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Kant’s “I Think” and Fichte’s principle of self-positing
(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2019) Bykova, M. (Marina)
This paper discusses the relation between Kant’s doctrine of pure apperception (the doctrine of the “I think”) and Fichte’s theory of self-positing. It shows that Kant’s conception of the transcendental unity of apperception is closer to Fichte’s principle of self-positing than is usually thought, and that Kant’s “I think,” and not Reinhold’s “principle of consciousness”, may have been a source of inspiration for Fichte in his attempt to justify transcendental idealism. As in Kant, in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, the activity of “self-positing” is the fundamental feature of the I-hood. Similar to Kant, in Fichte, too, the fi rst principle expresses a peculiar kind of unity, which he calls the original unity of self-consciousness (Tathandlung).