Suárez and Calvo-Sotelo on the small screen: a compared study of the television leadership during the democratic Transition in Spain (1976–1982)

Abstract

Between 1976 and 1982, Spain lived an intense political and media context in the process of transition to democracy. During this period, video-politics broke out and it influenced the way politics were conducted and the leadership of politicians. Throughout those years, two presidents led the process of change: Adolfo Suárez and Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo. Two different leaders: in their way of "doing politics" and in the way in which they used television to connect with society. This paper offers an analysis of, firstly, how both politicians understood their relationship with public television (TVE) and, secondly, what formats they used and the discourse of the television broadcasts that they starred in. To answer these questions, we conducted a thorough review of the existing literature on the topic, the published testimonies of protagonists, the Calvo-Sotelo archive, a content analysis of Televisión Española’s archives and the press published during Transition. The findings of this study clearly indicate that TVE marked the evolution of both presidents who, from the beginning, put in place different strategies to match their work from the Executive using public television. On the other hand, the shadow of Suárez and the way in which he had used television during the Transition, did not abandon Calvo-Sotelo whose decisions of media leadership were always aimed at countering the weight of the Suárez’s legacy.

Keywords

Suárez, Calvo-Sotelo, leadership, Spanish transition, television, RTVE, political communication.

1. Introduction

The Transition process to democracy in Spain went hand in hand with the concept known as video-politics (Sartori, 2002), which is that leadership and public action began to develop, to an extent, around television (Martín, 2013).

During Adolfo Suárez’s first year in office, RTVE, the public television service, took a leading role as it was managed by the government, first to pave the way to the political reform in December 1976, and then to launch Suárez’s and the UCD candidacy in the general elections
of June 1977. After that “magic year” (Ansón, 2014) and, above all, after the approval of the Constitution, already submitted to the regulation of a democratic parliament, the Government and its television no longer had this free will. It did not take too long for the social democratic opposition to understand the value of the audiovisual weapon and did not think twice before launching a campaign demanding the impartiality and/or regulation of the new Organismo Autónomo Radio Televisión Española1, founded in November 1977, headed by Fernando Arias-Salgado (Martín, 2013, p. 251). This conflict ended with the consensual approval of the Statute of Radio Televisión Española in 1980 and the election under an agreement between UCD and PSOE of Fernando Castedo as General Manager.

In 1981, a few days after the official appointment of Castedo, Adolfo Suárez resigned and Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo took office. The relationship of the new president with the Ente Público RTVE2 were turbulent, as accusations of manipulation by social democrats and communists strengthened while the Government –and the party in particular– kept considering television as a government-owned service. The outcome was the appointment of two General–Manager in just a few months: Carlos Robles Piquer y Eugenio Nasarre. Calvo-Sotelo was aware of his limitations in terms of image in comparison with his predecessor and designed a new communication policy which, in the television context, was continuously hindered by harassment and discredit that successive directors of the Ente and the different RTVE programs and professionals also went through.

Within the intense political and media context from 1976 to 1982, it is interesting to draw a comparative analysis between the first two presidents of the Spanish democracy from the perspective of television. While Adolfo Suárez’s charisma and telegenic quality have regularly been highlighted by historiography in specific studies such as those by Martín (2013) or Fuentes (2011) and in different histories of television during the Transition such as those by Pérez Ornia (1988), Palacio (2012) or Bustamante (2006) and even in general studies about this period, this is not the case with his successor. We are based on the hypothesis that Adolfo Suárez and Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo were quite different leaders if we observe the way they “did politics” and the way they used television to connect with society (Pelaz, 2016). This project aims to study how both politicians understood their relationship with the state television channel and address both the formats that were used and the discourse of the programs where they appeared, with a number of factors in mind. In the first place, that both leaders’ presence on the small screen depended on a certain schedule (Montero, 2018, pp. 319–563) that aimed messages towards the dominant meanings, as some studies about children and youth television programs have highlighted (Paz & Mateos-Pérez, 2015) or about the history popularization and debate on TVE (Paz & Montero, 2015). Secondly, at that time, Televisión Española was believed to be an “obscene object of desire” (Sotillos, 2002, p. 158) of all political units; and finally, that there was an active debate in force (especially during Calvo-Sotelo’s term of office) about the authorization of private television, which encouraged attacks against the public television channels in some media companies (Quintana, 2007, pp. 205–206).

This research has been done using the historical method, based on the existing bibliography, and then the search for published testimonies of the subjects, the Calvo-Sotelo archive, the TVE archives and the press of that time. As for testimonial sources, it is worth mentioning the published memories of Calvo-Sotelo (1990; 1999), Ansón (2015), Galdón (1984), Macía (1981), Ónega (2013), Robles Piquer (2011) or Sotillos (2002) among others. The personal archive of Calvo-Sotelo has allowed us to recover reports, surveys, letters or speeches, completed with the collection of newspapers like Diario 16, ABC and El País, El Alcázar or magazines like Interviú or Triunfo among other media outlets. Concerning television programs, the sample was determined by looking for those in which Suárez or Calvo-Sotelo

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1 Translator’s note: In charge of Spain’s public radio and television service between 1977 and 1981.
2 Translator’s note: Formerly known as Organismo Autónomo RTVE. Active between 1981 and 2007.
themselves were the main characters and appeared on their own initiative. In total, 11 interventions by president Suárez between 1976 and 1981 and other 9 by Calvo-Sotelo between 1981 and 1982. These were all classified depending on the theme and format and were related to the political context of the moment. The time of emission within the schedule, the staging and the oral and corporal languages of the subject have also been taken into account. Subsequently, the impact of these emissions on the national press has been carefully verified, both from an ideological and periodic perspective.

