REV - Persona y Derecho - Vol. 05 (1978)
Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10171/7555
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- De derecho natural medieval al derecho natural moderno: Fernando Vazquez de Menchaca F. Carpintero Benítez(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1978) Zumaquero, J.M. (José Manuel)
- ¿Leninismo o marxismo? y la revolución rusa R. Luxemburg(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1978) Redondo, G. (Gonzalo)
- Is it possible to derive a "moral" ought from a statement of fact?(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1978) Piñón, A.T. (Antonio T.)
- Euthanasia(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1978) Tzee-Cheng, C. (Chao)
- Human life: a beginning or a continuum a biological viewpoint(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1978) Rosales, V.J.A. (Vicente J. A.)
- Ethique medicale et transfusion sanguine(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1978) Kornprobst, L. (L.); André, A. (A.)
- Una visión cristiana de la conciencia(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1978) Morales, J. (José)The doctrine of Conscience occupies a central place in the life and works of John Henry Newman. It is a doctrine which constantly appears in his writings, which had already been exposed in nuce in his Anglican years, and which gradually undergoes a harmonious and enriching development, free from contradictions and ruptures. Conscience, for Newman, is that interior and irreducible sense which the human spirit possesses in order to capture ethical and religious values. It manifests itself in practical judgments which either order or prohibit. What Newman tells us about Conscience is a result of his own personal meditation concerning this point; it is therefore a teaching that has been matured over a large number of years, and so is rich in interior lucidity, profoundness and docility. It is a doctrine which was shaped with the help of God, who has to be sought and heralded by the same. 80th subjectivity and transcendence are to be found in man's Conscience. This is a fact that always will be recognized by all Christians and, indeed, all men of good will. In spite of the refraction which it undergoes upon entering into the interior and intimate domain of every individual, Natural Law informs the individual Conscience surrounding the law and manners of God. Newman personalism accuses a strong theocentrical character. He points out, forcefully, the fact that God and man's Conscience are not competitors; on the contrary, the true life of the Conscience can be preserved by God only. Newman, an excellent interpreter of Occidental sensibility, does not reject a true Christian vis ion of God, man, and the world. «Freedom of Conscience» and -free examination. in fact claim a riqht to do without Conscience. They constitute the battle cry of a radical anthropological postulate which is full of fatal consequences. Newman's doctrine, on the other hand, can be coordinated with that of any private judgment that maintains a wide margin of legitimate and necessary exercise with regard to the religious order. Newman disqualifies freedom of examination and reccommends, rather, personal activities and initiatives which seek truth and are always ready to build, with the help of God, the seeker's own personal destiny. Conscience is not, then, a screen placed between God and personal reality. It is called upon to unite the divine and human realms and not to separate these two domains. It is therefore a vehicle of Grace, not a pretext to resist God. Newman has anticipated many topics, making him a pioneer with regard to the sensibility which is manifested in sorne aspects of Vatican Council 11. He formulated, at the same time, sorne principies that help us understand the functions of the Magisterium of the Church whenever it interprets Natural Law. He puts forth, in a word, solid reasons in favour of a dialogue between the Church and Christians on the one hand, and civil legislation on the other, with reference to topics such as the defense of life, indiividual rights, religion, and the marriage bond.
