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dc.creatorGarcía-Valdecasas, M. (Miguel)-
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-16T13:47:17Z-
dc.date.available2024-01-16T13:47:17Z-
dc.date.issued2023-
dc.identifier.citationGarcía-Valdecasas, M. (Miguel). "Are Wittgenstein’s hinges rational world-pictures? The Groundlessness Theory reconsidered". Topoi. (42), 2022, 35 - 45es
dc.identifier.issn1572-8749-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10171/68386-
dc.description.abstractSome philosophers have argued that Wittgenstein’s hinges, the centrepiece of his book On Certainty, are the “ungrounded ground” on which knowledge rests. It is usually understood by this that hinges provide a foundation for knowledge without being themselves epistemically warranted. In fact, Wittgenstein articulates that hinges lack any truth-value and are neither justified nor unjustified. This inevitably places them wholly outside the categorial framework of JTB epistemology. What I call the “groundlessness interpretation”, inspired by OC 166, understands the fundamental pieces of our cognitive scaffolding this way. The view has been largely successful. I argue that this interpretation is incomplete for two basic reasons: first, it is not based on undisputed evidence; second, by assuming that hinges are committed to reality by epistemic fiat, it looks as if Wittgenstein is asking us to blindly trust them regardless of their actual content. Contrary to this, I argue that Wittgenstein describes hinges as illuminating world-pictures that reflect reality and are answerable to facts in a derivate way. As the book shows, hinges originate in our engagement with reality and, while considered unquestionable, could be challenged, reassessed, and replaced by new ones. This indicates that hinges are both the result of knowledge-acquisition and somewhat continuous with one’s set of beliefs. It follows that hinges are ultimately rational, and so, apt instruments to confront scepticism.es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipOpen Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature.es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherSpringeres_ES
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES
dc.subjectMaterias Investigacion::Arte y Humanidades::Filosofíaes_ES
dc.titleAre Wittgenstein’s hinges rational world-pictures? The Groundlessness Theory reconsideredes_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dc.description.noteThis article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Licensees_ES
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11245-022-09830-0-
dadun.citation.endingPage45es_ES
dadun.citation.number42es_ES
dadun.citation.publicationNameTopoies_ES
dadun.citation.startingPage35es_ES

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