González, A.M. (Ana Marta)
- Publications
- item.page.relationships.isContributorAdvisorOfPublication
- item.page.relationships.isContributorOfPublication
77 results
Search Results
Now showing 1 - 10 of 77
- Naturaleza y dignidad personal desde el pensamiento de Robert Spaemann(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1997) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)
- Bioethics Between Nature and Culture(Springer, 2008) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)A primary concern of practical contemporary philosophy is to discover an ethical rationality, which makes possible the justification of determined decisions in the context of a multicultural society. Bioethics is a field in which this necessity is perhaps especially pressing. However, the proposals that have come forth in this sense, along the lines of promoting a “minimalist ethics”– be it in principle (Beauchamp and Childress 1994) or in practice (Engelhard 1986), are open to criticism, and do not appear to be sufficient. In this article, I explore another path, more in tune with the ethics of virtue and the classical doctrine of Natural Law. Yet, before that, I expound the reasons that advise against tackling the question of multiculturalism merely from the perspective of minimalist ethics. The main reason against taking minimalist ethics as the way to deal with cultural differences is that minimalist ethics involve a liberal understanding of the private and the public sphere, according to which cultural differences would be accepted as long as they do not conflict with a supposedly neutral rationality which reigns in the public sphere. Implicit therein is the idea that culture can be confined to the realm of the private. Yet, all culture, to the extent it is alive, fights to become present in public life. From this perspective, the insistence in a minimalist ethics is hardly compatible with respect to true cultural diversity. Indeed, the proposal, apparently impartial, of a formal morality for a multicultural society, i.e. a morality which should be superimposed upon the ethics of a particular community, is the proposal of a double morality, which contradicts the unity of practical reason, and eventually leads to cultural uniformity. Accordingly, if we consider cultural diversity in the context of a single society with values worthy of being preserved, the path is not the imposition of a minimum ethics: the path to defend diversity follows, rather, by strengthening cultures from the inside. Now, the first step in this direction leads to respect the natural basis of each culture, because, just as Robert Spaemann observes, “culture is humanized nature, not abolished nature”. Now, if one can define culture as “humanized nature,” it is important to point out that the humanization of nature depends essentially on the development of habits. These, as Aristotle indicates, can be of three types: intellectual, ethical, and technical. Indeed, the consistency and perdurability of a culture depends, in a great measure, upon the solidity, not only of its institutions but also of the intellectual and moral habits developed by its people. Thus, the intellectual habits make possible the achievement of a vital synthesis between the new and the old, fostering the continuity between progress and tradition. The moral habits, in turn, make possible the integration of scientific and technical knowledge into the practical context of human life. From this perspective, protecting a culture cannot mean anything other than enabling or favoring the growth of the habits of its people. Now, while the development of habits is, for its most part, the work of the individual members of the community, politics can also help to this end by protecting the natural floor, upon which moral habits develop. At this point, the appeal to Natural Law becomes opportune. In this context, however, I depart from the usual –foundationalist- understanding of Natural Law, to regard it merely as the natural way of reasoning on practical matters, i.e., a way of reasoning based upon the very structure of our practical reason.
- Republicanismo. Orígenes historiográficos y relevancia de un debate(2001) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)El término “republicanismo” tiene en Europa connotaciones históricas diversas que en América. Durante siglos, el republicanismo se ha reconocido por su oposición al Imperio y a la monarquía como forma de gobierno. En el actual debate sobre el republicanismo, sin embargo, son otros los temas que se hallan sobre la mesa, y el interlocutor explícito o implícito del republicanismo no es el imperio o la monarquía, sino el liberalismo. Desde su aparición, el liberalismo tiene la virtualidad de definir posiciones políticas, y de hacerlo en unos términos que afectan radicalmente a la concepción que el pensamiento republicano tiene de sí mismo. Se habla, en efecto, de un republicanismo antiguo y de un republicanismo moderno, donde lo moderno de este último republicanismo, es básicamente una aportación liberal. Elementos clave en este debate son las concepciones de la libertad y la ciudadanía. Pero, en lo que sigue, me ha interesado sobre todo explorar los orígenes y las filiaciones filosóficas de un debate que es, sin duda alguna, uno de los más vivos del pensamiento político del momento.
