Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.creator | Manzano, C. (Carolina) | - |
dc.creator | Vives, X. (Xavier) | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-02-25T13:34:53Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-02-25T13:34:53Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021-07-26 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Vives, X. (Xavier). "Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions". Theoretical Economics. 16 (3), 2021-07-26, 1095 - 1137 | es_ES |
dc.identifier.issn | 1555-7561 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10171/62961 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear-quadratic-normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists and derives novel comparative statics results that highlight the interaction between payoff and information parameters with asymmetric groups. We find that the strategic complementarity in the slopes of traders' demands is reinforced by inference effects from prices, and we display the role of payoff and information asymmetries in explaining deadweight losses. Furthermore, price impact and the deadweight loss need not move together, and market integration may reduce welfare. The results are consistent with the available empirical evidence. | es_ES |
dc.description.sponsorship | Manzano acknowledges financialsupport from the Research Centre on Economics and Sustainability (ECO-SOS), the Ministry of Economyand Competitiveness (ECO 2016-75410-P AEI/FEDER, UE), the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation(PID2019-105982GB-I00 AEI/FEDER, UE), the Universitat Rovira i Virgili, and the Generalitat de Catalunya(2019PFR-URV-B2-53 and 2018PFR-URV-B2-53). Vives acknowledges financial support from the Ministry ofScience, Innovation and Universities PGC2018-096325-B-I00 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE) and the Generalitatde Catalunya, AGAUR Grants 2014SGR1496 and 2017SGR1244. | es_ES |
dc.language.iso | eng | es_ES |
dc.publisher | Econometric Society | es_ES |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es_ES |
dc.subject | Demand/supply schedule competition | es_ES |
dc.subject | Private information | es_ES |
dc.subject | Liquidity auctions | es_ES |
dc.subject | Treasury auctions | es_ES |
dc.subject | Electricity auctions | es_ES |
dc.subject | Market integration | es_ES |
dc.title | Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions | es_ES |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | es_ES |
dc.relation.publisherversion | https://doi.org/10.3982/TE3675 | es_ES |
dc.publisher.place | United States of America | es_ES |
dc.description.note | Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License 4.0. | es_ES |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.3982/TE3675 | - |
dadun.citation.endingPage | 1137 | es_ES |
dadun.citation.number | 3 | es_ES |
dadun.citation.publicationName | Theoretical Economics | es_ES |
dadun.citation.startingPage | 1095 | es_ES |
dadun.citation.volume | 16 | es_ES |
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