existentem concurrat ad effectum*, sive sit causa physica, id est, naturalis, pertinentis ad corpus naturale, sive sit spiritualis, aut supernaturalis: aut vitalis. Causa intentionalis est. *a qua prodit effectus non tanguam a principio per suam entitatem in effectum, sed per alienam influente*, ut finis, qui non influet per suam entitatem in effectum, sed per apprehensionem tanguam per movendi rationem, aut conditionem: ideo dicitur, *causa intentionalis*, quia movet ut obiectum, quod est existere intentionaliter, sive in intellectu”. Hurtado de Mendoza 1617. *Physica*, disp. VIII, sect. IX,§ 115, 315.
This is quite a standard general definition; here is yet another one of many examples, taken from the course of Antonius Mayr:

The external cause is divided into the physical and the intentional one. Physical cause is that which essentially and determinately stands behind the physical action that produces the effect: in this way the lion which is giving birth essentially and determinately stands behind the action that produces the lion which is being born. The intentional cause is that which, having been cognized either motivates or directs the agent to make the effect. [Dividitur causa extrinseca in physicam, et intentionalem. Causa physica est, quae ab actione physice productiva effectus, essentialiter, et determinate respicitur: sic leo generans essentialiter, et determinate respicitur ab actione productiva leonis generati. Causa intentionalis est, quae ut cognita, vel movet, vel dirigit operantem ad ponendum effectum] (Mayr 1759, pars II, disp. III, q. 1, a. 2, n. 811; 330).

There are several what may be called “sensitive points” in these definitions. The first one is the basis on which these very different causae are included under the general notion of the cause. In fact, “the cause in the proper sense is the principle which infuses (influens) being in something dependent on it” [“Dicendum: causa proprie est principium influens esse in aliud cum dependentia huius ab illo” (Gufl 1750, Pars I, tract. II, a. 1, § 1–2, n. 425; 242); moreover, here under “being” (esse) not only being de novo is understood, that is, not just the emergence from non-being, but also any changes in the already existent things within any category of reality. After all, if any causing is a change, and every change is movement, and movement is, from the ontological point of view, a transition from the potential state to the actual one, this transition should be, so to say, “provided with the energy”. We could ask – provided by what? Precisely by that “supplement” of being which was lacking for the possible things to become actual. The concept of influxus, “infusion” of being, supports the entire concept of real causality ut sic in the work of Francisco Suárez⁶ and in all the post-Suárezian scholasticism. But this “infusion” is questionable even in regard to physical

⁶ The doctrine of Suárez on the causes (DM, XII–XXVII), most recently has got into the focus of the research interest (Fink 2015; Schmid 2015: on influxus-theory of Suárez see 396–401).
causes. Should it be understood in the weak or the strong sense? It is taken in the weak sense by the Spanish jesuit Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1617, 1624), who believes that it is enough for physical causes to facilitate the effect by their very existence. In this case both the matter and the natural form of things should be counted among their real causes, because both of them undoubtedly contribute to the emergence and existence of material substance. Insofar as the concept of influxus is concerned, however, the “strong sense” seems to be more reasonable. Veremund Gufl puts this in the following way:

Physical cause is called physical not just because it has physical effects, but because of the physical infusion, that is, physical mode of action that is real and subjective. [Causa physica est et dicitur Physica non praeclis ratione effectus physici, sed ab influxum physicum seu modum agendi physicum, qui est realis ac subjectivus] (Gufl 1750, n. 430; 244).

The active action, exercitium, is necessary, Gufl believes, for the influxus of being by the physical causes. Which means that the matter and form are not, strictly speaking, physical causes (unless in a very broad sense) as they do not perform any special actions and do not “infuse” anything. They are simply two parts of a thing that have different modes of existence: as a part of a thing, matter exists due to informatio (formedness), and a form exists through receptio (acceptance in matter). Both of them exist while the thing itself exists, and the fact that their duration coincide may suggest there is no influxus here which would provide the generation of a being in the moment of transition from potency to act. Strictly speaking, the cause in the proper sense is only causa efficiens, which produces the union of the matter with the form.

Thus, in regard to the physical causes, except the efficient one, it is possible to question the reality of the “infusion of being”, but what about the intentional cause? Should it be considered as pure or simple representation of some objective meaning? That opinion was held by some of the scholastics and represented a “weak” variant of understanding the influxus intentionalis. “The object, or intentional cause”, writes the Dominican Ambrosio Lezard de Belliquadro (1664):
[…] can only produce effect of the same kind, and it is representation, not the production of change that is implied by the intentional dimension […] Purely intentional action can only produce intentional effects in the representational being. [Obiectum seu causa intentionalis nequit effectum nisi eiusdem rationis producere; sed de ratione ordinis intentionalis est solum repraesentare, et non alterare [...]. Actio mere intentionalis, solum effectus intentionales in esse repraesentativo, et non in esse alterativo producere potest] (Lezard de Belliquadro 1664: tomus IV, q. 5, a. 4 ; 88–89.

