The present work aims to remember and celebrate Professor Sergio
Cotta, who died in May 2007. This philosopher was one of the most important
20th century scholars of natural law doctrine. His ontological-phenomenological path in the field of law, as developed in Il diritto nell'esistenza, is characterized
by some fundamental questions: "What is the law like? ", "Why law? " and,
eventually, "Why law instead of the lack of law? ".
In addition to these, the Author poses another question: "Why is the law the way
it is today, in post-modern age" ? Cotta believes that the onto-phenomenological
structure of human being, a being in relation, gives a whole understanding of
law, of its both synchronic and diachronic presence. Among his most important
contributions in favour of the often disputed 20th century natural law doctrine, we can mention, first of all, his convincing rebutting of the charge of "naturalistic
fallacy" (David Hume) to natural law, by means of an innovative elaboration
of the onto-phenomenological perspective of the human being considered as
the basis of law. We can also mention his overcoming of the narrow-minded
reductionist views about law, like policy-and-state-oriented law and economy oriented
law.
Keeping close to Antonio Rosmini, even if from a different philosophical background,
Cotta believes that the just law origins from the onto-phenomenological
and co-existential structure of the human being.
In the second paragraph, referring to Günther Anders, the Author highlights the
signs of contemporary decadence, related to post-modern age, where the unique
and powerful subject of worldwide history is pluto-tecnocracy. Essential symbols
of this new and decayed existential condition may be considered Auschwitz
and Hiroshima.
The most evident outcomes of post-modern age on sociai and normative (legal
and moral) order are both the dissolution of an authentic co-existence within a
common world and the spread of forms of colonization and submission of human
being, defined by Anders as mass-hermit. The Jew-German philosopher describes the profound transformations of traditional
law and morality in terms of moral agnosticism (which is not ethical
indifferentism) and normative scepticism. His philosophical anthropology in the
age of technology is irreversibly directed from the already obsolete not-yet, as
getting ready and waiting for a possible change, towards the apocalyptic nolonger.
The Author's question: "Why is the law the way it is in post-modern age?"
refers to the research ofa concrete re-orientation towards the not-yet, in order
to redeem Anders'pure apocalyptical perspective. Indeed, we cannot deny that
today the just law is being replaced by another kind of law, which may have
contents, forms and aims diametrically opposed to those of the just law. This
different kind of law is a shadow of the former one.
The Author refers to Paul Ricceur's attempt to combine a though difficult dialectic
(mediation) between love, in the sense of beyond-measure, and justice, in the
sense of procedural form aimed at the application of the rule-measure. In this
path, coming back to Sergio Cotta and his opus maius, the Author views charity
and love in their highest axiologicai projection which, even if with difficulties
and effort, might involve and positively contaminate justice itself.
In the end, the waiting for a change, that is the not-yet, fills and overwhelms
with the contents of charity, a theological virtue, poured off into justice, a cardinal
virtue.The Jew-German philosopher describes the profound transformations of traditional
law and morality in terms of moral agnosticism (which is not ethical
indifferentism) and normative scepticism. His philosophical anthropology in the
age of technology is irreversibly directed from the already obsolete not-yet, as
getting ready and waiting for a possible change, towards the apocalyptic nolonger.
The Author's question: "Why is the law the way it is in post-modern age?"
refers to the research ofa concrete re-orientation towards the not-yet, in order
to redeem Anders'pure apocalyptical perspective. Indeed, we cannot deny that
today the just law is being replaced by another kind of law, which may have
contents, forms and aims diametrically opposed to those of the just law. This
different kind of law is a shadow of the former one.
The Author refers to Paul Ricceur's attempt to combine a though difficult dialectic
(mediation) between love, in the sense of beyond-measure, and justice, in the
sense of procedural form aimed at the application of the rule-measure. In this
path, coming back to Sergio Cotta and his opus maius, the Author views charity
and love in their highest axiologicai projection which, even if with difficulties
and effort, might involve and positively contaminate justice itself.
In the end, the waiting for a change, that is the not-yet, fills and overwhelms
with the contents of charity, a theological virtue, poured off into justice, a cardinal
virtue.