2. Suárez to TVE: a governing team

2.1. Public television serving the ‘suarista’ project for the Transition

Adolfo Suárez was aware of the ability of the small screen to reach public opinion, as he had proved during the period he directed RTVE (1969–1973) (Munsó Cabús, 2001, pp. 103-116). It was then when Suárez “learns the extraordinary effectiveness of this new means of communication” (Hernández, 2009, p. 50) and becomes a real “professional” and a “television animal” (Fuentes, 2016, pp. 164 y 171). With this background, his arrival to the presidency of the Government in 1976 means the irruption of video-politics into Spain. His government actions will be always developed with television as a strategic pillar. It does not come as a surprise that his first nomination upon arriving at Moncloa was Rafael Ansón as General Manager of the television broadcaster. He was a man who had his full confidence and whom he saw prepared to “convey the idea of the New Deal from the highest political authorities of the nation” (Munsó Cabús, 2001, p. 143).

From the beginning, TVE –as a key element of the suarista strategy of democratizing change, through the new schedule designed by Ansón and the change imposed on the news– “sells” democracy by launching on latest news or entertainment an educational and positive message of renovation and consensus (Martín, 2013). This “great stride” (Macía, 1981, p. 205) was praised, in general terms, by the press, and with special emphasis by the ABC. However, there were also detractors who pointed their fingers at the excessive involvement of Suárez in the small screen and more appeared when his own General-Manager affirmed that “this media outlet belonged to the Government and was entirely at his service, until further modifications in the political structure that recommended or determined another attitude.”

The president was very clear that “the success of his administration [would] partly depend on his ability to put television at the service of his policy. It was, basically, about winning his credibility for the general public, which he lacked within the political sphere, both Francoist and anti-Franco, and conveying the idea that his personal image, so separate from that of Carlos Arias, responded to a new, fresher, closer way to understand politics” (Fuentes, 2016, pp. 171-172).

In that symbiotic relationship between television and Suárez, Rafael Ansón was a fundamental element that turned him, at least for some, into the scapegoat that embodied “in a hyperbolic way, all evils of the Transition on TVE” (Pérez Ornia, 1988, p. 82). His term finished in November 1977, officially due to the assembling of the Administrative Council of RTVE (something which at the time he confirmed), although it was speculated that the broadcast of the program Yo Canto where Luis Pastor appeared surrounded by republican flags triggered this decision.

The appointment of his successor, Fernando Arias Salgado, was welcomed with certain optimism especially due to the fact that the creation of the Provisional Administrative Council had given way to the project for the elaboration of a statute that would lay the legal foundations –and democratization– of TVE. However, this new phase was soon deemed as

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3 ABC, 3-10-1976.
4 Triunfo, 16-10-1976.
regressive and came with controversy (the dismissal of Pedro Macía, the resignation en masse of the news directors of the “Ansón phase” or the audits that uncovered anomalies in the management) and of a strong tension in the industry, with the first strike. According to Macía himself: “Fernando Arias Salgado provided will and determination to keep things unchanged. The News, however, suffered a considerable slowdown. Daily meetings stopped happening and taboos arose again. Old pressures returned and everything indicated that things would get worse (Ornia, 1988, p. 103). In El País: “The General Manager of TVE, for the past five months, has confronted a number of authorities on different occasions and has even dismissed employees who had not been thought, precisely, to have conflicting attitudes. At Prado del Rey, these measures are interpreted as an extreme political hardening in the information and management of TVE.”

The discredit of state television and the reports against its inclinations towards Suárez’s government were on the rise when the campaign began in March, 1979. Tensions only increased since, as the president himself stated: “Consensus has ended [...]. It was an exceptional solution for an equally exceptional time in our political development, and proof of the maturity and responsibility of the political parties when it came to defending the true interests of the people and the State.”

Besides, the parties had recognized the need to focus their campaign on televsional communication and to not allow the Government to put this public means of communication at the service of their own electoral interests (Martín, 2013). Surveys revealed that the small screen was “the great electoral asset, the rally with guaranteed attendance.” One study indicated that in the last three elections, 68.35% had used television to follow the campaign, in comparison with 26.6% who used newspapers, 17.5% the radio, 7.7% used billboards and 4.1% meetings (Contreras, 1990, p. 65).

The proven power of the state channel –about which Alfonso Guerra claimed: “I wouldn’t change five minutes on television for ten thousand members” (Ramírez, 1979, p. 84)– contributed to structuring the campaign around a growing “video dependence” and to control the imbrication between Suárez and Prado del Rey. Hence, due to a nonexistent agreement on the distribution of the TVE space by the parties –and the fact that El País began to analyze on a daily basis electoral-related programming–, its airing on television was delayed for six days. Said study revealed that, on the first day of the campaign (February 7), the public network acted with a “moderation, a bit unusual on television,” which “seemed to respond to a desire to avoid partisan or overwhelming information for the viewer.” However, he also stated that “UCD controlled TV” and that over the seven days prior to the launch of the television campaign, the government party “owned almost 90% of the electoral information.”

