El juicio predicativo simple en Frege y Husserl: Una confrontación
Autor(es) : 
Palabras clave : 
Husserl, Edmund
Frege, Gottlob
juicio
lógica
fenomenología
Fecha de publicación: 
2004
Cita: 
Anuario Filosófico, 2004 (37), 129 - 155
Resumen
The doctrine on predicative judgment sustained by Frege and Husserl reopens a discussion already present in the philosophical tradition: Does predicative judgment consist in a “composition” of concepts made by the understanding, or in an “assent” to a propositional content? For Frege, the “thought”, i. e., the sense of the proposition, as expresion of the judgment, presents such unity that it cannot be explained by a “composition” of previous elements; Husserl on the contrary, sustains that, although the propositional content of judgments in composed judgments do present a unity, in the case of the simple predicative judgment this unity arises due to a “synthesis”. Thus, for Frege the act of judging consists in “recognizing the truth-value of a thought”, which agrees with the doctrine of an “assent” to a propositional content. For Husserl, on the contrary, the basic act of judging consists in a “synthesis” of basic representations, which is very close to Aristotle’s doctrine.
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