DSpace Collection:
https://hdl.handle.net/10171/13478
2024-03-29T01:30:44ZDue diligence in pandemic: state accountability for Covid-19 under international law
https://hdl.handle.net/10171/68967
Title: Due diligence in pandemic: state accountability for Covid-19 under international law
Abstract: In a press conference in February 2020, the Director-General of the
World Health Organization (WHO), Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus,
said, almost prophetically: "a virus is more powerful in creating
political, economic and social upheaval than any terrorist attack."1 He
went on to describe the novel coronavirus first identified in the city of
Wuhan-Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2)-as "public enemy number one" for the world.2 Only a
month later, with more than 4,000 deaths on record and in reaction to
"the alarming levels of inaction" 4 everywhere, the WHO classified the
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) as a pandemic, thus formally
recognising the uncontrolled spread of the virus all over the world.2022-01-01T00:00:00ZLa necesidad de las operaciones encubiertas como arma jurídica contra la corrupción (inter)nacional
https://hdl.handle.net/10171/68871
Title: La necesidad de las operaciones encubiertas como arma jurídica contra la corrupción (inter)nacional
Abstract: La corrupción pública es una plaga que amenaza la estabilidad de los Estados que actúan en un escenario internacional globalizado como es el contemporáneo. Las convenciones ONU de Palermo y de Mérida prevén el recurso a las “técnicas especiales de investigación”, en particular a las operaciones de los agentes encubiertos, para combatir los delitos relacionados con la corrupción. El presente artículo se propone demostrar la importancia que supondría para la seguridad internacional la ejecución efectiva por parte de los Estados de aquellas técnicas especiales de investigación para luchar con más eficacia contra la corrupción. Para ello, se profundiza en la normativa española relativa al agente encubierto y se destaca cuáles son los límites que le impiden contrarrestar con mayor vigor los asuntos de corrupción. Se sugiere, en consecuencia, que los países que aún no hayan acogido en su legislación dichas técnicas, se inspiren al ejemplo británico. En el Reino Unido la escasez de casos de corrupción pública se debe también a la adopción reciente de ciertos instrumentos jurídicos que permiten las operaciones encubiertas para investigar los delitos de corrupción. Se concluye, por tanto, que sería importante un compromiso más firme de todos los Estados que ratificaron ambas convenciones para recurrir a aquellas herramientas que podrían contribuir de una forma concreta a la lucha contra la corrupción (inter)nacional.; In our globalised international community public corruption is a serious plague that threatens States’ well - being.
The UN Palermo and Merida’s conventions provide for the use of “special investigative techniques”, in particular for the employment of the undercover operations, in order to combat c orruption related crimes. Thus, the main purpose of this article is to demonstrate the importance for States Party to employ those t echniques to effectively fight corruption. In order to do so, Spanish regulation on the undercover agent is studied in depth , as it is considered to be the main obstacle that prevent Spain to successfully counter corruption issues .
Therefore, it is argued countries that have not yet accepted in their legislation the possibility to resort to undercover operations against corrupt ion should follow the British example. In the United Kingdom, the lack of cases of public corruption is also due to the approval of some legal instruments allowing covert operations to investigate corruption related offenses.
Hence, it is assumed that a stronger commitment by all States Party to the Palermo and M érida c onventions to benefit from the tool of undercov er operations could concretely contribute to fight against (inter)national corruption.2019-01-01T00:00:00ZLos ciberataques de los actores no estatales y la "ciberdiligencia debida" de los estados.
https://hdl.handle.net/10171/68869
Title: Los ciberataques de los actores no estatales y la "ciberdiligencia debida" de los estados.
Abstract: Los ciberataques en tiempos de paz – por parte de grupos de hacktivistas, organizaciones criminales transnacionales o bandas terroristas – aumentan cada año más, suponiendo para los Estados la ciberamenaza más frecuente contra sus infraestructuras informáticas. Ante esta realidad, la comunidad internacional no cuenta todavía con una herramienta jurídica eficaz para atribuir la responsabilidad internacional a aquellos Estados desde cuyo territorio dichos actores no estatales lanzan sus ciberataques contra otros países. Por tanto, en el presente artículo se propone la adopción del concepto de “ciberdiligencia debida”. Partiendo de la noción clásica de “diligencia debida” desarrollada en el Derecho internacional del medioambiente, se sugiere que la “ciberdiligencia debida” permitiría identificar con más facilidad al Estado responsable y atribuirle la responsabilidad por no adoptar las medidas preventivas, como las de monitoreo, necesarias para oponerse a las actividades cibernéticas ilícitas de estos grupos privados.; Peacetime cyberattacks by groups of hacktivists, transnational criminal organizations or terrorist groups, increase every year, being the most frequent cyber threat against States’ IT infrastructures.
Given this reality, the international community does not have developed yet an effective legal tool in order to attribute international responsibility to those States from whose territory non-State actors launch their cyberattacks against other countries. Therefore, this article suggests that the adoption of the “cyber-due diligence” concept – based on the classic notion of “due diligence” – would make easier to identify responsible States and attribute them their responsibility for failing to adopt preventive measures, such as monitoring activities.2021-01-01T00:00:00ZThe Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime: Strengthening international cooperation or endangering fundamental rights?
https://hdl.handle.net/10171/68868
Title: The Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime: Strengthening international cooperation or endangering fundamental rights?
Abstract: In the last two years the use of ransomwares by cybercriminals has been constantly on the
rise. Thus, States have found themselves needing a stronger international legal response
to this criminal phenomenon, Germany being the second most affected country in the
world by ransomware incidents. However, online service providers often store users’ data
on servers that may be in different national jurisdictions. Therefore, faced with the necessity to obtain electronic evidence of cybercrimes, the competent State authorities are often hampered by other States’ territorial and jurisdictional boundaries. To overcome this
and other obstacles to a more effective inter-State cooperation, the Council of Europe has
recently adopted the Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime. This
paper aims to further explore this treaty by analysing the tools that the Protocol provides
for strengthening direct cooperation between States Parties and between them and online
service providers. Though, due to the intrusion that their application could entail for the
online users involved, these legal tools raise certain doubts as to their compatibility with
human rights and fundamental freedoms such as privacy, Hence, the ultimate purpose of
this paper is to examine whether the Second Protocol succeeds in creating a balanced legal framework that takes due account of the effectiveness of the fight against cybercrime
and, at the same time, the effective protection of online users’ fundamental human rights.2023-01-01T00:00:00Z