Concerning the controversy over the final decision on the distribution of the television spaces, this was resolved in parallel meetings and not in the committee created for it. “The big four,” –UCD, PSOE, PCE, CD (Democratic Coalition)– decided to return to consensus in order to enjoy a number of privileges as for the placement of their spots. The Primera Cadena (channel one) would be practically monopolized by them while the rest would get totally or partially displaced to UHF (channel two) and not always during prime time.

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2 Adolfo Suárez, inauguration speech, 30-03-1979.

3 Tele-Radio, 10 to 25-02-1979.


The tensions between UCD and PSOE at the expense of television reached its peak in May, 1980. When presenting in Congress the no-confidence motion against Suárez, Guerra used the situation at RTVE as one of his main dialectical weapons. During the following months, social democrats and ucedistas (supporters of UCD) would reach an agreement to “neutralize” the channel, approving the Statute and appointing the first director of the Ente, Fernando Castedo, in January, 1981 (Guerra, 2007, pp. 358 and 418). It looked like democracy was reaching the small screen.

2.2. Face to face with the people: speeches against the other formats

Suárez was a telegenic leader with a unanimously recognized ability to communicate, especially at a short distance. Besides, he knew how to take advantage of this talent with the help of cameras thanks to his closer approach (McGinnis, 1972, p. 30) and, through this “you to you” with the audience, he could, in the words of his collaborator Fernando Ónega, make his discourse seem like an “intimate conversation with the viewer” (Martín, 2013, p. 79). These addresses—unparalleled in number in comparison with other legislatures of the recent history of Spain—were, for him, his “strongest weapon” in front of the citizens.

Suárez, who may well be called the first television president of Spain, continuously tried to govern through a televisual and televised dialogue; conveying the citizen-audience the sensation of being directly and intimately involved in a process of collective decision-making. Throughout his term of office, there were six occasions when he sent his message directly through the screen and always at key moments for the establishment of the democratic system.

The first of these addresses took place on July 6, 1976, after his appointment as president. Aware of the lack of support by the national and international public opinion, he made the decision to approach Spanish citizens on camera from the living room of his house to present his government project and to silence the voices that criticized the King’s decision. The innovation of this message were beyond form, since the speech offered the audience a language—in the words of Suárez himself: “moderate, of mutual agreement and conciliation”—and content far from the Francoist discursive tone (Martín, 2013, pp. 74-76). Likewise, “the concept of popular sovereignty as the base of political organization” was introduced on television (Ysart, 1984, pp. 64-65), as reflected in quotes like “If I had to highlight an aspiration at this time, [...] I could reduce it to [...] governing with the consent of the governed”; and by using discursive principles quite similar to those of the royal message in his proclamation, e.g. “Working with and for every Spanish citizen” or stating that “Spain is a common task.”

A few months later he would turn to “his great communicative asset.” This time, the moment of choice was the day before the referendum for the Law for Political Reform. Suárez opted to star on the last act of the government campaign, providing a message, aired after the second edition of the news, in which he appeared standing with a neutral background while slowly reading his speech. The president explained that the reason why he came to this channel was that he wanted to “govern aided by society.”

In this way, for Suárez, television was a nexus between him and the citizens to whom he expressed a message encouraging collaboration and taking for granted the success of the Transition despite the hassles suffered along the way. Proof of this is the message he promoted on the occasion of the terrorist wave known as Semana Negra in January, 1977. During this speech, Suárez acknowledged that the executive body was aware of “the importance of the challenge” and showed the reasons why the Council of Ministers had decided to revoke articles 13 and 18 of the Fuero de los Españoles. The president used a language

13 TVE, First televised address of Adolfo Suárez as president of the Government, aired on 6-07-1976.
14 Ibid.
15 TVE, Address of Adolfo Suárez, aired on 14-12-1976.
that conveyed strength in the face of the general sense weakness that the country was going through.\textsuperscript{16}

The calls for elections were also opportunities to address the viewers. This was the case in June, 1977\textsuperscript{17} (a speech where he took the chance to explain the reasons why he competed by the newly founded UCD, what his political stance was and why he had decided to legalize the PCE), and in March, 1979.\textsuperscript{18}

On June 15, 1977, the Spanish citizens decided on the composition of the Parliament. However, the position of President of the Government was not at stake, so the law disallowed Suárez to campaign actively, even being the leader of UCD. This rule was flouted the day before election silence, when he starred on the third of 10-minute free ads that TVE assigned to political parties. This is the well-known message “I can promise and I will promise,” with which the president closed a hectic campaign that gave the starting signal to parliamentary life in the Transition (Ónega, 2013, pp. 169–171).\textsuperscript{19}

The weeks prior to the general elections of 1979 meant the explosion of video-politics with Suárez as omnipresent leader during the UCD campaign. He starred in all three spaces that his party had been assigned on the first channel of TVE. The first ad was a report followed by a brief interview\textsuperscript{20}. Federico Ysart, in charge of information and image of the ucedista campaign, was the chosen one to present it. During the first half, Ysart became the voiceover while different medium shots and close-ups of Suárez, alternating with several of his interventions on the small screen or in Congress, served as illustrative support for a retrospective vision of the Transition. The storyline drew a connection between the “I can promise and I will promise” of 1977 and the “Said and done. UCD complies” during the 1979 campaign. The second part, in interview format, took four more minutes. In fact, despite appearances, it was rather a monologue intervention of the candidate preceded by a question from Ysart about what the images projected at the beginning of the announcement had suggested to Suárez.

