Common ownership, market power, and innovation

Vives, X. (Xavier)

Autor(es):

Vives, X. (Xavier)

Palabras clave :

Competition policy
Partial merger
Minority shareholdings
Cross-ownership
SCP paradigm

Fecha de publicación :

2020

Proyecto:

789013 - OCIAN - Ownership, competition, innovation, and antitrust

ISSN :

0167-7187

Nota:

This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Cita:

Vives, X. (Xavier). "Common ownership, market power, and innovation". International Journal of Industrial Organization. 70, 2020,

Resumen

examine the effects of overlapping ownership on market power when there are external effects across firms. This is done in an oligopoly model with cost-reducing innovation with technological spillovers where firms have an overlapping ownership structure based largely on López and Vives (2019). The model allows for Cournot competition with homogeneous product and for Bertrand with differentiated products as well as for strategic effects of R&D investment. It derives positive testable implications and normative results to inform policy

URI :

https://hdl.handle.net/10171/66346

DOI:

10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.102528

Aparece en las colecciones:

DA - IESE - Artículos de revista

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