It is no wonder that since intentional causality is limited to representations, it is considered as causality only in a figurative sense, or metaphorically. How and where could we detect causal function of the bare representation? The Jesuit thinker Nicolás Martínez (1678), for instance, observes this kind of causality in logical operations, i.e. in the field of purely semantic relations. Martínez draws an example: when we get the knowledge of the sun from the knowledge of the solar light, the idea of sunlight acts as the intentional cause of cognition of the sun because of the relation between the sun and its light. The representation of light as the light of the sun is here the “causa cognoscendi intentionaliter motiva solem” – “a cause that intentionally moves to the knowledge of the sun” 7. This type of intentional causation occurs in all the a priori and a posteriori demonstrations, where it is expressed in purely semantic movement from one concept to another within the same cognitive potency, the intellect, and where intentional causation results in the semantic effect of thinking.

But this is not the only type of the intentional causation. Many scholastics speak not only about the motivated semantic transitions within the senses or the intellect, but also about the impulse to action and about

7 “In demonstratione a priori eadem est causa, propter quam est effectus, e propter quam, ut intentionaliter moventem, scitur effectus, ut sol est causa physica, et efficiens lucis, et propter connexionem, quam habet cum luce, est causa intentionaliter movens ad affirmandum lucem; in demonstrationibus a posteriori inventitur ordo physicus, et intentionalis; quod enim est effectus in genere physico causae, est causa intentionalis, propter quam cognoscitur causa. Quamvis enim lux sit in genere efficiens effectus solis, propter connexionem tamen, quam habet cum sole, est causa intentionaliter motiva cognoscendi solem, in utraque igitur demonstratione importatur cognitio, quae sit causa illius scientiae; qua scitur conclusion”. (Martínez Hispalensis 1678. Controv. I, disp. IV, sect. I ; 40–41).
the more tangible motivating effects of representations, as when a certain image or notion having been captured, its intentional content moves the agent or his potencies to act. Here Gufl expounds his approach in the most direct and uncompromising way as he argues for there to be the *influxus intentionalis* in the strong sense, as a special intentional infusion of being:

*The intentional cause* is and bears this name due to the intentional infusion... which is the case in so far as there is an act of cognition. And it should be that the intentional cause not only determines the act oriented towards itself, but also moves to act, because the effect of this cause is to *encourage the agent*. It moves as an object, whereas the agent is moved as a subject. [*Causa intentionalis est et dicitur ratione influxus intentionalis, qui idem est ac objectivus, quique posita cognitione duntaxat locum habet. Oportet autem, ut causa intentionalis non praecise specificet actum ad se tendentem sed etiam moveat ad agendum: quoniam *agens moveri* est illius causae effectus: movet enim objective, ut agens moveatur subiective*] (Gufl 1750, n. 431 ; 244).

3. Exemplar Causality

The further development of the concept of intentional causes depended on whether the *influxus intentionalis* was understood in the strong or in the weak sense. What will come of the intentional causality, if, for the sake of convenience, we try to match it – following the scholastic philosophers – with a modified Aristotelian classification? Let us go back to the scheme of Antonius Mayr. According to him, “*the intentional cause* is divided into the exemplary (*exemplaris*), final and moral”. The exemplary cause, the cause-sample, is also referred to by Mayr as *idea*, and this idea can be internal if it is the image in the soul (for example, the image of a house in the soul of the architect), and external if it is an external thing (for instance, Peter, who serves as a prototype for the image in the portrait)\(^8\). And here we

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\(^8\) “*Jam causa intentionalis subdividitur in exemplarem finalem et moralem. Causa exemplaris, seu idealis est, quae dirigat artificem, seu causam efficientem ad assimilandum sibi effectum: sic idea, quam architectus in mente concepit de fabricanda domo, est causa exemplaris, sive idealis domus: item Petrus, cui curat se depingi, est causa idealis imaginis, a pictore ad similitudinem Petri factae. Addo, si talis idea est conceptus in mente artificis existens, dicitur *idea intrinseca*: si vero est aliquid prototypon externum, e.g. Petrus depingendus, dicitur *idea extrinseca*.*: (Mayr 1739; Pars II, disp. III, q. 1, a. 2, n. 813; 331).
come to the second sensitive point of the *causa intentionalis* concept which has to do with the interpretation of the impact of the sample, *exemplar*. According to Mayr, an idea is causal not in the sense of motivating someone to action, but in that it intentionally directs the agent, i.e., it acts upon him as a direct efficient cause, completely determining the nature of his actions through the knowledge of the sample, forcing him to conform with itself, to imitate itself: when building a house, painting a portrait, writing an essay, a novel, etc.