In the remaining television spaces, they opted for the format with which Suárez felt most comfortable: speeches on camera\textsuperscript{21}. The spot of February 23, 1979 reminds us how the president left any intervention where confrontation was evident or in which he had to deal with more than one speaker. That spot shows how he rejected the proposal for a debate with F. González, which sparked a strong controversy that continued after the celebration of the elections; and this event was suggested to be related with his subsequent rejection to debate during his inaugural session (Ramírez, 1979, pp. 143–144). But the most decisive intervention was his last message, in which the president’s deteriorated appearance and his speech against Marxism–which differed from his usual style and whose purpose was to instill fear among the electorate– were decisive for the final victory of UCD (Herrero, 2007, pp. 191–192).

This campaign strategy was the beginning of the destabilization actions against Suárez, mainly promoted by the PSOE. The consensual Transition had ended, and with it the president also abandoned his usual television maneuvers. Since that moment, on-screen addresses will cease to give way to press conferences and interviews for the news, which until then had never been the format with which he felt most comfortable–although later during his CDS stage they became even more important\textsuperscript{22}– but new times seemed to demand new skills. Then, after the no-confidence motion debate, he offered an almost forty-minute long press conference

\textsuperscript{16} TVE, Address of Adolfo Suárez, aired on 29-01-1977.
\textsuperscript{17} TVE, Address of Adolfo Suárez, aired on 3-05-1977.
\textsuperscript{18} TVE, Address of Adolfo Suárez where he calls for general and municipal elections, aired on 29-12-1978.
\textsuperscript{19} TVE: Free spaces for electoral propaganda at the end of the campaign, aired on 13-06-1977.
\textsuperscript{22} Interview to Adolfo Suárez by Mercedes Milá on De jueves a jueves (22-05-1986): http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/programas-y-concursos-en-el-archivo-de-rtve/jueves-jueves-entrevista-adolfo-suarez/3964377/.
Suárez used the same format to communicate his resignation: on-camera (Fuentes, 2011, pp. 387–389). As a great video-leader, “he never thought of informing Parliament of his decision, preferring to shoot a farewell speech” (Powell, 2001, p. 290). On January 29, 1981, he gave a speech filled with contained honesty and emotion in which he tried to explain the reasons that led him to resign: “but there are crossroads [...] where one must ask oneself, in a calm and objective stance, if it provides a better service to the community by remaining in its position or otherwise by renouncing.”

Thus ended a stage in which Suárez had led Spain towards democracy, aware of the need for the public opinion to support the decisions of the leaders and take part in the commitment to consensus. Television was the perfect instrument to achieve that direct relationship between the Government and the citizens-audience.

### Table 1: Appearances of Adolfo Suárez on TVE (1976-1981).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-7-1976</td>
<td>21.30h</td>
<td>6 mins.</td>
<td>Presidential address. On Telediario second edition</td>
<td>Appointment President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-12-1976</td>
<td>22h</td>
<td>15 mins.</td>
<td>Presidential address</td>
<td>Message on the day before the referendum on the Political Reform Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-1-1977</td>
<td>22h</td>
<td>9 mins.</td>
<td>Presidential address</td>
<td>Message with regard to the “Semana Negra” (Black Week)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5-1977</td>
<td>22h</td>
<td>No info</td>
<td>Presidential address</td>
<td>Announces elections for June 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-6-1977</td>
<td>22h</td>
<td>10 mins.</td>
<td>Free campaign space: campaign ad UCD</td>
<td>Election campaign June 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-12-1978</td>
<td>No info</td>
<td>No info</td>
<td>Presidential address</td>
<td>Announces general and municipal elections for 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-2-1979</td>
<td>22h</td>
<td>10 mins.</td>
<td>Free campaign space: campaign ad UCD</td>
<td>Election campaign March 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-2-1979</td>
<td>22h</td>
<td>10 mins.</td>
<td>Free campaign space: campaign ad UCD</td>
<td>Election campaign March 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-2-1979</td>
<td>22.10h</td>
<td>10 mins.</td>
<td>Free campaign space: campaign ad UCD</td>
<td>Election campaign March 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-5-1980</td>
<td>No info</td>
<td>40 mins.</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
<td>Debate motion of no-confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-1-1981</td>
<td>19.40h</td>
<td>12 mins.</td>
<td>Presidential address</td>
<td>Announces resignation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TVE, El País and ABC archives. Compiled by the authors.

