Anuario Filosófico

Permanent URI for this communityhttps://hdl.handle.net/10171/1453

Anuario Filosófico es la revista del Departamento de Filosofía de la Universidad de Navarra. Desde 1968, Anuario Filosófico ha recogido en sus páginas el resultado de la investigación de numerosos autores españoles y de muchos otros países. Cada volumen anual comprende dos números con un total de 700-800 páginas por año. Incluye Estudios y Notas sobre las diversas disciplinas que configuran la filosofía, así como reseñas de libros de actualidad. Cada número comprende también una amplia información acerca de Novedades Bibliográficas -unos 800 libros anuales- ordenada por áreas temáticas.
Anuario Filosófico mantiene un embargo de dos años respecto a la edición en papel. Si es suscriptor y desea solicitar un artículo de estos años, escriba por favor a: spublicaciones@unav.es

News

Título: Anuario Filosófico
ISSN: 0066-5215
Entidad responsable: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra
Materia: Filosofía
Fecha de inicio: 1968

See

Results

Now showing 1 - 7 of 7
  • Thumbnail Image
    La subjetividad como manifestación de lo absoluto
    (2005) Ortiz-de-Landázuri, C. (Carlos)
    In this article, the author presents the interpretation of Juan Cruz Cruz, according to whom the philosophy of subjectivity of the later Fichte succeeded in overcoming the errors of the subjective idealism of his youthful period, and which was the only part of Fichte’s philosophy that Hegel knew. For this reason, following Pareyson, Dr. Cruz claims that today we are better prepared to understand the strictly logological character of Fichte’s doctrine of science, understood as a science of science, which at the same time reflects on the ultimate indemonstrable principles of any reflective process of rational self-justification.
  • Thumbnail Image
    El sujeto ante el espejo. La valencia ontológica de la subjetividad en el criticismo kantiano y su interpretación contemporánea
    (2004) Teruel, P.J. (Pedro J.)
    The idea of Immortality plays a very important (and often unknown) part in Kantian Criticism. This paper analyses the epistemological value of the second postulate of practical reason and the ontological dimension of this one. The results of this research will allow to value the reception of Kant’s Criticism in the contemporary Philosophy of Mind.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Wilhelm Dilthey y las categorías de la vida: la metamorfosis historicista del apriorismo kantiano
    (2004) Fernández-Labastida, F. (Francisco)
    After the collapse of the Hegelian philosophy, many thinkers returned to the main principles of Kantian transcendentalism. In this way, they initiated the neo-Kantian movement. Wilhelm Dilthey was among them. Nevertheless, only in spirit his “Critique of the Historical Reason” can be called neo-Kantian. In fact, the core of Dilthey’s project, the “Categories of Life”, is a completely new gnoseological proposal that mediates between transcendental philosophy and empiricism.
  • Thumbnail Image
    La vía segura de la filosofía
    (2004) Pérez-de-Laborda, M. (Miguel)
    The secure way of Philosophy. In the Prologue to the first Critique Kant gives some notes to recognize if a science goes his own secure way. The author discusses if Philosophy is able to follow the science’s way, or if —in doing so— goes against its own nature.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Sobre el sentido interno. La reflexión de Leningrado
    (2004) Couto-Soares, M.L. (Maria Luísa)
    In 1986 the Russian Woprossy Filosofii published three Kant’s Autographs. This paper analyses one of them: the Leningrad Reflection “On the internal sense”. This Reflection adds knew arguments to these central topics of the Critique of Pure Reason: space and time and their relation to the constitution of subjectivity.
  • Thumbnail Image
    ¿Son válidas las razones por las que Kant afirma que 7 + 5 = 12 es un juicio sintético?
    (2004) Rovira, R. (Rogelio)
    In his Critique of Pure Reason and in his letter to Johann Schultz, November 25, 1788, Kant proposes at least six arguments in order to prove that arithmetical judgements are synthetic. In this paper these arguments are systematically expounded and critically discussed.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Tener y existir, reflexión y donación
    (2003) Alvira, R. (Rafael)
    Pure being, without reference to negativity and otherness, is unthinkable and unreal. Being with regard to negativity is giving: being gives what it is not. The radical act of giving is to produce the other in itself; the derived act is to create. Being in relation to non-being is having. There is no existence (being before another) other than in having. Giving, donation, implies a having which is had, consciousness, freedom, reflection. Without reflection, there is no giving. Being is knowing; having, loving. There is no donation without love. The notion of “pure exchange” is infrahuman.