It is against this understanding of the idea as the intentional cause that the same implacable Veremund Gufl speaks out:

If we take the sample correctly, it is not the sample which causes something created on its model, but the master. And it does not move the master to create works, but just exposes itself (*exhibet*) so that the master could imitate it. Similarly, when someone wants to depict an external thing - for example, the mountain, - the real mountain does not make any infusion into the depicted mountain. [Nam si recte exemplar inspiciamus, ipsum per se nec causat exemplatum, sed artifex, nec movet artificem, ut illud conficiat sed praecise semet exhibet, ut ipsum artifex imitari queat, non alio modo, ac siquis rem externam v.g. montem depingat: mons realis enim nullum praestat influxum in montem depictum] (Gufl 1750, n. 432; 244).

It is also impossible to say that the idea causes the way of the master’s actions, because it functions as a model merely through exposing itself (*per meram exhibitionem*), and not through some infusion or impression:

But the object as the object does not have, properly speaking, the meaning of the cause, even if it gives a specific determination to the act and gives occasion for performing the act in one way or another and for adopting one predicate or another. [Dicendum, quod idea causat, ut agens hoc vel illo modo agat, non per influxum aut motionem aliquam sed per meram sui exhibitionem ac praecise objecti munus subeundo. Atqui objectum qua objectum non habet proprie rationem causae, tametsi specificet actum sitque ratio, cur actus hoc vel illo modo exeat, haec vel illa habeat praedicata] (Gufl 1750, n. 435; 245).
As a result of that, Gufl takes the idea-sample out of the classification of causes and regards it as a variant of simple objects of intellectual consideration. In other words, Gufl treats the intentional causality in the strongest sense, as the conceptual motivation, and not just cognition. But this infusion (influxus) still remains within the boundaries of intentional causality.

It is interesting to compare this debate between two late scholastic philosophers, for whom the distinction of physical/intentional causation was the natural and most adequate way of thinking causality within the intentional life, with the position of Francisco Suárez, formulated in the *Metaphysical Disputations* (1597). It is known that this work of Suárez contains the most extensive and most complete consideration of the causes in the whole scholastic tradition. The cause-sample is viewed in the *Disputation* XXV (Renemann 2010). Suárez, who did not yet know the above-mentioned distinction, tried to interpret *causa exemplaris* within the boundaries of the physical, naturalistic concept of causality. On the one hand, his description of the causal action of the internal exemplar or internal idea is reminiscent of the description given by Mayr:

For those who act reasonably (*per intellectum*) the sample is necessary by itself, so that they could rationally direct their action to achieve a certain effect. For as by their nature they are not limited to give certain forms to the effects as it is the case in the natural agents, they should be determined to act in an intellectual way that is proper to them. And although from the point of view of exercising their action (*quoad exercitium*) they are defined by the will, yet in regard to specific determination and direction they are led by the intellect. And for this they need their own models of such effects in order to be able to produce them skillfully and wisely. [in iis enim quae per intellectum operantur, per se necessarium est exemplar, ut rationabili modo possint actionem suam in definitum effectum dirigere; nam cum a natura sua non sint limitata ad determinatas formas effectibus tribuendas, sicut naturalia agentia, oportet ut suo proprio et intellectuali modo determinentur. Quamvis autem quoad exercitium suae actionis determinentur per voluntatem, tamen quoad specificationem et directionem ducuntur per intellectum; ad hoc autem indigent propriis exemplaribus talium effectuum, ut artificioso et intellectuali modo possintillos efficere] (*DM*, Disp. XXV, sect. 2, n. 1).
In this passage, Suárez emphasizes the formative, determinative role of the sample. Alongside with that Suárez wants to explain the *causa exemplaris* as a real cause, and this is why he needs to find some real “infusion of being” in its action. He does not yet know about the intentional infusion (and Gufl, who is aware of the concept, does not see this infusion in the cause-sample); therefore, he needs to find a physical infusion. Suárez sees it in the fact that exemplary cause, in his view, acts not as the formal, but as the efficient cause – producing the agent himself as the *agent* who actually performs certain actions and *thus* produces well-defined effects:

The position of those who... say that it (the cause-sample) pertains to the efficient cause seems to me more reasonable. [...] The causality of the sample pertains to the efficient causality... the sample is referred to the master as the proximate form by which he acts in his own way. Therefore, as the form of the agent pertains to the efficient cause [and] as it is the principle of action for him, the sample, because it is a form of the master by which he acts, pertains to the efficient cause. [...] (DM, Disp. XXV, sect. 2, n. 8).