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23 [TVE, Press conference after the no-confidence motion debate, aired on 30-05-1980.]
24 [ABC, 5-10-1980 and El País, 5-10-1980. Of the respondents, 41% thought it had been “good” or “very good,” and 44% “not so good,” “bad” or “very bad”. 70% considered press conferences “interesting.” “Survey about the press conference of President Suárez”, CIS, Madrid October 1980, E.1246.]
25 [Press conference after the RTVE budget debate (1-12-1980) or the one that took place in Sevilla on 22-11-1980 with topics such as the UCD, Andalusia, terrorism and divorce.]
26 [TVE, Address of Adolfo Suárez, aired on 29-01-1981.]
3. Calvo-Sotelo and television: making the difference

3.1. Control and turmoil of the Ente

Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo did not share the communication skills of Suárez, which he was aware of. He also considered that, after the foundational stage of this young democracy, the president’s relationship with television should be normalized. Calvo-Sotelo affirmed that “Suárez was more self-confident; he believed in his charisma, in his control over television, in his overflowing sympathy, more than in the sustaining pillar of a political organization,” and that had led him “to the exercise of a direct democracy, with the old ways of political persuasion that connect citizens with a leader without really needing a party” (Calvo-Sotelo, 1990, pp. 55–56).

For Calvo-Sotelo, the power of television in Spain had “accentuated the presidential bias of our parliamentary monarchy” and trivialized politics in general and parliamentary action in particular, which he had dispossessed of “distance, mystery (and) myth.” In his words, “you can’t invite the cameras to come in the bedroom of the pacts, or in the kitchen of disagreements, or offstage during a coup.” Calvo-Sotelo acknowledged “he had never been a television man.” He lacked the “telegenic qualities of Suárez and González,” who he said were “both excellent actors” (Calvo-Sotelo, 2010, pp. 461–463). As Sinova claims, “he was a different kind of politician. He focused more on the discursive argument, on reflection, on the excellence of language and prose, which don’t have as much room on television” (Calvo-Sotelo, 2010, pp. 461–463).

From the beginning, the public image of Calvo-Sotelo –of whom Guerra would say “he is such a dull man that his most useful role would be a cobblestone” (Sotillos, 2002, p. 22)– was a key element for his advisors. Being an unelected president at the polls, his image would be examined later and not before he came to power: as is the norm in democracies. Among the first tasks of the new “plumbers” of Moncloa was to elaborate a report titled “Opinions about Calvo Sotelo.” It gathered the opinions of politicians, businessmen, trade unionists, media and image experts (Pelaz, 2016, pp. 459–463). These comments were almost identical in tone: “his worst enemy is, precisely, his lack of image; the opposition knows it, and of course he will exploit it.” The new president had to design a different communication strategy from that of his predecessor. A strategy in which television had to play an important but different role. As another report indicated before his inauguration, it must be evident that “the Transition and the political ways it demanded have ended: the appearance of the President on the small screen must be normal, to explain to the country what is happening.”

But RTVE meant a problem for the Government. During his time at Moncloa, relations with television became a real headache for Calvo-Sotelo, with three different General-Manager in 20 months (Quintana, 2007, pp. 138–150). Castedo, legacy of Suárez, contributed to an opening that was considered as “too leftist” by some sectors of UCD. His term ended abruptly when Calvo-Sotelo and Rodríguez Sahagún, president of the party, ordered his resignation on October 22, 1981 (Calvo-Sotelo, 1990, p. 73). He was replaced by Robles Piquer, seen as a more conservative and judged person, especially for being brother-in-law of Manuel Fraga (Robles Piquer, 2011, pp. 475–505). If Castedo was too progressive for the people, with Robles Piquer we observed the opposite. Hostilities from many of the employees, an attitude sometimes bordering on arrogance, parliamentary harassment, obstacles in the Administration Council and the aversion from some written media, particularly El País, made their situation unsustainable (Robles Piquer, 2011, p. 477). He was replaced by the Christian democrat Eugenio Nasarre on July 22, 1982. In the words of Sotillos, he fulfilled his term “with

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"Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo Archive (referred to as ALCS)" 
"Opiniones sobre Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo" (Opinions about Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo). 
"ALCS, Inauguration, 07, “Los días antes de la investidura” (The days before the inauguration)."
dignity,” particularly during the electoral campaign of 1982 (2002, p. 159). According to Sinova, he served “with enough capacity to change the bad environment in a short time” (1983, p. 97). Calvo–Sotelo thought that this constant tension about Prado del Rey was given by a “desire for partisan control of the means of communication which, due to its monopoly situation, is attributed magical powers of influence.” In his opinion, the arrival of private television (frustrated project of his mandate) would ease the tension on the Ente.29

In this context, the coverage of government actions on television was always surrounded by controversy: “the PSOE complained that Leopoldo Calvo–Sotelo covered almost twenty times more screen time than Felipe González; and Robles Piquer himself covered twice as much as the main leader of the opposition “(Sotillos, 2002, p. 165). This tension was accentuated in the Galician and Andalusian autonomic electoral campaigns that took place during that time. A report of the social democrats in the Administration Council affirmed the “evident informative servitude to the figure of the president of the Government (366 pieces of news referred to Calvo Sotelo in the period between October and February)” (Sinova, 1983, p. 87). El País wrote several reports minuting the appearances on the news.30

In addition to the newscasts, the president also appeared on the small screen on the occasion of major parliamentary debates. While Suárez’s aversion to the hemiciclo31 was known, his successor was a brilliant parliamentarian, gifted with a slyness that confused his opponents. Calvo–Sotelo was aware that “the deputies no longer speak for the hemiciclo, but for the television audience” (Calvo–Sotelo, 1999, p. 252) and precisely for that reason there was an enormous precaution at the time of exposing him in this type of events.

