REV - Persona y Derecho - Vol. 83 (2020)

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10171/61644

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    El bien común político en «Natural Law and Natural Rights» en cotejo doctrinal con el tomismo
    (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2020) Castaño, S.R. (Sergio Raúl)
    This article deals, first of all, with the analysis of the notion of common good and political common good, as it is proposed by John Finnis in Natural Law and Natural Rights. Then, in a second moment, the paper aims to contrast this conception with the doctrine held by Aquinas and some outstanding contemporary Thomists, until 1980. The scientific-philosophical question about the systematic validity, «in the things themselves» (Husserl), that it is possible to recognize both one and the other, remains open to debate.
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    Vinculación conceptual entre el derecho y la moral. Tensiones entre una teoría de la razón práctica y una concepción autónoma del derecho en la propuesta iusfilosófica de John Finnis
    (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2020) De-Rosa, E. (Eliana)
    The present work aims to analyze the problem of the conceptual link between law and morality in the philosophical thought of Oxford professor John Finnis. This analysis recognizes, as a starting point, the objection formulated some years ago by Robert Alexy in which he tries to show that Finnis would maintain criteria typical of positivism in order to solve possible tensions between both normative orders. Specifically, I intend to analyze the different writings that Professor Finnis dedicates to the problem of the conceptual link between law and morality, in order to elucidate his true position around the aforementioned question, and confront it with the rest of his elaboration theoretical in order to verify if it is consistent in a systemic key.
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    The Good of Play in John Finnis’s «Natural Law and Natural Rights»
    (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2020) Tollefsen, C. (Christopher)
    Despite the scrutiny that has been given to John Finnis’s masterwork, Natural Law and Natural Rights, relatively little attention has been given to a feature of that work that plays a recurring role, namely, the place of the basic human good of play in the book. In addition to a number of passing references, that good is discussed in an extended way on three occasions. The first is when the good of play is introduced, as part of Finnis’s taxonomy of basic human goods; the second is in his discussion of Aristotle’s understanding of friendship, when Finnis reframes Aristotle’s friendship of pleasure as instead friendship of play; and then finally, in Finnis’s concluding chapter, with its discussion of the «further point» of morality, where Finnis, following Plato, describes the point of morality as participation in a divine play. Play’s presence at the end of Natural Law and Natural Rights, indeed, in one of the culminating passages of the book, suggests that this good should be paid more attention than has been given to it. After a review of Finnis’s various discussions of play, I argue that Finnis’s account provides resources for answering Thomas Nagel’s skeptical doubts about life’s meaning; and for furthering Finnis’s own claims about the authority of law.
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    El «ius» y la gramática de los derechos en «Natural Law and Natural Rights». Cuestiones problemáticas
    (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2020) Widow-Lira, F. (Felipe)
    Finnis’s adoption of the grammar of rights as proposed by Hohfeld, and his intention to translate the classical theory of natural law into this modern language, reveal an understanding of ius divergent from that of Aquinas, inasmuch as that translation implies the primacy of subjective right over the ipsa res iusta, and the consequent affirmation of rights with an abstract and intrinsically unlimited nature, so that they are constituted as a juridical expression of individual freedom.
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    El derecho penal y la significación moral de la pena en John Finnis
    (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2020) Pérez-del-Valle, C. (Carlos)
    Although the theory of punishment is not a central issue in Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis develops there the principles of his own vision of the function of criminal law. If these assumptions are integrated with other works by Finnis in which he has explicitly defended the idea of punishment as retribution it is possible to show a table that allows to explain the fundamental aspects of criminal law. This vision of a penalty as retribution as the heart of a penal system determined by demands of justice derived from natural law constitutes a plausible solution. It is only necessary to show the requirements of the punishment consequent to a fair imputation, and determine to what extent natural law conditions the stipulations of a specific penal system.