It is difficult not to see a certain infringement on the very notion of the idea in Suárez’s attempt to interpret physically the causal effect of the idea and to understand the *exemplum* as a natural principle or a meaningful efficient factor of human activities. In accordance with the common understanding and with Suárez’s own detailed explanation in the first section of the same *Disputation XXV*, the idea is a formal concept in the intellect and, of course, it is a real physical formal cause of a representation that is found in the intellect. Representation is that of the *exemplum* in accordance with which something is to be created outside of the intellect or, at least, outside of the concept in which the sample is thought. Up to this point Suárez does
not contradict himself, and agrees with the tradition. But as soon as he tries to make the direct leap from non-naturalistic, purely intentional, objective content of the concept to the physical shaping of the real human activity, seeing here a real infusion of being (influxus) from the content of the idea, the question arises: how is this possible? Suárez says that the idea completes the determination of those actions directly, giving them the final specification which presets, through these steps, the production of an effect appropriate to the sample present in mind. But this direct impact of the intentional content on the nature of a physical act falls under the ontological ban of the direct impact of spirit on matter or matter on spirit: the ban that Suárez himself took as a basis of his teaching about the soul. Again, in other words: assuming that the intentional content of the idea really makes the agent to be the agent, Suárez makes something purely imaginable and non-real (in the sense of non-physical) into the physical efficient cause of real things. The explanation, which is natural (in our opinion and in the opinion of the 17th century scholarship) and according to which the agent is simply following the meaning of the sample, and his actions are semantically determined by the intentional content of the idea, – this explanation does not suit Suárez because it does not fit into the concept of influxus physicus as the unique and universal principle of causality, valid for the world of things and for the world of human beings. This insoluble contradiction in Suárez’s doctrine of exemplary causality indicates that the purely naturalistic explanation of meaningful human activity had virtually exhausted its explanatory potentiality by the 17th century, and that scholastic philosophy was in need of conceptualizing some form of causality that would be appropriate for the specifically human mode of thinking and acting.

4. Moral Causality

The third sensitive point of the theory of two types of causes has to do with the moral cause as related to the will. Mayr and many other authors of the 17th century consider it to be a kind of intentional cause, and sometimes just put the sign of equality between the two terms. But the fact is that the
expression *causa moralis* refers to two different kinds of causation which should be carefully distinguished in the exact description of volitional acts. On the one hand, the will is itself a *free efficient cause*, a cause that in presence of all the necessary conditions for the action is free to choose between acting or not acting. In this sense, the moral cause is the will, understood as a *natural ability*; it is “identical to the physical cause” and is one of the subspecies of the efficient cause as such.

Taken in another sense, moral causality of the will corresponds not to the real physical action in the world of natural beings, but to what scholastics called “the moral being” (*esse morale*), that is, to the realm of established social rules, institutions, and norms. “Moral being” is the only domain of being wholly determined not by the natural relations, but by the relations of meanings and symbols (relations of domination and subordination, possession of rights and duties, etc.), and therefore it is intentional, and not physical, by its definition. Any action caused by the order of someone in charge, and any call for action, enforcement of action or refraining from action based on a particular form of social relations is interpreted, accordingly, as a manifestation of the intentional moral causality.

5. Final Causality

The fourth sensitive point is how the intentional causality is associated with setting and achieving the goals. In relation to human beings scholastics

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9 “Causa moralis duplex est: alia physice influens per se, quae est causa libera: liberum enim et morale idem esse patebit in livris de anima, de qua causa morali in praesenti non agitur, quia est idem cum causa physica” (Hurtado de Mendoza 1617, *Physica*, disp. VIII, sect. IX, § 116; 315).