- El panteísmo de Jenófanes(1997) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)En este artículo tomo posición en una polémica de escuela en torno a si Jenófanes es o no un panteísta, y saco consecuencias en orden a rectificar su lugar en la historia del concepto presocrático de naturaleza. Abstract : In this paper I argue that Xenophanes is a pantheist, so that he deserves a place in the history of the presocratic concept of nature.
- El fundamento de la ley natural(Eunsa, 2010) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)El documento de la Comisión Teológica Internacional "A la búsqueda de una ética universal" abre su capítulo tercero insistiendo en la diferencia entre la ley natural –cuya vigencia práctica cabe reconocer en la adhesión espontánea a los valores morales- y la cuestión de su fundamento: “El sujeto moral puede llevar a cabo en la práctica las orientaciones de la ley natural, sin ser capaz, por motivos de particulares condicionamientos intelectuales, de comprender explícitamente sus fundamentos teóricos últimos” (60). A la vista de esas palabras, y, sobre todo, a la vista de las dificultades que puede plantear el acceso intelectual al fundamento teórico de la ley natural parecería razonable preguntar ¿por qué no conformarse con la vigencia práctica de la ley natural?
- Dos visiones del derecho. La epiqueya en Aristóteles y Kant.(Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2002) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)
- Verdad, tolerancia, diálogo(CEU Ediciones, 2008) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)“Tolerancia” y “diálogo” son palabras de moda. En cambio, la palabra “verdad” despierta suspicacias. Esto se debe a que tolerancia y diálogo se presentan como cauces para la paz; por el contrario, la pretensión de verdad sugiere un potencial conflicto. En efecto: cuando, a propósito de un asunto cualquiera, los implicados defienden su postura convencidos de estar en la verdad, parece que será imposible lograr un acuerdo –lo cual constituye para muchos el único objeto del diálogo-, y que, por tanto, el conflicto será inevitable. Ahora bien: esto parece contradecir el imperativo silencioso que recorre nuestra vida social: todo menos el conflicto –al menos el conflicto explícito. Sin embargo, si comprendemos la naturaleza de la verdad práctica, comprenderemos que la pretensión de estar en la verdad no conduce necesariamente al conflicto. Por lo demás, evitar el conflicto no puede constituir el único objeto de la convivencia, si es que ésta quiere hacer justicia a la totalidad de las exigencias éticas.
- John Rawls and the New Kantian Moral Theory(Continuum, 2005) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)I argue that Rawls’ reading of Kant has been a major influence on the work of some contemporary Kantian scholars. Rawls’ influence on the new Kantian moral theory can be recognized in several points: a) the conception of philosophy as a “deeply practical project”, which leads to the adoption of a first-person approach to ethics; b) the reception of Kant’s philosophy within a pragmatic context, which leads to play down the metaphysical implications of Kant’s dualisms, in favor of an interpretation which seems plausible within a political culture given in advance c) a characteristic interpretation of Kant’s moral constructivism, which while stressing the primacy of the right over the good, tries to specify the ways in which the good plays a role in morals, thereby opening a way to show the relevance of the empirical in Kant’s ethics d) an approach to Kant’s practical reason which stresses the complementarities between the Hypothetical and the Categorical Imperative, interpreted in the light of Rawls’ distinction between the Rational and the Reasonable; e) the central role played by the concept of “rational nature” in the new Kantian moral theory, which may likewise be related to Rawls’ concern for clarifying the conception of the person behind his approach to practical reason.
- Multiculturalismo y ley natural(2008) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)En este trabajo me propongo un acercamiento a la ley natural en parte sistemático y en parte histórico. Con lo primero procuro responder a las objeciones habituales con las que se enfrenta la apelación a la ley natural, reconsiderando algunos de sus aspectos básicos, para lo cual tomaré como punto de referencia la visión tomista de la ley natural, a la que de un modo u otro remiten las elaboraciones posteriores; a estas elaboraciones y su impacto en la ética contemporánea me refiero en la segunda parte de mi exposición.
- El hombre como buscador: una lectura práctico-existencial de la "Fides et ratio"(1999) González, A.M. (Ana Marta)This paper focuses on the third chapter of Fides et ratio, entitled Intellego ut credam This sentence is usually connected with the preambula fidei, truths which are supposed to prepare human mind to receive the gift of faith. But in this case, Pope John Paul II develops this sentence in a different, more existential way according to which the real preambula fidei are not so much a set of truths as the real man who seeks the truth with his entire life. This interpretation remarks the practical dimmension of the relationship between man and truth.