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    El significado de «derecho» y el concepto de derecho
    (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2020) Rodríguez-Toubes-Muñiz, J. (Joaquín)
    John Finnis advocates in Natural Law and Natural Rights a conceptual and practical investigation of law that identifies its central case and rejects attempts to formulate a concept common to competing descriptive legal theories. This study questions this methodological approach and argues that forming a neutral concept of law is a sensible and important theoretical objective; and that the common meaning of the word «law» is a viable starting point for achieving it. The central case method is inappropriate for a descriptive legal theory because it applies an interpretation of that centrality that arises from a particular conception of law; and it excludes that law could have the negative value described bycompeting conceptions. The central case method would be apt if law is a specific phenomenon described and named in the past which is now the precise reference of «law». However, the prevalence of theoretical disagreements makes this hypothesis implausible and suggests that law is what human groups have historically recognised as such, as reflected in the use of the word «law» and its equivalents.
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    Sobre los bienes básicos de John Finnis como fundamento para los bioderechos
    (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2020) Pereira-Sáez, C. (Carolina)
    The purpose of this paper is to suggest that John Finnis’ basic goods may provide a reasonable basis for present-day bio-rights. To this end we start by recalling the present situation of human rights –which are not at their best, but rather in a situation of hyper-pluralistic fragmentation and proliferation– and their need for a foundation; in particular, for the so-called bio-rights. In the following, we will present the main aspects of John Finnis’ work regarding basic goods and their demands; especially their relationship with rights. To conclude, we will discuss if considering John Finnis’s basic goods as foundation for bio-rights would allow us to give a minimum of order and meaning in the mentioned landscape of proliferation and hyper-pluralism.
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    Religious Liberty in «Natural Law and Natural Rights»
    (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2020) Bradley, G. (Gerard)
    John Finnis since 1980 has published many important scholarly papers treating different aspects of religious liberty. These works include both philosophical and theological perspectives. Some of the best of this work has specifically addressed Dignitatis humane, the Second Vatican Council’s declaration of Religious Freedom. Perhaps surprisingly, then, Finnis says almost nothing explicitly about either the Council or about religious freedom in Natural Law and Natural Rights. I shall argue here that Finnis nonetheless identifies and cogently defends in Natural Law and Natural Rights (NLNR) the foundational components of a sound conception of religious liberty. Building upon these anchor points – drawing a line connecting the dots, if you will – one can bring this conception into clear view. Because it is constructed bottom up from deep philosophical foundations, this implicit account of religious liberty is critically justified, as well as robust. In this article I also build upon Finnis’s foundations, and show how putative divine revelations to humankind impact religious liberty and, then, describe the cultural formations conducive to making robust religious liberty practically available to the inquiring, deliberating, acting person.
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    The Three Levels of Law’s Goodness and then One More: Exploring John Finnis’s Account of Good Juridical Reasons for Action
    (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2020) Popovic, P. (Petar)
    The article revisits, in the first section, the core arguments of John Finnis’s account of law’s «goodness». Having established that the premises of these arguments are situated in Finnis’s theses on what constitutes good juridical reasons for action, and on law’s «double life», the three levels of law’s goodness are explored in detail. In the second section, the author argues that Aquinas’s juridical philosophy contains another discrete level of juridical goodness relevant to law. This level is then presented along with a critical assessment of its harmony with Finnis’s theory.
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    John Finnis y la defensa ética del «Rule of Law». «Natural Law and Natural Rights» y otros escritos posteriores
    (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2020) Massini-Correas, C.I. (Carlos Ignacio)
    In this paper, written as a tribute to the first edition of John Finnis’ Natural Law and Natural Rights, the author examines some of the versions introduced by the Australian philosopher, in order to analyze, specify, develop and defend the notion of rule of law. He later goes on to give an assessment of Finnis’ contributions, primarily of the ones regarding the ethical character of that institute, and the mastery with which he has integrated the classical-realistic tradition of the natural law theory, the methodological approaches of analytical jurisprudence and the contemporary reflection about the idea of a government limited by law.