The debate that should set the tone was the inauguration debate. Suárez had avoided this in 1979 and now Calvo–Sotelo wanted it to be his letter of introduction: an “essential time for the electorate to appreciate that the ways do have changed.”32 However, RTVE opted for the night pre-recorded broadcast for fear that potential mistakes could cause irreparable damage to the candidate’s image. This type of broadcast also allowed long summaries suitably edited for the newscast (Pelaz, 2016, pp. 466–468).

The idea of avoiding live broadcasts remained for the important parliamentary meetings with presidential interventions. In this way, for example, and despite the complaints of the press, the debate on rapeseed oil scandal was not aired in September, 1981, “to avoid creating panic and concern among the Spanish people [...] and due to the technical nature of this discussion”33. The same thing happened with the one of October of 1981 which covered the approval of the affiliation of Spain in the NATO, doing, according to Daily 16 “a disservice to the Atlantic cause,” and giving the impression that “there was something embarrassing to hide.”34

In the face of the ongoing public controversy about the government control of television, the preferred way for Calvo–Sotelo to deliver his messages to society was the press conference. That was the format he chose on the first time he addressed the country as president of the Government, on February 25, 1981 (Galdón, 1984, p. 728). Throughout his tenure there were more than twenty press conferences, which gives an average of more than one each month. They used to start with a statement about the most important issues and then the Q&A time was opened. Almost all major decisions of his term were explained by this means. Sometimes the president appeared with Ignacio Aguirre, secretary of state of

29 ALCS, UCD, 10, 220, “Comité ejecutivo nacional” (National executive committee).
31 Translator’s note: Chamber of the Congress of Deputies.
32 ALCS, Inauguration, 07, “Los días antes de la investidura” (The days before the inauguration). All the strategy on the Inauguration, 01, “Inauguration LCS” and Inauguration, 142, “Aspectos formales básicos del debate de investidura” (Basic formal aspects of the inauguration debate).
information, in the usual appearance after a meeting of the Council of Ministers. In all of them, it is proven that the RTVE newscasts provided a timely coverage, although there is no evidence that they were aired live.

3.2. A matter of formats: interviews, speeches and the debate that never existed

Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo did not refuse either to appear on the small screen at the homes of the Spanish people when he considered necessary. During his term of office he gave three interviews to RTVE and four speeches on the occasion of special events.

Table 2: Appearances of Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo on TVE (1981-1982).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28-2-1981</td>
<td>20.30</td>
<td>30 mins</td>
<td>Interview Rosa María Mateo on</td>
<td>Appointment President of the Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-5-1981</td>
<td>10 mins</td>
<td></td>
<td>Inaugural address</td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-6-1981</td>
<td>22.00</td>
<td>30 mins</td>
<td><em>Informe especial.</em> Interview</td>
<td>First Hundred Days in Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2-1982</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>3 mins</td>
<td>Programme of USA International Agency</td>
<td>Day of solidarity with Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-5-1982</td>
<td>14.40</td>
<td>10 mins</td>
<td>Free electoral space, on <em>RTVE Andalucía</em></td>
<td>Electoral campaign Andalusia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6-1982</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>5 mins</td>
<td>Presidential address. During second edition of <em>Telediario</em></td>
<td>About the 23F. Announces appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-8-1982</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>3 mins</td>
<td>Presidential speech. During second edition of <em>Telediario</em></td>
<td>Announces general elections for October 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-11-1982</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>3 mins</td>
<td>Presidential speech. During second edition of <em>Telediario</em></td>
<td>Farewell</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TVE, the Calvo-Sotelo Archive, El País and ABC archives. Compiled by the authors.

Just like press conferences, the interview also provided the viewer with dialogue, but on a closer perspective and with more spontaneity. The first was aired on February 28, 1981, on *Informe Semanal* and conducted by Rosa María Mateo, and the stage was the house of the Calvo-Sotelo family in Somosaguas (Madrid). Questions to the president and his wife were presented with images of their family and a hurried biographical note. There were references to the problems of image, which were taken with humor by the interviewee and his wife, Pilar Ibáñez-Martín.35

The second interview was again conducted by R. M. Mateo, this time in Moncloa, and was aired at 22:00 h on June 11, 1981, on the occasion of the first hundred days in office. The interviewer reviewed the latest topics and mentioned the accusations towards the president of being a “cold, distant man”: “it will be because I deserve it,”36 he answered. After a number of politics-related questions, some remarks about their hobbies were made and they moved on to visit the Palace. At one moment, a relaxed president took one of the cameras in his hands and pretended to shoot the cameramen. The decision to air this special program was somewhat hurried for reasons that were not made explicit. One hundred days had already

36 ALCS, Conferences, 37-1. Transcription of the interview.
passed on the 5th and that was when the press gave him more attention. Six days later the presence of the president on television was no longer news and the program went largely unnoticed, although in general the professionalism and the rigor of the interviewer were praised.\textsuperscript{37}

