REV - Persona y Derecho - Vol. 01 (1974)
Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10171/7551
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- Itinerarios humanos del derecho. Sergio Cotta(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1974) Ballesteros, J. (Jesús)
- Los conceptos elementales del materialismo histórico. M. Harnecker(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1974) Martínez-Sánchez, S. (Santiago)
- Psicoanálisis y marxismo. C. Castilla del Pino(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1974) Poveda, J.M. (José María)
- Estructuralismo y marxismo H. Lefebre y otros(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1974) Rodríguez-Iturbe, J.B. (José B.)
- Anthropologie structurale C. Lévi Strauss(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1974) Gómez, M. (Manuel)
- Eros y civilización. H. Marcuse(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1974) García-Prieto, J.A. (José A.)
- Economía y libertad A. Millán Puelles(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1974) Peligero-Escudero, F. (Fernando)
- Ética política iusnaturalista(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1974) Gómez-Pérez, R. (Rafael)lhe Natural Law political ethic has at times been considered as something vague and ill-defined; in this article the author outlines a way of analyzing the presentday political and ideological reality from the view-point of Natural Law. lo this end he studies the relations that can arise between permissiveness in general and permissiveness in the juridical context, and then considers the implications of these relations in the Law-Morality binomial, together with the different solutions put forward in the course of history by Relativism, Pragmatism, Liberalism, Marxism and by the Natural Law; finally he makes a special analysis of the criticisms that have been made of the principIes of the Natural Law.
- Moral y derecho(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1974) Portillo, Á. (Álvaro) delThen manner in which the juridical order and the moral order are related between themselves is a question which continues to be debated even in our times. The cultivors of the moral sciences and of the Philosophy of Law, as well as those of Canon Law, dedicate arduous studies to this. The author, in brief annotations only, submits sorne points for an ulterior consideration, principally those which are related to Canon Law. l. Previous Questions: a) What is the moral order? Ordinarily, the moral order is identified with the relations which man observes under the orientation of laws and precepts related to God. It can be defined even better still as «the dimension of the order convenient to man as person»; that is, the sum of the exigencies which stem from the «ontological» structure of man as personal being. This definition or description provides us with many useful facts. b) What is Law? This generally indicates the social order or the order of the human community, inasmuch as it is composed and ordained organically, from whence the notes of .positivity» and «historicity» are deduced. Also, Canon Law is law or «social order» which governs the People of God and which, for the «community», has a temporal and historical dimensiono And, the communitary lite of its members, the same as its reciprocal relations, must be ordained according to the principies of Justice. 11. The Moral Foundation of the Narms af Lavv. The moral arder (of persons) and the juridical order (of communities, with respect to the social dimension of persons) must be distinguished, however, and must not be separated radically the one from the other, beca use both deal with persons. Law pre-establishes for itself a high «value», that is, Justice, in reason of its end; yet its rules can not ignore the arder of «persons». The juridical order will not be a complete reproduction of the norms of morality; even when it should be in consonance with the moral norm, the juridical norm will not urge always, nor will it urge in all the exigencies of the moral order. 111. Existing Nexuses betwe'en the Moral Order and Law. The first problem refers to the obligation which the human laws impose upon the moral conscience: the human society has roots -in the social condition of the human person, and therefore, fundamentally, in the will of the Creator- such that real obligations of responsibility and solidarity arise, whose weight is not yet determined in the ecclesiastical community, neither mechanically nor in a uniform manner, but they are known by the objective examination of the norms of Law and of its ends (often bearing in mind the rules for interpreting Law: think, for example, of .equity» and «epiqueía»). The author dedicates a particular and prudent investigation to the interpretation of the clause «gravitar onerata concientia» which is used in Canon Law. The second question is about the conflict which can arise between the dictates of one's own conscience and the human law (be it in itself, be it in its application to a certain concrete case). The general principie which imposes obedience in relation to the dictates of conscience is both known and clear. The third question is put by those who favour the new ideas about ecclesiastical law, and, aboye al!, its relation to personal conscience for which certain norms of Canon law (founded in the norms of morality) would barely have «ideal» or «indicative» value. Therefore, there would not yet exist obligatory juridical norms (that is, a real .law» would not exist). This thesis cannot be accepted. Ergo, the Christian community knows as its foundation the revealed message which promulgates the moral exigencies emanated from the institutional wil! of Christ. The observance of the moral norms is an essencial element of the «testimony» of the Church, whose juridical ordinances and social structures must respond to the moral message of the Christian Doctrine. Save for error -always possible- the law of the Church finds in the Christian message, legitimately transmitted, a criterion which obliges.
- Perspectivas doctrinales del derecho a la información(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1974) Soria-Saiz, C. (Carlos)The Ríght to Informatían has already passed through the first stage of its development. It needs, however, a theoretical treatment capable of explaining its foundation, structure and nature, as well as removing its present imperfections. It is necessary to rise beyond the already classical idea that Law affords Information a guaranteed boundary and the protect:on of a zone of freedom, in order to be able to consider Information from the viewpoint of being subject to Law. This state of affairs does not imply, however, that the idea of freedom has to be considered useless when establishing the right to information, but rather it becomes necessary to abandon the liberal idea of freedom of information for that of autonomy; this latter concept, apart from defining the zone of freedom in a positive manner, lays the foundation of a unified vision of freedom and responsibility. The concept of autonomy of information and the awareness that its nature is multiple and not bipolar (State-medial, implies a double role for legislation: to safeguard and defend in all cases the different spheres of autonomy; and to assure its exercise in practice, that is, to legislate for information as a right. The theoretical expression of the right to information has undergone in the course ot a relatively short time a process of successive refinement. At first mistaken for the freedom of information, it has been later perfected by passing through different stages that have progressively enriched its contento With regard to the juridical nature of the right to information, it appears quite reasonable to suppose that it is one of the rights of man, and as such subject to the processes both of fundamental law and of public and private subjetive law. As public subjective law it demands guaranteed concrete powers as an expression of the juridical application in practice of the right to information in its aspect as fundamental law. In its role as private subjective law it assumes the task of coordinating the contractual relationships that arise from the phenomenon of information, because it is obvious that fundamental rights ought to influence juridical relationships of a private nature.
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