La unidad de nuestro ser como cuestión fundamental de la antropología filosófica: Robert Spaemann y la crítica del Cogito cartesiano
Keywords: 
Spaemann, Robert
Vida
Biología
Subjetividad
Consciencia
Issue Date: 
2008
ISSN: 
0066-5215
Citation: 
""La unidad de nuestro ser como cuestión fundamental de la antropología filosófica: Robert Spaemann y la crítica del Cogito cartesiano"". Anuario Filosófico, 41 (92), 459-482
Abstract
The unity of the human person is adequately affirmed when the notion of life is recovered. An opposition between subjectivity and body makes dualism insuperable. On the other hand, life is both interiority and exteriority. The interiority which is proper to consciousness implies a qualitative leap. Nevertheless, human unity becomes thinkable in the following terms: reason or consciousness is the form of life, i.e. the particular power which bring life to consummation.
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