Fernández-Beites, P. (Pilar)

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    El valor y el bien como objetos de la intencionalidad en Max Scheler
    (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2020) Fernández-Beites, P. (Pilar)
    This paper studies affective intentionality in Max Scheler, showing that the “phenomenology of values” does not only deal with values but also includes a complete theory of the good. In this theory, Scheler performs a genetic analysis that begins with the Sache (understood as wertvolles Ding, valuable thing) in order to defi ne the notions of Ding (theoretical thing) and Gut (the good), understood as Wertding (thing of value). This approach indicates the possibility of improving on classic descriptions of the good and offers an interesting alternative to current “pragmatist” proposals.
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    Razón afectiva y valores: más allá del subjetivismo y el objetivismo
    (2012) Fernández-Beites, P. (Pilar)
    This article reconstructs the ethical proposal of “classic phenomenology” as developed by E. Husserl and M. Scheler. On this view, the notion of value is inscribed within the sphere of “reason”, but of a broader reason, which is a genuine “emotional reason” that connects (subjective) emotions and (objective) values. To this end, the article takes the Husserlian perspective of a subjective-transcendental phenomenology which distances itself from objectivism, and so avoids a possible objetivist reading of Scheler’s theory.
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    Ensayo de ontología pluralista: mundo de la vida y valores
    (2011) Fernández-Beites, P. (Pilar)
    This article outlines a pluralist ontology which, starting from a theory of wholes and parts, aims to achieve a classification of real wholes that is able to avoid the excesses of idealism, while not turning into a materialist view which underestimates the importance of subjectivity.
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    La posibilidad del humanismo (después de Heidegger)
    (2008) Fernández-Beites, P. (Pilar)
    The thesis defended in this article is that Martin Heidegger’s “ontological difference” disguises an anti-humanist nihilism, which eliminates philosophical anthropology as a science. Thus we are justified in going beyond Heidegger, in order to recover the notion of subjectivity proposed by Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, and by Max Scheler, the founder of philosophical anthropology. These thinkers show that the subject occupies a privileged place in the totality of the real, as that in which the “appearing” (“manifestation”) of being is produced. This permits the construction of a philosophical anthropology without abandoning humanism, which has been the outstanding characteristic of Western culture.