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dc.creatorHuzarek, T. (Tomasz)-
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-11T08:41:33Z-
dc.date.available2017-10-11T08:41:33Z-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.citationHuzarek, T. (Tomasz). "Knowledge Argument versus Bundle Theory according to Derek Parfit". Scientia et Fides. 5 (2), 2017, 237 - 250es
dc.identifier.issn2353-5636-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10171/44017-
dc.description.abstractAccording to constitutive reductionism of Derek Parfit, a subject/person is not a separate existing being but his existence consists in the existence of a brain and body, performance of actions, thinking and occurrence of other physical and mental events. The identity of the subject in time comes down only to “Relation R” - mental consistency and/or connectedness – elicited by appropriate reasons. In the following article, I will try, relying on Frank Johnson's Knowledge Argument, to argue in favour of the following conclusions: (1) a person/subject is a “fact”irreducible to body and physical relations with the environment and (2) a subject is something/”fact” non-reducible to mental occurrences.es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherServicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarraes_ES
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES
dc.subjectsubjectes_ES
dc.subjectpersones_ES
dc.subjectidentityes_ES
dc.subjectqualiaes_ES
dc.subjectconsciousnesses_ES
dc.subjectself-consciousnesses_ES
dc.titleKnowledge Argument versus Bundle Theory according to Derek Parfites_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dadun.citation.endingPage250es_ES
dadun.citation.number2es_ES
dadun.citation.publicationNameScientia et Fideses_ES
dadun.citation.startingPage237es_ES
dadun.citation.volume5es_ES

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