10 “*Causa moralis* est, quae movet causam efficientem, *quia est*: sic imperium domini movet servum, ut laboret, non ut detur imperium (non enim laborat, ut imperetur labor), sed quia datur, aut est imperium. Alia autem est causa moralis *alliciens*, alia *retractens*, alia *neglecta*. Prima movet ad agendum: secunda vero absterret ab agendo: tertia, licet in mentem veniat, et posset movere, vel absterrere, tamen negligitur...”. (Mayr 1739; Pars II, disp. III, q. 1, a. 2, n. 815; 332). “[...] haec autem causa intentionalis, seu moralis, dupliciter etiam accipi potest, primo pro causa libera, quo pacto causae physicae non opponitur, alio modo, prout non influit in effectum, adscibitur illi tamen dictus effectus; quia illum mandat, ac praecipit” (Neri 1682, 180).
distinguished between several subtypes of final causes: finis quo (literally, “the end by which”: the intermediate goal which serves as the means of achieving other goals), finis cui (literally, “the end to which” – “for the good of”: a thing or a person for whose sake something is done), and the finis qui (literally, “the end which” - that which is the object of desire for its own sake). The latter is the final cause in the most precise and strict sense of the word. Sometimes this is an existing thing, in other cases, and perhaps most often, a non-existing one, and the effect of this kind of a goal is the fact that it comes into existence: ut fit. The still-not-existing goal is the quintessence of the final cause, and in a certain sense it is the quintessence of the intentional causality as such.

Although a number of paradoxes, related to specifying the causal nature of the goal and its impact on the agent has long attracted the attention of philosophers, beginning with Plato, and – in the Medieval period – with Avicenna, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Ockham, and others, we take again the Metaphysical Disputations by Francisco Suárez as the starting point. The Disputation XXIII is devoted to the final cause. Suárez was one of the latest scholastic authors who did their best to defend the integrity of the final cause, despite the obvious and significant difference between the three agents – God, natural things and highly organized living creatures, especially humans. Suárez was indeed one of the last authors who attempted to defend the exclusively physical nature of the final causality. Since we are interested in this question in the context of the doctrines on human intentionality, we will focus on how Suárez sees the causal action of the goal in humans\(^{11}\).

\(^{11}\) In relation to the subject of the final cause of Suárez it is worth paying attention to (Schmid 2015): The article also contains an impressive bibliography. However, it should be noted that the research workers who do not address post-Suárezian scholastic texts usually overlook the formation of the distinctions of the physical/intentional causality within them. Therefore, stating the essential tensions within the naturalistic descriptions of the formal and the final cause of Suarez, they either enclose a Sisyphean effort to keep any kind of causality in the framework of Aristotelian naturalism, believing that it was the desire of scholasticism of the turn of 16th-17th centuries, or, on the contrary, accuse Suarez of the impossibility of such retention and consider it to be his failure. Meanwhile, Suárez represents here a transitional figure as well: it were his elaborations served as the basis to rethink the Aristotelian concept of the causality, although it may have been contrary to the subjective intentions of Suárez. See further in the text.
If the essence of the causation itself is real “infusion of being” (influxus), a non-existent goal can certainly have no physical influence on another internal potency (the will), and even less on the external human behavior. It is well-known, however, that real actions are directed at the non-existent goals, and that these actions issue from the will which is intentionally aimed at these goals. And yet, it is forbidden both by scholastic physics and metaphysics for real effects to be produced by an unreal cause. Therefore, it is necessary to explain the reality of final causation that issues from a non-existent thing or a non-existent state of affairs. Suárez’s explanation proceeds in two steps: 1) he introduces the notion of the metaphorical motion (metaphorica motio) by which the intellect who presents a non-existent object of thought to the will causes its attraction to the object, and thereby actualizes it; 2) the actualized will (actus voluntatis) as an active potency is perfectly real and it physically directs further actions (actiones) of its owner to achieve the goal. The metaphorical motion on the part of the intellect and the physical act of the will are one and the same act in reality: as derived from the representation of the goal in the intellect it is caused metaphorically; as a guide of human actions, it itself is causal, namely as the efficient cause of these actions.\footnote{“Est ergo tertia sententia, quae constituit etiam hanc finis causalitatem in motione metaphorica. Addit vero huiusmodi motionem non poni in actu secundo nisi quando voluntas in actu secundo movetur, et quando sic ponitur in re, non esse aliquid distinctum ab ipsa motu voluntatis. Sed sicut supra dicebamus unam et eadem actionem, prout fluit ab agente, esse causalitatem eius, ut vero inest materiae, esse etiam causalitatem eius circa formam, ita aiunt unam et eadem actionem voluntatis causari a fine et a voluntate ipsa, et prout est a voluntate esse causalitatem effectivam, prout vero est a fine esse causalitatem finalem, et priori ratione esse motionem realem ac propriam, quia talis actio manat a potentia ut a proprio principio physico, posteriori autem ratione esse motionem metaphoricam, quia manat ab obiecto alliciente et trahente ad se voluntatem”. (DM, XXIII, sect. 4, n. 8).}
the two are so interconnected that they cannot be separated”. And in no way we can assume that the motion on the part of the intellect is secondary and accidental, as it stands in the beginning of the entire causal chain and the act of writing would not take place without it. Therefore, it should be considered as the real original cause of the act of writing. The conclusion is that although the movement by which a non-existent conceivable goal actualizes the will is metaphorical and non-physical, its ultimate consequence - the specific behavior of a human - is real and physical, because the metaphorical motion actualizes the will really, and the real act of the will naturally produces real physical effects. According to Suárez, this allows us to assert that a non-existent goal is the necessary and integral principle of these real and physical actions. Hence, the final cause is real. Thus, the naturalistic interpretation of the final cause and causality in general has reached the aim; the Aristotelian scheme is saved.

