Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.creatorKinateder, M. (Markus)-
dc.creatorMerlino, L. C. (Luca Paolo)-
dc.date.accessioned2024-02-02T07:57:01Z-
dc.date.available2024-02-02T07:57:01Z-
dc.date.issued2022-12-20-
dc.identifier.citationKinateder, M. (Markus); Merlino, L. C. (Luca Paolo). "Free riding in networks". European Economic Review. 152 (104378), 2022-12-20,es
dc.identifier.issn1873-572X-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10171/68713-
dc.description.abstractPlayers allocate their budgets to links, a local public good, and a private good. A player links in order to free ride on public good provided by others. We derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium, in which large contributors link to each other, while others link to them. If linking costs are sufficiently high, poorer players may contribute more and have more central positions in the network than richer ones do. In large societies, free riding reduces inequality only in networks in which it is initially low. Otherwise, richer players free ride more, as they can afford more links. Finally, we derive the policy implications for income redistribution.es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherElsevieres_ES
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccesses_ES
dc.subjectNetworkses_ES
dc.subjectPublic goodses_ES
dc.subjectFree ridinges_ES
dc.subjectInequalityes_ES
dc.titleFree riding in networkses_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dc.description.noteCC BY-NC-NDes_ES
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104378-
dadun.citation.number104378es_ES
dadun.citation.publicationNameEuropean Economic Reviewes_ES
dadun.citation.volume152es_ES

Files in This Item:
File
Free Riding in Networks.pdf.pdf
Description
Size
430.32 kB
Format
Adobe PDF
The file will be visible since 20-Dec-2024


Statistics and impact
0 citas en
0 citas en

Items in Dadun are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.