- Los términos "bonum ordinis" y la "bonum moris" y la noción de moralidad estudio en Santo Tomás(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1978) Sarmiento, A. (Augusto); Malvar, J. (Joaquim)This study constitutes a contribution to the metaphysical fundamentation of the moral order. The chapter dealing with «The Notion of Creation and the Metaphysical Situation of Created Beingo lays down the metaphysical basis for the study of the terms bonum ordinis -good of order- and bonum moris -moral good. The chapter on «The Causeof the Order in the Universeo offers the point of departure for passing away from the object of Metaphysics towards that of Morals. It is interesting to find out what constitutes the cause of the order found in the Universe and which can be captured in a first appreciation of reality as being multiple and ordained: a unit of order which calls for an investigation of its cause and a reduction of its real multiplicity to the unit level. From this, there derives the necessity of distinguishing between the predicamental and transcendental levels, and al so the introduction of the concept of participation and of its logical vision, the analogia entis. In this manner, we reach the problem of Being and of beings, of transcendental causality and of the presence of Being in the nature of beings -« The Founding Presence of Godo. From the fullness of perfection found in God as Pure Act of Being, we can deduce explicit notions of the being and manner of operating of God which are present in all posterior developments of the present work, for example, good of order, divine government, etc. By this way only is it possible for us to give the notion of morality a sound and sol id metaphysical basis. The chapter devoted to .God and the Created Universe» permits us to affirm that the formal constitutive element of morality is to be found in the ordaining or relating of human acts towards man's ultimate end. Now, morality is to be found to be metaphysical because of its formal object, insofar as it studies an aspect of the being as such, the good, which entails an ordination towards that end -«Being and Perfection»- which constitutes the bonum ordinis. For this reason, the passing from being as such to being as good, and of the ordo rerum to ordo ad bonum, has a real metaphysical basis. The ordo ad bonum is, as a consequence, ordinatio in Deum as a result of creation. The ordinatio in finem is a necessary relation found in creatures and in the divine creative action -given the free wll of God to create. It is based upon the esse and has for its subject the supposed subsistent. It is an esse a Deo and ad Deum, since the Final Cause is the very first of all causes. The Final Cause -the ultimate end- is the principie of all order, including the moral order. This is so because God gave their being to all creatures with order, according to the plan sketched out in His Divine Providence -eternal law- and conducts them towards their end through the execution of His plan -divine government- and wanted to count with the rational creature, making him partial to the eternal law and to the divine government in a different manner than that of irrational creatures. The moral natural law is that participation of the eternal law in man which can be known by way of natural reason and which can be wished by free will. In this manner, man participates in the divine government and is capable of governing himself as well as others, of carrying out the divine order wished by God, wanting what God Himself wants and in the same manner in which He wants it. He can give to the good of order a new dimension: the moral dimensiono The first basis, therefore, of the moral order is Godo The objective basis of morality is the ordaining of everything to Godo But its subjective basis is created freedom: thanks to it, man is capable of ordaining himself, on his own, to Godo The ordaining to God is a good, a participation in the eternal law which in man acquires a moral dimension, the moral goodo The moral order is the divine order found in the rational creatureo The moral law is universal, objective, immutable and inherent to man: it has been given to him in agreement with his own nature, with his proper mode of being -rational being- and his own mode of being ordained to Godo And, as a consequence, man's freedom is not the cause of his ordaining to God, nor its measure, but rather is created according to the eternal law of Godo To say that the constitutive element of morality is to be found in the good of order is to refer to to good of order in man, because the constitutive element or essence of morality is rather to be found in that relation, ordinance, or proportion of human acts with regard to the endo This relation towards the end -that is, towards God- is a necessary accident, consequent to the divine creative actiono In human acts, however, that accident is put forth as a determination of the operation, as an intention of the end, or as an identification with the plan of Godo In order for that to happen -for man to attain through his own acts the fullness of goodness to which he is ordained- integrity is necessary in the three principies which are present in the mora lit y of all human acts: the object, the end, and the circumstanceso