Suárez obviously uses here the same explanatory strategy he used in the interpretation of the action of the cause-sample. It is clear that all the reasoning of Suárez rests on one key assumption: the metaphorical motion on the part of the intellect is capable of physically actualizing another ability that is the will. Being non-real in the indicated sense, it produces the real effect. Ontologically it represents only the pure conceivable being (ens rationis), but its causality is quite real: it is impossible to understand otherwise this statement of Suárez, repeated many times and formulated in various ways. By its very nature the statement, however, is self-contradictory, and apparently this contradiction is insoluble within the purely naturalistic understanding of the causes, when the causal action is taken exclusively as the “infusion” of real being. No matter how sophisticated are the distinctions

13 “[… ] haec autem motio aliquid est in rerum natura; non est enim aliquid imaginarium vel fictum per intellectum; et aliquod genus causalitatis est, quandoquidem est origo operationum realium” (DM, XXIII, sect. 1, n. 7).
14 “Haec causalitas quodammodo est moralis et quasi artificiosa et intellectualis” (DM, XXIII, sect. 4, n. 16).
15 “Eius autem motio dicitur metaphorica, non quia non sit realis, sed quia non fit per influxum effectivum, nec per motionem intentionalem et animalem, et ideo nihil obstat quominus vera ac propria sit eius causalitas. (DM, XXIII, sect. 1, n. 14).
between different types of causation fused in the same act of the will, they are produced by the mind (as distinctiones rationis) in the already actualized will, that is, post factum. They do not explain how it was possible for the metaphorical motivation to make a conceivable but non-existent object to produce a physical effect, that is, an actualization of the will. How does this motivation overcome the ontological ban on the transition from the domain of something conceivable to the domain of something real? How is it possible to circumvent the physical law of adequacy between the cause and the effect?

Suárez gives no answer to these questions. But it was Suárez who, while relying on the previous tradition, developed the concepts of influxus, on one hand, and of metaphorica motio, on the other, that is, those concepts that were used by his younger contemporaries when they shifted the entire question to the context of the dichotomy between the physical and intentional causality and resolved the difficulties in their own way. This meant the rejection of the purely naturalistic understanding of the causes and the establishment of the sphere of meanings as of the condition without which human actions and human intentionality as such would remain totally unexplainable.

6. After Suárez: the 17th century Discussion

In 1617, the year Suárez died, Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza enters – already in the first edition of his course Disputationes de uniuersa philosophia - into the direct controversy with the great Jesuit. Let us look at his remarkable argument (Hurtado de Mendoza 1617, De anima, disp. XIII, sect. V, § 25–33; 897–901). “Father Suárez, -writes Hurtado,- in volume I of Metaphysical Disputations, Disp. 2, part 1, sets as the first principle and the dogma that the final cause is a real cause. But I believe that we need to differentiate in order to avoid ambiguity”. First, the words of Suárez can be so understood that the thing which serves as a goal, is real. We have found that this is completely unnecessary, and most often the finis qui is a thing or a state of affairs which does not yet exist. Second, those words may mean that the very causality of the final cause is real. “In this sense, I believe that the
final cause as a final one is not real, that is, it does not produce physical and real infusion in the effect”, if we take the goal as a non-existent thing.

All the causality of the goal consists in drawing the will to itself, because the goal moves by its goodness, and its motion consists in causing love. Therefore, although the goal does not produce any physical infusion, we can understand it to have full causal power if it has goodness. We should understand, however, that it causes precisely because it completes the act of love by its goodness, without physical infusion. [Tota causalitas finis consistit in attractione voluntatis as se: movet enim per suam bonitatem: cuius motio consistit in amabilitate: ergo licet finis nullum habeat physicum influxum, intelligitur habere totam virtutem causativam, si habeat bonitatem: actu autem intelligetur causare eo praece, quod terminet amorem ratione suae bonitatis sine physico influx] (Hurtado de Mendoza 1617, De anima, disp. XIII, sect. V, § 27; 897–898).