The third and last interview was aired on February 27, 1982, and on this occasion the reason behind it was the balance of the first year of Government\textsuperscript{38}. It was shot in the courtyard of the columns in the Palace of Moncloa and next to Mateo, conducting the interview another time, was the journalist Pedro Altares. This interview achieved a deeper impact on media than the previous one, since the internal issues of UCD were starting to be worrying. The references to the presidential image were again laid on the table with a single question (the second of the interview) concerning the opinion of Calvo-Sotelo for the representation (a sphinx) that the cartoonist Peridis made of him on \textit{El País}. In general, the press could observe the thoughtful but also professional tone of the interviewers, who touched on all the issues that were considered important (including the dismissal of Castedo), and the realism, authority and dignity of the president, comparing him in a good way with the last days of Suarez. The image issue was alluded to; José Luis Gutiérrez on \textit{Diario 16} claimed “if Mr. Calvo-Sotelo does not abandon that attitude of elitist arrogance that seems inseparable from his personality, he will do very badly in life.” On a survey commissioned by \textit{Off the Record} some positive aspects of the interview were observed: “seriousness, honesty, concise and founded answers, clear colloquial language,” and some negative: “lack of expressiveness.”\textsuperscript{39}

Despite his reticence, Calvo-Sotelo used speeches or presidential addresses four times. The first was on May 8, 1981, to show the firmness of the government in the face of the terrorist attacks against the Army and the Police that took place on May 4 and 7 by ETA and GRAPO in Madrid and Barcelona. A moment of silence that preceded his intervention was convened that day across the country. The president spoke standing on a lectern and with a national flag to his right. The press highlighted his coldness and serenity, with no concessions to rhetoric, and how his attitude always borders on rigidity, which this time served to underscore the drama of the occasion. They also praised his realism as opposed to his predecessor: “this time there was no conjuror, no hat, no rabbit. Nor empty promises” highlighted the editorial of \textit{Diario 16}. For \textit{El País}, however, it “lacked that enthusiasm, that capacity for conveying hope, that leadership that characterizes men on great occasions.”\textsuperscript{40}

The existence of an exceptional situation called for the intervention of the president on June 4, 1982, to announce that the Government had the intention to appeal to the Supreme Court the sentences for the 23-F trials. On this occasion, he appeared seated behind a table, with curtains in the background and the Spanish flag. On the table a microphone, a glass of water and a vase of flowers. The press praised the government’s decision (except \textit{El Alcázar}) and did not worry about the form this time.\textsuperscript{41}

The third and fourth interventions were just purely procedural. On August 27, 1982, he announced his plan to dissolve the Chambers and to call elections for October 28. Standing, on a lectern with a microphone and with the Spanish flag next to him, the president, “a bit tense,” according to \textit{El País}, barely used three minutes to express his “simple and enlightening” message, according to \textit{Pueblo}. One reference was the most criticized of the

\textsuperscript{37} ALCS, ABC, 11-6-1981; Pueblo, 12-6-1981; Tiempo de política, 18-6-1981.
\textsuperscript{38} ALCS, Conferences, 15. 01. Transcription of the interview.
\textsuperscript{40}ALCS, Diario 16, El País, ABC, Ya, 9-5-1981.
\textsuperscript{41}ALCS, Diario 16, El País, ABC, Ya, El Alcázar, Pueblo, 5-6-1982.
session: “nothing makes a majority change necessary,” which was interpreted as an inappropriate electoralist message.42

After the electoral fiasco, the president returned to the screen on the 24 of November, 1982, on the night news. Sitting in his office, with a curtain and the flag in the background, the microphone, some sheets of paper on the table, and behind him the photograph of his presidential oath of office before the King, Calvo-Sotelo said goodbye in three minutes and eleven seconds, vindicating his job in office. According to El País, “with a moderate voice and a slightly less severe aspect than in previous occasions.” Almost all the press took the opportunity to take stock of his term and insist on correcting and cleansing the transfer of authority to the new social democrat government.43

Afterwards, Calvo-Sotelo appeared twice on television in very different contexts. On the Sunday afternoon February 1, 1982, he gave a short speech on a special show of American television aired on RTVE, claiming freedom for Poland after the military coup at the end of 1981. This show, hosted by Charlton Heston starring from Ronald Reagan to François Mitterrand, was described by Pravda as “TV western” and by El País in his editorial as a “completely cheap and vulgar example of how to make the cold war from the footlights”44. Lastly, on May 18, 1982, he used a 10-minute long free electoral space in the regional programming of TVE to ask for votes in the coming elections to the Andalusian Parliament as UCD president. Despite throwing himself completely into the campaign, and taking the advice of Ansón, the well-known result was the beginning of the end of centrismin45. Calvo-Sotelo waited to know the results before taking the risk of an unexpected change of image: new glasses “of less threatening mount.”46

