REV - AF - 2004, vol. 37, n. 1
Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10171/3734
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- Índice del número 37/1 (2004)(2004) Anónimo
- Juicio y modalidad en Husserl. La evolución de la teoría del juicio y el contenido judicativo de Vorlesungen über Bedetungslehre hasta Ideen I(2004) Vigo, A.G. (Alejandro G.)This paper discusses the evolution of Husserl’s conception of judgement and propositional content from the lections on theory of meaning (1908) up to Ideen I (1913). It is shown that the conception of Ideen I, with the distinction between the complete noema and the noematic core, results from the fullfilment of tendences wich are already present and active in Husserl’s earlier work. Along with the conception of Ideen I it is the problem of the modalities of judgement that becomes crucial, from a systematical point of view.
- Reseñas 37/1 (2004)(2004) Sison, A.J. (Alejo José); Argüello, S. (Santiago); Sellés-Dauder, J.F. (Juan Fernando); Alvarado-Marambio, J.T. (José Tomás); Ortiz-de-Landázuri, C. (Carlos); Premoli-De-Marchi, P. (Paola); Sanz, V. (Victor); Salinas-Tainta, S. (Soraya); Cobreros-Bordenave, P. (Pablo)
- Horizonticidad y juicio(2004) Walton, R.J. (Roberto J.)According to Husserl, oppositions pertaining to horizonedness provide the grounding for kinds of judgment. The first part of the article shows how the contrast inner/outer horizon develops into two distinct types of judgment, and how modality and generality refer back to the contrast indeterminateness/determinatess. The second part deals with the role of the opposition emptiness/ fulfillment in the process of making judgments distinct and clear. The third part argues that a material apophantics must be worked out in respect of situational truths, and shows how a general syntaxis underlies not only judgments but all spheres of behaviour.
- El juicio predicativo simple en Frege y Husserl: Una confrontación(2004) Skarica, M. (Mirko)The doctrine on predicative judgment sustained by Frege and Husserl reopens a discussion already present in the philosophical tradition: Does predicative judgment consist in a “composition” of concepts made by the understanding, or in an “assent” to a propositional content? For Frege, the “thought”, i. e., the sense of the proposition, as expresion of the judgment, presents such unity that it cannot be explained by a “composition” of previous elements; Husserl on the contrary, sustains that, although the propositional content of judgments in composed judgments do present a unity, in the case of the simple predicative judgment this unity arises due to a “synthesis”. Thus, for Frege the act of judging consists in “recognizing the truth-value of a thought”, which agrees with the doctrine of an “assent” to a propositional content. For Husserl, on the contrary, the basic act of judging consists in a “synthesis” of basic representations, which is very close to Aristotle’s doctrine.
- Percepción y juicio en el análisis genético de Husserl y los grados noemáticos de la idealidad(2004) Rabanaque, L.R. (Luis Román)Static phenomenological analysis discloses a tension between judgement and perception as a result of the way intentionality was developed in Husserl’s early thought: 1) The apprehension-content schema determines the way noesis is understood as sense-giving, 2) Sensuous perception models the way noema is conceived of as correlative sense. Both directions conflict with regard to the question of the ideality of their noemata. After describing this conflict, this paper aims to lay bare the static relation between judgement and perception in order to follow up its transformation in genetic phenomenology. This may then help to outline a stratification of noematic ideality grounded on the intentional continuity between passive and active syntheses.
- Husserl's phenomenological reduction revisited: An attempt of a renewed account(2004) Luft, S. (Sebastian)This essay attempts a renewed, critical exposition of Husserl’s theory of the phenomenological reduction, incorporating manuscript material that has been published since the defining essays of the first generation of Husserl research. The discussion focuses on points that remain especially crucial, i. e. the concept of the natural attitude, the ways into the reduction, and the question of the “meaning of the reduction”. The reading attempted here leads to two, not necessarily related, focal points: a Cartesian and a Life-world tendency. In following these two paths, Husserl was consistent in pursuing two evident leads in his philosophical enterprise; however, he was at the same time unable to systematically unify these two strands. Thus, I am offering an interpretation which might be called a modified “departure from Cartesianism” reading that Landgrebe proposed in his famous essay from the nineteen-fifties (a reading that is still valid in many contemporary expositions of Husserl’s thought). This discussion should make apparent that Husserl’s theory of the phenomenological reduction deserves a renewed look in light of material that has since appeared in the Husserliana and by incorporating the most important results of recent tendencies in Husserl research.
- El concepto de la intuición categorial en Husserl(2004) Lohmar, D. (Dieter)Dieter Lohmar: Husserls concept of categorial intuition Husserl’s theory of categorial intuition is presented in the 6.th Logical Investigation. It starts with the question: what fulfills the specific categorial elements of thinking and language? Husserl’s analysis of the structure of categorial intuition opens up with a confrontation of simple acts of perception in contrast with complex, founded acts of categorial intuition. This is illustrated by the difference between simple synthesis of identification in continuous perception in contrast to the thematic identification of the same object. Then the crucial “fulfilling” function of the “synthesis of coincidence” between implicite and explicite (partial-)intentions in categorial intuition is very carefuly presented. The source, the special character and the special mode of givenness of the synthesis of coincidence is characterized: They are non-sensual contents which are nevertheless given to us in the transition of the perceptual acts within the whole structure of a categorial act. This leds to a detailled categorial act. In the end there is to be found a critical evaluation of the procedure of seeing essenses (Wesensschau) viewed as a special case of categorial intuition. The performance and the limits of this central phenomenological method are discussed.
- El método husserliano en las Logische Untersuchungen(2004) Flores-Hernández, L. (Luis)Our proposal is that there exists already a method in Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen. Nevertheless, this method is operative, but not thematized. We characterize it as follows: analytic, descriptive, pure, reductive, intuitive, reflexive, variational and functional. Concerning Logische Untersuchungen, analysis of significations fulfills a strategic role of mediation between mathesis universalis’ analysis and phenomenology’s analysis. Finally, one of the leading features of Husserlian method is reflexion considered as anábasis of pneuma.
- Presentación: "Estudios sobre Husserl"(2004) Vigo, A.G. (Alejandro G.)