- Publications
- item.page.relationships.isContributorAdvisorOfPublication
- item.page.relationships.isContributorOfPublication
77 results
Search Results
Now showing 1 - 10 of 77
- Gerson, Lloyd P.: God and Greek philosophy, Studies in the Early History of Natural Theology, Routledge, London, New York, 1994, 340 págs. [RECENSIÓN](Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1998) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)
- Claves éticas para la bioética(2001) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)Se argumenta la importancia de recuperar un concepto teleológico de naturaleza y la unidad de la razón práctica, si pretendemos desarrollar una bioética que permanezca fiel a la intuición original de mediar entre “el mundo de los hechos” y “el mundo de los valores”, sin incurrir en los excesos de las éticas evolucionistas y de la deep ecology, en los que finalmente se pierde la diferencia entre el hombre y la naturaleza.
- Trabajo humano para un desarrollo humano(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2023) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)Uno de los logros más significativos del pensamiento moderno fue el alumbrar una versión más positiva de esta realidad humana, alejándola de la visión penosa que tenía, como un mal necesario.
- Bioethics Between Nature and Culture(Springer, 2008) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)A primary concern of practical contemporary philosophy is to discover an ethical rationality, which makes possible the justification of determined decisions in the context of a multicultural society. Bioethics is a field in which this necessity is perhaps especially pressing. However, the proposals that have come forth in this sense, along the lines of promoting a “minimalist ethics”– be it in principle (Beauchamp and Childress 1994) or in practice (Engelhard 1986), are open to criticism, and do not appear to be sufficient. In this article, I explore another path, more in tune with the ethics of virtue and the classical doctrine of Natural Law. Yet, before that, I expound the reasons that advise against tackling the question of multiculturalism merely from the perspective of minimalist ethics. The main reason against taking minimalist ethics as the way to deal with cultural differences is that minimalist ethics involve a liberal understanding of the private and the public sphere, according to which cultural differences would be accepted as long as they do not conflict with a supposedly neutral rationality which reigns in the public sphere. Implicit therein is the idea that culture can be confined to the realm of the private. Yet, all culture, to the extent it is alive, fights to become present in public life. From this perspective, the insistence in a minimalist ethics is hardly compatible with respect to true cultural diversity. Indeed, the proposal, apparently impartial, of a formal morality for a multicultural society, i.e. a morality which should be superimposed upon the ethics of a particular community, is the proposal of a double morality, which contradicts the unity of practical reason, and eventually leads to cultural uniformity. Accordingly, if we consider cultural diversity in the context of a single society with values worthy of being preserved, the path is not the imposition of a minimum ethics: the path to defend diversity follows, rather, by strengthening cultures from the inside. Now, the first step in this direction leads to respect the natural basis of each culture, because, just as Robert Spaemann observes, “culture is humanized nature, not abolished nature”. Now, if one can define culture as “humanized nature,” it is important to point out that the humanization of nature depends essentially on the development of habits. These, as Aristotle indicates, can be of three types: intellectual, ethical, and technical. Indeed, the consistency and perdurability of a culture depends, in a great measure, upon the solidity, not only of its institutions but also of the intellectual and moral habits developed by its people. Thus, the intellectual habits make possible the achievement of a vital synthesis between the new and the old, fostering the continuity between progress and tradition. The moral habits, in turn, make possible the integration of scientific and technical knowledge into the practical context of human life. From this perspective, protecting a culture cannot mean anything other than enabling or favoring the growth of the habits of its people. Now, while the development of habits is, for its most part, the work of the individual members of the community, politics can also help to this end by protecting the natural floor, upon which moral habits develop. At this point, the appeal to Natural Law becomes opportune. In this context, however, I depart from the usual –foundationalist- understanding of Natural Law, to regard it merely as the natural way of reasoning on practical matters, i.e., a way of reasoning based upon the very structure of our practical reason.
- El faktum de la razón(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1999) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)
- Acción(Eunsa, 2010) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)Introducción. 1. Enfoque ontológico. 2. La especificidad de la acción humana. 3. Definición de acción. 4. La estructura intencional de las acciones. 5. La relevancia moral de las acciones. 6. La diversificación moderna del estudio de la acción. 7. Debates en la filosofía analítica de la acción
- Verdad y libertad. Su conexión en la acción humana(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1999) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)
- MELENDO, TOMÁS, Dignidad humana y bioética, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1999, 186 págs. [RECENSIÓN](Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2000) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)
- Aristotle and Kant on Practical Reason. An Annotation to Korsgaard(2009) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)After many years drawing attention to the differences between Aristotelian and Kantian Ethics, recent scholarship tends to stress their commonalties instead. Among the authors representing this trend of contemporary moral philosophy, Christine Korsgaard has undoubtedly a leading role. Without denying the differences existing between them, Korsgaard has been particularly keen on calling our attention to their shared views.Yet Korsgaard herself has acknowledged an obvious difference between Aristotle and Kant, regarding their approach to emotions : unlike Kant, Aristotle does not think of inclinations and emotions as mere feelings, but rather as valuable sources of information about morally salient aspects of our situation. In other words : they provide us with (germinal) reasons for action. Korsgaard, however, keeps this difference at the level of moral psychology, arguing that it does not make a great difference at the level of ethical theory. Now, this is precisely what I find controversial. My point is that this sort of difference imports a more fundamental one about practical reason in its entirety, a difference which used to be preserved in Kant’s own reference to a “pure practical reason” – against which Aristotle’s might be called “impure practical reason”.
- Reseñas 28/1 (1995)(1995) González, A.M. (Ana Marta); Pardo, A. (Antonio); Riaza, C. (Carmen); Arnau, P. (Pau); Nubiola, J. (Jaime); Martínez-Priego, C. (Consuelo); Fontán-del-Junco, M. (Manuel); Zorroza-Huarte, M.I. (María Idoya); Mateos, A. (Ana); Montequi, J.M. (J.M.); Quesada-Molina, M.P. (María Paz); Hervás, M. (Mar); Soto-Bruna, M.J. (María Jesús); Llamas-Sáiz, C. (Carmen)