Third, yet another argument against the reality of the goal as of the cause is the common opinion that the goal is the principle of “metaphorical, that is, intentional, motion (metaphorica, sive intentionalis motio)”, because “the will is drawn to the goal through its representation. Therefore, I believe that the goal is not formally a real cause, and the definition of the cause corresponds to it only in a figurative sense (translatitie [sic!])”. Suárez argues that the motion is metaphorical, but its effect, the desire of the will, is real and not fictitious. In response, Hurtado distinguishes between the incentive motion (motio), and the real physical infusion of being, (influxus):

Note that the motivation is different from the infusion: infusion is the actual motion by which the cause physically affects the effect; the motivation is the capturing of the object that implies a desire for it. It is in this way that we are motivated by something that does not exist, moreover, often even by that which cannot exist. Therefore this consequence is wrong: motivates, therefore, causes physically: in fact, the goal motivates not physically but through knowledge. [Adverte, motionem differre ab influxu\; quod influxus sit actualis motus per quem cuasa physice influit in effectum: motio autem est apprehensio objecti, ex qua sequitur illius appetitio: sic nos movent quae non sunt: immo saepe quae non possunt esse. Unde non valet haec consequentia: movet; ergo causat
physice, quia non movet physice, sed per cognitionem] (Hurtado de Mendoza 1617, § 29; 898).

Let us sum up what we have reached here. A non-existent goal is present in the intellect only as known, that is, only as the content of the intellectual repraesentatio; it can attract the will and be the completion and the term of its act only as the intentional content. There is nothing physical in it as in the object of the willful intention, and it cannot cause any physical motion. It is real only in the sense that it is seen by the will in its goodness, and the will is by nature drawn to the good as to the substantial completion of its own act of love. This appetence for the intentional object as residing in the intellect is itself intentional; it remains within the immanent mental acts, within the purely intentional life: not fictitious, but not physical either. Completing a willful act, serving as its term, the goal performs a metaphorical motion, motio, which is what the above-mentioned authors identified as influxus intentionalis, and rather in the weak than in the strong sense.

Now, how is it possible to go out from this intentional reality and intentionalis influxus? How to pass from the relation between the purely intentional object of the intellect and the purely intentional love it inspires to the physical actions of the will, to the fact that it provides the means of achieving the goal and dictates to the humans the appropriate course of actions? In order to understand this, we need to learn what the intentional realities are ontologically, and for this, Hurtado says, it is necessary to distinguish between “the fiction and fictitious thing”. The fictitious thing, that is, the non-existent goal itself, has a purely mental being, but fictio is an act, a real and physical act of thinking a non-existent thing. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the motio metaphorica or intentionalis influxus from a non-existent object, and the motio or influxus physicum from the intellectual act by which this object is conceived. In the words of Hurtado de Mendoza, “the object does not move the will formally, but only completes its act of love; but the will is moved by the intellect... Therefore, cognition is... the directly motivating principle”, but not “the terminative principle”; it is not what completely determines the will, but the efficient cause of
the motion. The non-existent goal, by contrast, “terminates” the will and completely determines it meaningfully, but does not move physically. The general conclusion is as follows:

The goal “moves not physically”, and not fictitiously, but intentionally... As it really moves through the act of the intellect, it is said that it moves truly, and not fictitiously, but not because it is a real and physical cause, although it is real as opposed to a fictitiously moving thing. [...] nec movet physice, nec ficte, sed intentionaliter, et quia re ipsa movet per intellectum dicitur movere vere, et non ficte: non propterea est causa realis et physica: licet sit realis ut opponitur ficte moventi] (Hurtado de Mendoza 1617, § 29; 898).

This conclusion is confirmed by the comparison:

Just as the object that terminates the act of vision and the species impressa that produces this act make the entire principle of vision on the part of the object, so the goodness of the goal and the act of its cognition make the entire principle of volition on the part of the object. [Quemadmodum ex obiecto terminante visionem, et specie impressa eam efficiente conflatur integrum principium visioneis ex parte obiecti, ita ex bonitate finis et eius cognitione conflatur integrum principium ex parte obiecti] (Hurtado de Mendoza 1617, § 37; 900).

