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dc.creatorManzano, C. (Carolina)-
dc.creatorVives, X. (Xavier)-
dc.date.accessioned2022-02-25T13:34:53Z-
dc.date.available2022-02-25T13:34:53Z-
dc.date.issued2021-07-26-
dc.identifier.citationVives, X. (Xavier). "Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions". Theoretical Economics. 16 (3), 2021-07-26, 1095 - 1137es_ES
dc.identifier.issn1555-7561-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10171/62961-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear-quadratic-normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists and derives novel comparative statics results that highlight the interaction between payoff and information parameters with asymmetric groups. We find that the strategic complementarity in the slopes of traders' demands is reinforced by inference effects from prices, and we display the role of payoff and information asymmetries in explaining deadweight losses. Furthermore, price impact and the deadweight loss need not move together, and market integration may reduce welfare. The results are consistent with the available empirical evidence.es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipManzano acknowledges financialsupport from the Research Centre on Economics and Sustainability (ECO-SOS), the Ministry of Economyand Competitiveness (ECO 2016-75410-P AEI/FEDER, UE), the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation(PID2019-105982GB-I00 AEI/FEDER, UE), the Universitat Rovira i Virgili, and the Generalitat de Catalunya(2019PFR-URV-B2-53 and 2018PFR-URV-B2-53). Vives acknowledges financial support from the Ministry ofScience, Innovation and Universities PGC2018-096325-B-I00 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE) and the Generalitatde Catalunya, AGAUR Grants 2014SGR1496 and 2017SGR1244.es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherEconometric Societyes_ES
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES
dc.subjectDemand/supply schedule competitiones_ES
dc.subjectPrivate informationes_ES
dc.subjectLiquidity auctionses_ES
dc.subjectTreasury auctionses_ES
dc.subjectElectricity auctionses_ES
dc.subjectMarket integrationes_ES
dc.titleMarket power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctionses_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://doi.org/10.3982/TE3675es_ES
dc.publisher.placeUnited States of Americaes_ES
dc.description.noteLicensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License 4.0.es_ES
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/TE3675-
dadun.citation.endingPage1137es_ES
dadun.citation.number3es_ES
dadun.citation.publicationNameTheoretical Economicses_ES
dadun.citation.startingPage1095es_ES
dadun.citation.volume16es_ES

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