- Notas para una crítica de la "razón comunicativa"(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1978) Lozano-Bartolozzi, P. (Pedro)After pointing out that this paper has been made possible thanks to an informative process achieved by systematic means of communication and starting off from a dialogistic approach to social life as an informative activity, the author attempts to provoke a series of reflections on the subject of the urgency of differentiating between the concepts of information and of communication, both of which are nowadays confused and unbalanced. Social dialogue requires, apart from the terms transmitter and receiver of the message, acode and a channel or support, being the latter typical elements which instrumentalize this relation. Whereas the communicative activity aims at making possible the -placing in common», the in-formative supplies the content, «gives form to., ordains ideas, behavior, or things themselves. In this paper, the author also examines the mutual references existing between these two concepts. These principies being well established, we come across the emergence of a powerful and complex Communications System in our historical horizon which is continuously active and present, a sort of -artificial and interposed nature. between man and the world, an authentic deceptive media coercion which does not carry with itself a parallel in-formative transfer. The author then devotes attention to the more specific topic of the properly «journalistic- mean s of communication, in order to consider the contribution of the -imago mundi- supplied by these mean s toward the appraisal of that which is proper to the means themselves, that which is related, systematic and mechanical, in detriment of that which is truly substantial. The Means supply a partial view of reality, a view which is often spectacular, magical and structuralistic, imposed as unique and as the only accessible interpretation of man's milieu. This has repercussions with regard even to the mental categories of the members of its receptive audience, the result being that the public at large -as in the platonic allegory of the cave- finds itself with a message that has been tampered with but which the public takes to be true. The roots of this are to be found ancho red on the idealistic and mechanistic moorings of the so-called communicative reason, which is opposed to the ontological which corresponds to the informative reason, expressed according to the correct conception of news, that is, without its ceasing to be a reflection of reality and at the same time responding to the stimulus of events that really take place, beca use -that which takes place happens to something or somebody that are really there, not to those of us who see it take place-. From this stems the journalistic requirement to see and consider actuality as a manifestation of what really takes place, and this exigency converts itself into a firm strongpoint, so that the understanding and ordaining of a changing milieu, a milieu that is at the same time fleeting, unsteady and novel, can be undertaken. The Means have been raised from the rank of intermediaries to that of apparent creators of a relativistic universe which is nearby but inaccessible, shared by many but yet belonging to nobody, possessed but not understood due to a lack of in-formation. Finally, a critique is made of those who give themselves up to the fetishism of this instrumental vision which sets its sights on the relational complex and forgets that which in fact is being related. Equally censured are those who underestimate the evidence of this Communicative System returned to a certain naive atomism which rejects the presence of the already-mentioned coercion of the new - interposed nature- of the Means. Both realities thus have to be refitted and put correctly into place according to the very structure of the process of dialogue, thereby establishing a hierarchy with regard to the antecendency of the messages and of the subjects, and removing the myth surrounding communicative reason to bring it down to its proper function.
- Comunicación colectiva y desarrollo socioeconómico: cambio social, información y libertad(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1978) López-Escobar, E. (Esteban); Entremont, A. (Albán) d'With regard to the socio-economic development process undertaken by a large number of countries in the so-called Third World and in connection with the central role played by collective communications within modern society, the authors of this article state -and try to answer- the following questions: 1) -What is the role of collective communications with regard to the modernization process? 2) -Is the former at the same time one of the motors and one of the indicators of the latter? 3) -Is freedom of information and of expression one of the sacrifices which have to be made in order to attain the desired objective? To answer these questions, the authors start off by defining the frame of reference of their work which is made up of an adequate notion of what constitutes both terms, collective communications and socio-economic development. Afterwards, they investigate the nexus existing between these two realities. For this task, they bear in mind the latest basic bibliography on the subject, put out by such classic researchers as LERNER, SCHRAMM, ROSTOW, PYE, MERRILL, DE SOLA POOL, FREY, etc. In this sense, and following SCHRAMM aboye all, they point out systematically the uses and the conditions for effectiveness of the means of collective communications in societies which initiate the difficult and long development process. The authors then put forth the problems of freedom and responsibility with regard to development, taking as their starting point for this investigation the freedom and responsibilities of the media themselves. To solve adequately the relations which exist between these two realities, the co-ordination of which holds obvious ethical implications, is not an easy task, and constitutes as the authors point out one of the main challenges facing those nations which hope to attain social and economical development.