Finally, the electoral campaign of October, 1982, resulted in several interesting on-screen circumstances (Pelaz, 2018). First, that despite Eugenio Nasarre’s attitude, press criticisms against RTVE did not stop, since he kept seeing it as “an obstacle to his interests in the audiovisual industry” (Quintana, 2007, pp. 205-206). Also, that the president of the Government was not a candidate for a second term of office, so the attention of the government television shifted towards the new leader of UCD, Landelino Lavilla, whose campaign focused on praising his own virtues, not those of Calvo-Sotelo. The third issue is that it led to the electoral confrontation between UCD and its former leader, Suárez, who was running as head of the CDS. Suárez now had to suffer for the first time the existence of a public television that he did not have any control over, despite the residual presence of two suaristas in the RTVE Council, whose complaints about an alleged television abuse against him were constant (Sinova, 1983, p. 99). In spite of everything, he used the electoral spots and participated in the round of interviews with the political leaders that RTVE aired during prime time47, although he refused to go to one program of La clave, and sent Rodríguez Sahagún in his place (Lavilla and Fraga did participate, although not González, who delegated on Guerra)48. Lastly, that Calvo-Sotelo could have put a brilliant televisual finishing touch to his presidency had the electoral debate happened with Felipe González, something that was being demanded by different media. It did not happen for two reasons: on the one hand, Lavilla demanded the place in that debate for himself and, above all, because “González refused categorically to face the cameras with someone other than the president of the Government” (Sotillos, 2002, p. 168). The television summary of the 1982 campaign turned out to be quite

48 ALCS, Diario 16, 2-10-1982.
paradoxical. Calvo-Sotelo who had access to television, he did not use it because he was not a candidate; Suárez was a candidate, but did not have this access, even though he demanded it. Finally, González, who did not ask for it but had it, he probably did not need it anymore to reach his historic triumph in October, 1982.

4. Conclusion

Adolfo Suárez and Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo were very different politicians who, as they held office, developed two models of television leadership that reflected their way of understanding government action.

Suárez, thanks to his previous experience in RTVE and the experience of his team, launched his democratization project with the aid of television, which he considered an essential instrument for achieving political change. For a year, he and Ansón had this instrument in their hands and used it brilliantly. In 1979, once the consensus ended and became subjected to harassment from the opposition, Suárez, who had been an outstanding statesman, would reveal certain limitations. Direct appeals to the citizenship on TV were not a thing anymore, and it became necessary to define a new communication strategy. As for its adversaries, aware of the importance of RTVE and the growing feebleness of Suárez, strengthened their attacks and complaints, leading to a new legal status of television, greater control by Parliament and an independent director (in theory); all of which became a poisoned legacy for his successor.

Calvo-Sotelo tried to define an image and style of government distancing himself from Suárez, separating from what had been considered as his excesses or errors: hyperleadership, personalism, improvisation, “the Moncloa syndrome,” absence of Parliament... and also, controlling television. The emphasis had to be placed on the form, as in the end the differences were not so relevant, considering that both represented the same party. Besides, the political ethos he inherited was very different (“The transition is over, democracy is in full sail,” he claimed during his inaugural speech) and, of course, did not have the telegeny of his predecessor. Apart from the public perception of him as a cold, distant, conservative and a bit elitist man, from 23-F on, his image would also be that of a president incapable of keeping up with the events, especially conditioned by the coup threat and the constant UCD crisis (Martínez, 2014, pp. 209-221, Pelaz & Díez, 2018).

The contrast between the two leaders is also observed in the formats they opted for when they made use of the state television. Although this was a means that felt very familiar to Suárez, and in which he felt comfortable, he was quite selective with his participation, which he did mainly through the broadcast of messages, as if he believed that the schedule guidelines marked by Ansón or, later, by Arias-Salgado, would do the rest. That is why he did not quite like giving interviews or facing debates on camera. His late choice for press conferences evidenced the exhaustion of the direct democracy model of the early days.

Calvo-Sotelo, however, actually preferred meetings with journalists (Mateo and Altares) as a way of communicating with society through television. The president tried to strengthen his image of a politician that was open for discussion, as opposed to the monologue (or, if you like, of false dialogue) that had characterized his predecessor. However, that does not mean that he didn’t give short presidential addresses on an exceptional basis.

The shadow of Suárez followed Calvo-Sotelo throughout his term of office. References to both in comparative terms were a constant on the press of the time, and specifically the allusions to a lack of charisma or telegeny increased, becoming an almost mandatory question to the president Calvo-Sotelo during interviews. However, we should not read this competition as something necessarily negative for him. In media, there was certain boredom about the “conjuring” capacity of Suárez, his contrasted ability as a deceiver, and especially in his later days an evident wear of his image, which had been overexposed in media since 1976. For that reason, it was also fairly frequent to find journalistic interpretations more favorable
to a less mediatic style of leadership, but perhaps intellectually and politically more solid; more about realities and less about gestures.

RTVE was fundamental during the Transition in order to consolidate Adolfo Suárez’s leadership and to pave the way for the democratic process. However, it is also fair to say that it was not enough to maintain the image of a UCD in constant crisis and a president like Calvo-Sotelo who, despite his efforts, soon gave the impression of being too dependable on circumstances. The growing influence of the left in RTVE (unions and journalists), the constant accusations (from *El País* in particular) of informative manipulation and government pressure and the constant dance of General-Manager, contributed to a partial deactivation of its potential influence. Finally, the alleged control over television by the UCD, was a double-edged sword, as the social democrats turned criticism against the lack of objectivity of RTVE and its leaders into a decisive weapon to achieve the exhaustion of the executive, both of Suárez, and later of Calvo-Sotelo.

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