In this chapter, the author shows that the dialectic of identity and difference cannot be resolved via the radicalization of one of its poles without falling into an absolute totalitarianism when all difference is sacrificed in favor of identity (Hegel) and, conversely, without falling into a radical nihilism when all identity is sacrificed in favor of difference (Derrida). The balanced posture of Levinas is committed to an integration of both, because the subject recognizes that there is a reality beyond itself, a reality which questions it in the depth of its being and, hence, difference forms a constitutive part of identity itself, because the subject is a being who has to respond. In this manner, the ethical dimension of the person is made patent with all its force. Only from this perspective are we enabled to return newly to the relation between truth and interest. It is necessary because after Hegel the anthropological and sociological turn of philosophy has been accompanied by a loss of the sense of truth. The only things that then count are interests and conflicts between interests. The movement of rehabilitation of practical reason showed that there is no exclusive antagonism between truth and interest, because the truth also has a practical dimension, that is, there exists a practical truth.