Let us summarize again the reasoning of Hurtado in this dispute with Suárez. 1) A non-existent goal is conceived by the intellect. 2) The goal itself is in the intellect only intentionally, as represented, and, as such, it meaningfully and intentionally completes the determination of the will, attracting it by the metaphorical motion. 3) However, this intentional representation of the goal is retained in the intentional being not on its own, but by the real and physical act of the intellect. 4) Being real and physical, this act really and physically actualizes the will. It is not the intentional object as such, i. e., not the non-existent goal which directly, by the metaphorical motion, physically activates the will in the forbidden transition from the domain of thinking into the domain of real existence, but the act of the intellect which conceives an unreal goal real and physical. 5) Those distinctions are valid not only for the final cause that affects the will. They will be valid
for the \textit{causa exemplaris} (assuming, against Gufl and following Mayr, that \textit{motio intentionalis} is sufficient for the intentional causation), and for purely cognitive acts as well, because the same is the case, for example, with the act of sensual perception: \textit{species impressa} completes the determination of the act of the sensual capacity by its intentional content taken from the virtual object and represents it virtually, and then physically actualizes it by its physical reality, that is, the reality of quality-accident. 6) Both do occur in the same act, which combines the effects of intentional and physical causes, and not of two different types of physical causes, as Suárez believed.

This implies, among other things, that the physical existence or nonexistence of the external object does not make a difference from the point of view of the internal mechanism of intentional causation. Regardless of any previous settings in relation to the outside world, the intentional causality works only with the immanent content. As John of St. Thomas, one of the strongest Dominican philosophers and theologians of the 17th century, puts it:

\[\ldots\] the intelligible and intentional causality does not require the presence of an object in the real being (\textit{entitative}), because even if the object is present in the real being, it acts on the will not by its real being, but by its cogniscibility and its \textit{species}, which it leaves in the potency as its intentional seed, where the object of the potency is present intentionally... Hence, whether the subject has the real being or not, it is irrelevant for its efficient causal influence on the will or on another potency. \[\text{[efficientia intelligibilis et intentionalis, non requirit obiectum entitative praesens, siquidem obiectum quantum cumque entitative praesens sit, non operatur in voluntatem per suam entitatem, sed per suam cognoscibilitatem, et speciem relictam in potentia tanquam semen eius intentionale, ubi obiectum eius praesens est intentionaliter; ergo sive obiectum entitative sit, sive non, parum refert ad efficientiam in voluntatem aut in aliam potentiam (Juan de Santo Tomás 1667, q. LXI, disp. XXI, a. III, dub. Tertium; 72).}\]

John of St. Thomas proceeds on the two sides of the same act of causation:

This efficient causation is not only moral (i.e., intentional – \textit{G.V.}), but also physical, because the very act of cognizing, intentionally embracing the object
is, however, a physical perfection, a power and an act of the intellect. So, it can move physically and act on the potencies that are movable by its power. And what is physical in respect to one thing is moral (i.e., intentional) in respect to another: in fact, it is physical in relation to the motion within the potencies, but intentional in relation to an external effect. [Neque efficientia ista moralis est, sed etiam physica, quia cognitio ipsa, et si intentionaliter continens objectum, physica tamen perfectio et virtus et actus intellectus est; unde physice movere motest, et agere in potentias mobiles a se. Id tamen quod est physicum respectu unius, est morale respectu alterius; physice enim se habet ad potentias movendas intra se, moraliter autem respectu exterioris effectus] (Ibidem).

There are many similar examples for that.

**Conclusion**

What results from all this? First, the post-Suárezian scholasticism distinguishes a special kind of the intentional causation that is purely semantic and causes by the objective content of the concepts. It is metaphorical only in the sense that it does not mean the physical “infusion of being”, but is it real as the meaningful completion and termination of cognitive and volitional potencies, which is a necessary condition for their activation. The internally motivated motion of meanings forms the content of intentional life as a whole. Second, the intentional being of mental contents and, consequently, their causal force cannot “support themselves”; they are always in need of being supported by physical acts of real vital capacities of physical life. Third, the inseparability of the two sides of acts in the intentional/physical causation, through which the intentional life of the intellect and of the will develops, not to mention the lower levels of cognition and desire, raises the question of how it is possible in this perspective, if it is possible at all, to account for Locks’s separation of the “consciousness” and the “singular person”, and – in a more general way – for the fundamental disconnection between the intentional life and its physical bearer, and its transfer (*per impossibile*) to any other bearer, to follow what Locke says on the matter in chapter 27 of the *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. 
(Locke 1894, c. 27). The topic of physical/intentional causality in the 17th century scholasticism can also contribute to the contemporary discussion of functionalistic approach in the philosophy of mind.

References


